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When anthrax attacks recently led to a run on the patented
antibiotic drug Cipro,1 politicians and commentators suggested that
the government consider purchasing generic alternatives. 2 Some used
the occasion to illustrate what they perceived as a broader problem
with patent protection: that pharmaceutical companies seeking profits
would not allow the sick to obtain access to needed medications. 3 The
argument repeated a familiar refrain in the intellectual property
debate, as a long history of articles has inquired whether society
would be better off with no patent 4 or copyright law5 at all. Even
1. See Tamar Lewin, Anthrax Scare Prompts Run on an Antibiotic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2001, at B8.
2. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Cipro Is Not the Only Pill That Fights Anthrax, WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2001, at A20 (reporting that Senator Charles E. Schumer "issued a public appeal
that the government suspend Bayer's patents and allow generic companies to add to the
supply"); see also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., A Rush for Cipro, and the Global Ripples, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2001, at Al (discussing such proposals); Jesse Pesta & Daniel Pearl, Indian Drug
Makers May Now Imitate Cipro: Controversial for Knockoffs of AIDS Pills, the Firms May Do
Same for Anthrax, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at A13 (same). President Bush rejected these
proposals on the ground that patent law made them illegal. See Elisabeth Bumiller,
Administration Won't Allow Generic Versions of Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at B8. The
Canadian government initially embraced similar proposals. See Amy Harmon & Robert Pear,
Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al.
Subsequently, however, the Canadian government backed down, agreeing to rely on Bayer
unless the company was unable to accommodate requests for the drug. See Tom Cohen, Canada
Allows Bayer to Supply Anthrax, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 23, 2001, available at 2001 WL
29336130.
3. See, e.g., Ronald Johnson, In the War of Nerves, the Capitol Is a Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2001, at A18 (arguing in a letter to the editor that developing countries should be allowed to
import generic versions of AIDS drugs); Anthony York, Is It Time to Bust the Cipro Patent?, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/10/18/cipro-patent/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002)
(reporting Senator Charles Schumer's call for governmental purchase of generic Cipro, as part of
a broader website critiquing expansive patent protection). The accusation arguably is misplaced
in the case of Cipro, because the drug was not priced so high that any American whose life was in
danger would not be able to obtain it.
4. See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 44-45 (Comm. Print 1958) (summarizing arguments both for and
against the patent system); EDITH PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT
116
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recently, commentators have questioned the broad scope of
intellectual property protection, arguing that business methods should
not be patentable6 or that copyright terms should be shorter than
Congress has dictated. 7 The antiprotection advocates have won some
SYSTEM (1951) (arguing that the patent system harms developing countries); C. TAYLOR & Z.
SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 194-208 (1973) (reporting results of
a survey suggesting that abolition of the patent system would affect innovation in some
industries more than in others); Brian Peckham, Should the U.S. Patent Laws Be Abolished?, 11
J. CONTEMP. L. 389, 421 (1985) (concluding that present knowledge does not strongly justify
immediate abolishment of the patent system); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and
Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 454-55 (1969) (identifying various costs of the patent
system); The Debate on the Patent Laws, 27 ECONOMIST 656, 656 (1869) (predicting that it was
"probable enough that the Patent Laws will be abolished ere long," as the laws "either are, or are
becoming, out of date"). Some recent researchers have argued that patent protection may not be
necessary in some industries even if it is necessary in others. See JAMES BESSEN & ERIC MASKIN,
SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, AND IMITATION (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Working Paper No.
11/99, 1999). For discussions of nineteenth-century debates on patent law, see H.I. DUTTON, THE
PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1852 at
17-29 (1984); and Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950). For an interesting compendium of quotations denouncing
the patent system, see Gordon Irlam, Re: Articles, Books Against Copyright, Trademark, Patent,
COALITION FOR NETWORKED INFORMATION, at http://www.cni.org/Hforums/cni-copyright/1994-
04/0648.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
5. See, e.g., FRANCIS HARGRAVE, AN ARGUMENT IN DEFENSE OF LITERARY PROPERTY 30-33
(Garland Publishing, Inc. 1974) (1774); T. MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT 21-24 (C. Gaston
ed., 1914); ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 83 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 1978) (1896); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of
Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 328-29 (1989); Arnold Plant, The Economic
Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167 (1934). Perhaps the most famous exchange on
the utility of copyright law is between then-Professor Stephen Breyer and Professor Barry
Tyerman, with Tyerman more enthusiastic about copyright than Breyer. See Stephen Breyer,
Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 281 (1970); Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971).
6. The Federal Circuit found business methods to constitute patentable subject matter in
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Critics
include Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 277-80 (2000); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank
Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61 (1999); Brian P. Biddinger, Note, Limiting the
Business Method Patent: A Comparison and Proposed Alignment of European, Japanese and
United States Patent Law, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2523 (2001); James Gleick, Patently Absurd,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, March 12, 2000, § 6, at 44; see also Nicholas Groombridge & Christopher
Loh, Congress Takes Aim at Business Method Patents, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6, 2001, at 1. Defenders of
business method patents include Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated
with Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657 (2001);
and Sari Gabay, Note, The Patentability of Electronic Commerce Business Systems in the
Aftermath of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 8 J.L. & POLY
179 (1999).
7. In 1998, Congress extended the copyright term of many works to seventy years beyond
the author's death, twenty years beyond the previous length. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term
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victories, 8 but the Patent and Trademark Office does business largely
as before, or even as never before. 9
At least some of the Cipro-related proposals, however, offered a
new twist. The government, it was argued, should allow generic drug
manufacturers to produce the drug ciprofloxacin and charge a low
price for it,10 but Bayer, Cipro's manufacturer and patent owner,
should be compensated.1 Such a proposal may seem particularly
appropriate given concerns that Bayer would not by itself be able to
produce enough of the drug to meet demand,1 2 but the proposal has
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b)(1)-(2), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)). Critics have argued that this period is too long. See Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Remarkable-and Irrational-Disparity Between the Patent Term and the
Copyright Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 233 (2001); see also William Patry, The
Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907,
923-30 (1997) (critiquing the proposed extension); Jenny L. Dixon, Note, The Copyright Term
Extension Act: Is Life Plus Seventy Too Much?, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 945 (1996)
(same); Joseph A. Lavigne, Comment, For Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer via the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 311 (1996) (same). At one time,
the copyright and patent terms were the same. See Walterscheid, supra, at 234.
Lloyd Weinreb has argued that proposals for increasing the scope of copyright protection
generally have not considered the costs and benefits of such expansion:
The inclusion of new subject matter has generally been responsive not to a
demonstrated need but to the bare assertion of need, indicated only by the
proliferation of copies and occasional anecdotal evidence, and an analogy to books, for
which copyright was taken for granted. The expansion of copyright in ways that the
argument cannot plausibly justify suggests its substantial irrelevance to the outcome,
except as a talking point.
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1243 (1998).
8. The most prominent victories of antiprotection forces, however, have been technological
rather than legal. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Napster, Gnutella, Hybrids, and the
(Re)emergence of Anti-Property 6-16 (Aug. 29, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (exploring the continuing success of copyright infringement through peer-to-peer file
sharing despite the Ninth Circuit's injunction preventing such infringement on Napster).
9. The number of patent applications rose from 164,558 in 1990 to 270,187 in 1999, with
grants rising from 90,365 to 153,485. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICES, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/-us-stat.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
10. Senator Schumer emphasized that the concern was not just adequate production, but
also that the drug be sold at "reasonable prices." Robert Pear, Government Talks with Drug
Companies About Buying Antibiotics That Treat Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at B8.
11. See, e.g., McNeil, supra note 2 (discussing the possibility of a taking of the patent under
the eminent domain power); US Government Could Override Bayer's Cipro Patent (Minn. Pub.
Radio radio broadcast, Oct. 17, 2001), available at 2001 WL 24074267 (same). Advocates of the
government's overriding the patent cited 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000), which provides that when the
United States infringes a patent, "the owner's remedy shall be by action against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture."
12. Bayer has insisted that it would be able to meet demand. See Keith Bradsher, Bayer
Insists Cipro Supply Is Sufficient; Fights Generic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 1B (A Nation
Challenged), at 7. If Bayer were not able to meet demand with its own manufacturing facilities,
it could seek to contract with generic drug manufacturers to produce the drug for Bayer. See
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broader resonance. In theory, the government could pay patent owners
to place their discoveries in the public domain. Doing so would
encourage research and development to produce inventions, while
ensuring that the rich and poor alike could benefit from them. Indeed,
the newest generation of scholars to challenge the foundations of
intellectual property law has not called for simple abolition of
intellectual property rights, recognizing the importance of the
innovation incentives that these rights provide. Instead, they have
considered the alternatives of prize or reward systems, in which the
government would provide some form of monetary compensation
instead of patent or copyright protection.
The basic idea of a prize system is not new. Michael Polanvyi
trumpeted the idea as a means of patent reform back in 1944,13 and
participants in a nineteenth-century debate about the appropriateness
of patent protection recognized the possibility that the government
might buy out some patents. 14 There are historical precedents for
Vanessa Fuhrmans, Questions of Security: Bayer May Ask Rivals to Help Make Cipro, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A10.
13. See Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61 (1944). Polanvyi
summarizes his primary proposal as follows: "In order that inventions may be used freely by all,
we must relieve inventors of the necessity of earning their rewards commercially and must grant
them instead the right to be rewarded from the public purse." Id. at 65 (emphasis omitted).
Later, he elaborates that the proposal "is to supplement licences of right by government rewards
to patentees on a level ample enough to give general satisfaction to inventors and their financial
promoters." Id. at 67 (emphasis omitted). While Polanvyi suggests that rewards would be based
on information from patent holders and licensees, he does not offer a detailed justification of his
assumption that the government would be able to use such information to calculate rewards with
sufficient accuracy. Polanvyi, without elaboration, explains simply that prizes should depend
"only [on] data endorsable by accountants' certificate." Id. at 68. Perhaps recognizing the
potential for inaccurate decisionmaking, Polanvyi adds that the system need only be "not
markedly less fair than the rewards which are earned by patentees to-day." Id.
14. R.A. Macfie summed up such a proposal as follows:
In every patent there should be a condition that the State, from public moneys, or
moneys supplied by individuals, shall be entitled to demand that the value of the
invention be estimated, and, on this value being paid (with a liberal percentage added
in consideration of "compulsory sale"), the use of the invention should become free to
all the Queen's subjects (even in the Colonies, so far as privileges granted there do not
clash).
2 R.A. MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, at vi (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1883).
Macfie also reports comments by various supporters of reward schemes. In 1795, for example, Sir
John Sinclair proposed "a general agreement among the powers of Europe, and of the United
States of America, for the purpose of rewarding those who make any useful discovery, interesting
to the species at large." Id. at 33. Others provided more detail on the mechanism for valuing
patents, with Sir David Brewster arguing that a "Board at once scientific and practical,
containing men of practical sagacity, and scientific men at the same time ... might in my
opinion come to a very sound decision on the value of a patent-right." Id. at 33-34 (alteration in
original).
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awarding prizes for the development of useful information, 15 and even
today prizes are used by at least one firm as a way to encourage
solutions to scientific problems. 16  Moreover, government-funded
research dollars rival those from private research supported by the
patent system. 17 The new generation of scholars, however, has offered
twists and credibility to the debate.18 Steven Shavell and Tanguy van
Ypersele have described a prize system that inventors could opt into
Commentators also offered concerns about the proposal-concerns that reflect some of the
issues that the more modern literature addresses. R.W. Thomson, the President of the Royal
Scottish Society of Arts, recognized the benefits and costs of delaying payment of a reward:
It would be very easy for a scientific tribunal sitting now to determine the value of
inventions which have been in use for a number of years, but the task the commission
would have to fulfill would be to judge of the value of an invention before it is
developed.... If the inventor is simply to register his invention and send it out into
the world, letting all who wish bring it into use and work what improvements they
please upon it, postponing the reward to the inventor until time has been given to
ascertain the value of his invention, then the difficulty arises which, to all practical
men acquainted with the growth and change which all inventions undergo, is at once
evidence, how would it be possible to ascertain how much is due to the original
inventor, and how much to those who have added successive improvements, and, in
fact, turned what is very often a crude idea into a successful invention?
Id. at 36.
15. A famous example is the offer of a £20,000 prize for a chronometer, a device to
determine the location of a ship. Amateur clockmaker John Harrison invented the device but was
initially denied the prize. See generally DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE (1995) (providing a detailed
history); Frederick C. Leiner, Book Review, 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 671 (1996) (reviewing SOBEL,
supra) (offering a brief summary). The Society of Arts and the British Parliament tried to
replicate the success of such approaches by offering prizes, but the experiments were
unsuccessful, in part because prizes were too small. See DUTTON, supra note 4, at 25-26. In the
United States, the American Philosophical Society sometimes offered modest prizes, such as a
seventy-dollar prize "[flor the best construction of improvement of ship-pumps." Notification, PA.
GAZETTE, June 22, 1796, at n.p., available on Accessible Archives, Penn. Gazette Database, Item
No. 81211, http://srch.accessible.com/accessible/text/gaz4/00000812/-OOO812 11.htm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2002). Prizes were of greater though still modest impact in France. See generally
ELISABETH CRAWFORD, THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NOBEL INSTITUTION: THE SCIENCE PRIZES, 1901-
1915, at 16-22 (1984) (describing scientific prizes in Europe in the years preceding the
establishment of the Nobel Prizes).
16. See http://www.innocentive.com; see also Online Bounties and Scientific Hired Guns:
Problem-Solvers Rewarded in Novel Search for Researchers, CNN, Aug. 25, 2002, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/science/08/25/scientific.bounties.ap/index.html (discussing the
website) (last visited Nov. 23, 2002).
17. About sixty percent of all U.S. research-and-development expenditures are privately
funded, with the public sector providing disproportionate resources for basic research. See Linda
R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Privatizing Public Research, SCI. AM., Sept. 1994, at 72, 75; John M.
Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in
the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 136 (2001). For an economic analysis of why the
government might offer grants in addition to intellectual property protection, see Brett
Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and
Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 386-90 (2000).
18. Other scholars have advocated radical reform of the intellectual property system
without endorsing rewards. See, e.g., Lester C. Thurow, Needed: A New System of Intellectual
Property Rights, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 95.
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instead of the patent system. 19 Steve Calandrillo has argued for a
prize system for copyright as well as for patent.20 Meanwhile, Michael
Kremer has described a system in which patent recipients would agree
to give up their patents in exchange for compensation that would be
determined through a unique auction process.21 Finally, Douglas
Lichtman has suggested that the government could achieve the
benefits of a prize system with much lower costs by keeping the patent
system and subsidizing consumers who would value patented products
above marginal cost but cannot afford them at the monopoly price.22
As the diversity of reward proposals indicates, there is no
academic consensus on how a prize system should work, let alone on
whether any particular prize system is advisable. Prize system
advocates recognize that the devil is in the details and that the devil
for a prize system is the government's ability to dispense rewards
accurately. Although prize system proponents have given more or less
developed indications of what the government should look to in
determining awards, none has given an assessment from the
perspective of public administration of how such an agency should
function. That is the project of this Article, but the Article's aim is not
to fill in obvious implementation details for such a regulatory scheme.
Outlining a design for a regulatory agency charged with disbursing
funds is a familiar, if not easy, task. Give rulemaking authority,
authorize the appointment of commissioners, create hearing
procedures, and appropriate funds, and the agency will work well
enough. Or perhaps it will not work so well, which is the point of those
who laud the copyright 23 and patent 24 system's ability to induce
innovation with a relatively small amount of governmental
involvement and expense.
19. Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44
J.L. & ECON. 525, 537-39 (2001).
20. Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information:
Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the
Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
301, 331-36 (1998).
21. Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 1137, 1147-48 (1998).
22. Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the
Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124-25 (1997).
23. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 868 (1992) (concluding that markets are likely
to be superior to courts and administrative agencies in setting appropriate prices for use of
copyrighted material).
24. As Dutton notes in explaining the reasoning of those who rejected prize systems in the
nineteenth century, "Patents at least let the market decide." DUTTON, supra note 4, at 26.
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This Article seeks to undermine a premise common to all of the
recent proposals. The quest underlying the renaissance of scholarship
on prize systems seems to be for a specification of just how such an
agency should act in granting awards. If only the task of giving
awards can be reduced to a formula or algorithm, it must seem, then
the objection that government will- not do the job right will go away.
Specify the formula or algorithm in the statute governing the reward-
granting agency, leaving as little bureaucratic discretion as possible,
and the system will work just fine. I will argue, however, that there
are so many considerations relevant to dispensing prizes, many of
which cannot be measured in an objective way, that no proposal is
likely to be successful in specifying adequately in advance just what
result an agency should reach in each case. Even if academics could
settle on a solution, and even if there were sufficient political will to
effect a radical change in the patent system, Congress might not adopt
the proper formula. Political considerations might interfere, and the
ideal formula or procedure might be altered to benefit a key
legislator's constituency or district. In addition, legislators might
distrust formulas and procedures that would be difficult for even an
economist to understand quickly. Congress could charge an
administrative agency with the task of creating regulations for
optimal disbursement of funds, but this solution just moves the
problem to a new venue, with concerns about agency capture replacing
concerns about special interest influence in Congress. 25
Nonetheless, I do not argue that the administration of a prize
system would be so fraught with difficulties as to make it infeasible.
Because of the deadweight loss that exists when some consumers
value a good at more than its marginal cost but less than its price
under patent protection, even an imperfect prize system might
improve social welfare relative to the patent system. If there are
enough consumers who would not purchase a product in the patent
system but would be able to afford it if the product were released in
the public domain, the resulting increase in social welfare may well
offset any decrease attributable to inadequate or excessive prizes.
There is, however, a much more important reason that I do not
conclude that a prize system is infeasible: The quest for the perfect
formula or algorithm may be not only futile, but also unnecessary. An
administrative agency given a degree of flexibility in awarding prizes
might perform better than one hamstrung to a poorly designed
formula or algorithm. There are two explanations for why previous
25. On capture theory and its successors, see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997).
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commentators have assumed that flexibility is an evil to be avoided by
an appropriate constraint. The first is that an agency might do a
haphazard job in awarding prizes, arbitrarily giving some patent
holders too much and others too little. The second is that an agency
might be systematically inaccurate, either giving all patent holders too
much or all patent holders too little. There are, however, relatively
straightforward antidotes to both of these problems, neither of which
requires an elaborate formula.
The key to discovering the antidote to the first problem, that of
haphazard decisionmaking, is the recognition that if a patent holder
has no more reason to think that it is more likely to receive too much
for a patent than that it will receive too little, the uncertainty is of
relatively little consequence. A patent holder cares most about the
expected returns, whether from the commercialization of a product or
from an agency decisionmaker, and so the prospects of receiving too
much or too little may well cancel out. Uncertainty, of course, imposes
some cost on a patent holder. If a patent holder auctioned the right to
a prize, as it might do if faced with a liquidity constraint, bidders
presumably would offer somewhat less than the expected value of the
prize to compensate for its variance. 26 But this cost need not be large.
There are many other uncertainties associated with the development
of patented products, and this would merely be a new such
uncertainty. Moreover, uncertainty about prizes would replace
uncertainty about commercial success. Even if the former were larger
than the latter in most cases, only the marginal increase in
uncertainty is of any concern at all. The danger of haphazard
decisionmaking is therefore not large.
Haphazard decisionmaking, however, might still be a problem
if the patent holder has the right to decline a governmental offer of a
particular prize. This might seem to create an impossible choice for
the designer of a patent prize system: Either a prize system could be
mandatory, in which case it will be both politically impossible to
implement and quite risky given the unproven empirics of any prize
proposal, or it could be optional, in which case the only individuals to
accept prizes would be those who believe that the government is
willing to pay too much. 27 The flaw in this argument is the assumption
that an optional prize system must give a patent holder an
opportunity to decline participation after the government has
determined a value for the patent. A straightforward alternative
26. A separate point is that bids might be depressed because of the "lemons" problem. See
infra note 296 and accompanying text. This, however, does not reflect an increased cost of
uncertainty, but merely a difficulty of alienating rights to prizes.
27. See infra Part II.C.1.
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would be to make selection of a prize system an optional alternative to
the usual approach to pursuing a patent but to make decisions on
opting into a prize system irrevocable. That is, if a patent holder chose
to place a patent in the public domain and to receive a prize, then it
could not change its decision if the prize turned out to be smaller than
hoped. Just as a patent holder who pursues commercialization of a
patent does so for better or for worse, so too a patent holder who
chooses a prize would do so for richer or for poorer.
A prize system structured in this way can achieve the
particularism that is a virtue of the common law in a context that,
because of the subjectivity of government spending decisions, is not
easily amenable to the crafting of doctrine and precedent. The
government may be able to induce efficient private allocation of funds
toward achieving desired social goals even if the government itself
would never be able to make funding decisions in an optimal way. The
possibility of government failure is not an argument against a
retrospective prize system, but an argument for it. The decisions that
matter most in a prize system are not those of the government, but
rather those of private parties predicting what the government will do.
In this context, there are two such decisions: first, whether to invest in
research and development of a product; and second, whether to place
the product in the public domain or to take some other action to
reduce the deadweight costs associated with patent protection.
Creation of an optional prize system will generally increase incentives
for research and development, with greater increases for larger total
amounts of government funding, although the overall effect may be
small since patent holders will have to sacrifice monopoly profits if
they wish to receive a prize. Meanwhile, if the government gives a
reward for taking an action to reduce deadweight loss, even if we are
sure that the government's decisions will be haphazard, the prediction
of what an average governmental decisionmaker will do in a
particular case may be quite close to optimality. Thus, even if there is
no perfect formula or algorithm for determining the size of prizes, an
administrative agency given the flexibility to make a prize
determination, either from whole cloth or by starting with a formula
or algorithm and making appropriate adjustments, might be expected
to make the right decisions on average. Because that is all that
matters, the random errors associated with haphazard
decisionmaking are not a significant concern.
This conclusion leaves the second concern about flexibility, that
prizes might be systematically too low or too high. This concern,
however, is greatly reduced with an optional program. If the
government gives prizes that are too low, fewer patent holders will opt
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into a prize system by placing their patents into the public domain. An
agency that tries to shortchange patent holders will feel the costs of its
approach almost immediately, with fewer firms opting into the system
in response to the agency's decision. This is in contrast to a mandatory
system, where the costs of shortchanging applicants might be distant,
affecting only future decisions about whether to develop products,
thus giving agency administrators with short time horizons incentives
to pay too little.28 At the same time, an agency that pays too much will
face pressure from Congress and indirectly from taxpayers, with the
eventual result of excessive spending likely to be the termination or
reduction of the program. Of course, interest groups may advocate
continued funding of inefficient programs, but they may seek to obtain
government subsidies in any event, and at least even excessive
spending in this area would induce increased research and
development.
Most significantly, Congress can eliminate the problem of
systematic errors by capping the amount that the agency may spend.
If an agency, for example, can spend $1 billion, then industry will not
be able to capture the agency and receive undeserved funds simply by
inducing the agency to make favorable assessments, because the
agency would not be able to spend any more than the congressional
appropriation. A cap is particularly useful for an experimental
program, with larger appropriations possible should a modest program
initially turn out to be successful. At the same time, Congress can
prevent undercompensation by requiring that an agency spend
whatever it has been appropriated. A statute could simply require the
agency to determine the value of each project for which a prize is
sought and then distribute the available funds proportionately,
regardless of whether the assessed values aggregate to less than or
more than the total size of the fund. For example, if the combined total
of all prize submissions equaled $500 million for a $1 billion fund,
then each applicant would receive twice the assessed value; if the total
were $2 billion, each applicant would receive only fifty cents on the
dollar.
It might seem that giving an agency a certain amount of money
to spend, regardless of the number of projects it receives, entails a
substantial risk. After all, if projects providing only $500 million in
social value deplete a $1 billion fund, the government in effect has lost
$500 million. This risk is not a significant concern, however, and not
only because the loss would simply be a transfer rather than a real
economic loss. The provision of a $1 billion fund will lead to private
28. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 401 (1988).
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expenditures of close to that amount to obtain the money; this
response is the simple logic of market incentives. Because placing a
patent in the public domain reduces deadweight loss, there are likely
to be many applications for which the social value of placing a patent
in the public domain is greater than the corresponding private
sacrifice in terms of reduced revenues from a patent. Thus, especially
with an initial experimental program, while the risk and uncertainty
of the prize system may mean that the total sacrifice of monopoly
profits is slightly less than $1 billion, the aggregate social value of
projects is likely to be considerably greater than the total amount that
the government offers. Those who opt into the fund, moreover, will be
those for whom any increase in risk is worth it. That group will
include those who believe that their projects will rate as producing
high social value despite relatively little private sacrifice, precisely
those whom we would most like to induce to participate in a prize
system.
A prize system, of course, is not costless. Significant costs are
incurred for the prizes themselves and for the administrative
apparatus, and any distortionary effects of taxation needed to meet
such costs must be balanced against the benefits of a prize system.
There are several reasons that a retrospective prize system is
particularly appropriate as a supplement to the patent system,
whatever the virtues of using prizes in other administrative contexts
outside the patent area. First, the deadweight loss that a system of
patent prizes may help eliminate makes any costs associated with the
prize system worth bearing. Second, a patent prize system may help
reduce redundant research-for example by a firm seeking to invent
around a patent. Third, replacing markets with prize systems may
obscure the important role that prices serve in helping to coordinate
economic activity. This coordinating function is more important in
some contexts than in others. It is relatively unimportant in the
patent context, because research-and-development expenditures are
made far in advance of profits from a patent.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I critically reviews the
recent literature urging acceptance of reward mechanisms in the
patent context. It begins by identifying weaknesses in each of the
major proposals for a comprehensive system that either would replace
the patent system or would be available for inventors as an
alternative to it. While my purpose is partly to critique the mechanics
of the proposals, it is more broadly to emphasize that any approach is
likely to have advantages and disadvantages.
Part II then identifies potential obstacles for any such
comprehensive system. Problems include inadequate incentives for
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commercialization, deadweight loss attributable to the distortionary
effect of taxes, redundant research effort by competitors,
noncompetitive markets for production or distribution of goods, lack of
incentives for adequately screening reward applications, high
administrative costs, and rent-seeking.
Part III argues for a system that provides more flexibility to
agency decisionmakers. This argument provides support for an agency
that is simply given a sum of money to distribute to those who have
placed patents in the public domain or taken other actions, such as
lowering prices, that decrease the deadweight costs associated with
patent. Although it seems politically unlikely that such an agency
could replace the patent system, the simplicity of this approach may
make it attractive as a complement to the patent system. At the same
time, an agency might use a technique similar to one of those sketched
out in Part I, but with modifications that either allow one proposal to
take advantage of the insights of another or that provide greater
flexibility for the agency administering the proposal. Part III
concludes by suggesting how changes might be made to each of the
proposals sketched in Part I to make them more attractive.
I. THE LIMITS OF PATENT PRIZE PROPOSALS
This part considers four recent proposals to establish patent
prize systems. The proposals exhibit a remarkable diversity in
approach. All, however, share the goal of addressing how the
government might determine the size and form of prizes. The earliest
proposal, in Part I.A, imagines that the government would use its
eminent domain power to take certain patents, with a "market test"
available to patent holders to challenge the size of the prize given. The
proposal in Part I.B, by contrast, seeks to derive a formula that a
government agency could use in providing prizes, and the proposal in
Part I.C describes a market mechanism involving auctions and
randomization for determining how much should be paid in patent
buyouts. The most distinctive of the proposals is that in Part I.D,
which urges that the government give prizes in the form of coupons
instead of buying out patents. Besides describing the proposals, I aim
to show that each has significant flaws and that even if these flaws




A. Guell and Fischbaum's Market Test
Robert Guell and Marvin Fischbaum offered the first of the
recent proposals for prize systems, focusing specifically on the
prescription drug industry.2 9 Their proposal is useful initially for
describing the central problem that all proposals for patent prizes seek
to attack: the inefficiency associated with the grant of a limited
monopoly. 30 As Guell and Fischbaum explain, "[t]he problem is that, in
order to garner [monopoly] profits, monopolists set price above
marginal cost and produce less than the socially desirable output."31
By definition, a profit-maximizing firm will raise its prices on a
product until the decrease in the number of consumers purchasing the
product more than offsets the profit attributable to the higher price
paid by consumers who will still buy it. If the producer can prevent
other firms from selling the same product, as a patent entitles the
producer to do, 32 then the price the producer ordinarily charges will be
more than it costs to make an additional unit of the product. A pill
that costs just a few cents to manufacture might sell for tens or
hundreds of dollars.
This story is familiar, but two points are worth emphasizing.
First, as Guell and Fischbaum note, "monopoly profits per se are not a
cause for concern." 33 The economist's standard objection is not that the
drug producer will get rich at the expense of consumers-a
distributional issue. 34 The economist worries about the effect of an
increase in price on production.35 Some consumers who value the drug
at more than the price it costs to manufacture the drug will fail to
purchase the drug at the monopoly price, either because they decide
that their money is better spent elsewhere or because they do not have
29. Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription
Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q., June 1995, at 213.
30. See, e.g., ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, ECONOMICS 273-74 (3d ed.
1991) (describing the welfare losses associated with the exercise of monopoly power).
31. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 216-17.
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (prohibiting infringement of a patent). Excludability is, of
course, the essence of the patent right.
33. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 216.
34. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient
Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
35. This emphasis is apparent in George Stigler's Coasean observation that in a world of
zero transaction costs, consumers could pay a monopolist to increase output. See George J.
Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12
(1972). In effect, in a patent prize system, the government serves as the consumers'
representative in making just such a bargain with a patent holder.
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sufficient resources to make the purchase.36 When this outcome
occurs, "consumers lose more from higher prices than producers
gain,"37 and a deadweight loss results. Second, the economist's concern
may not be the same as the politician's concern. To be sure, politicians
sometimes worry publicly about individuals being denied health
care.38 It is at least as common, however, for politicians to complain
about the effect of the high cost of prescription drugs, sometimes on
specific groups like senior citizens.
3 9
Of course, the possibility of deadweight loss is not by itself
sufficient to justify eliminating the patent system. Guell and
Fischbaum recognize that the "static efficiency" from elimination of
the patent system might be outweighed by the system's "dynamic
efficiency." 40 Elimination of patent protection would produce a short-
term benefit, as the price of products currently inflated because of
patents falls.41  It would, however, discourage producers from
innovating in the future. The end of patents would not be the end of
invention altogether. Innovators might still be able to protect some
inventions by keeping them secret. 42 In addition, research and
development might be worthwhile because of first-mover
advantages. 43 In a survey, chief research-and-development executives
36. This phenomenon occurs because consumers' demand for the drug is not completely
inelastic. See EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 30, at 119-22 (explaining elasticity).
37. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 217.
38. See, e.g., Gore Vows Penalties If HMOs Cut Seniors, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 26, 2000,
at 8, available at 2000 WL 4975826 (describing Al Gore's criticism of drug companies for refusing
coverage and dropping patients).
39. See, e.g., GOP Rips Al's Far-Fetched Story on Pooch's Drug Prices, N.Y. POST, Sept. 19,
2000, at 4 (discussing a controversy involving Gore's allegation that his mother-in-law paid more
for arthritis medication than the price of the same drug for his dog).
40. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 221.
41. This assumes that the government could eliminate the patent system without providing
compensation, which is unlikely given the Takings Clause. See Mitchell N. Berman et al., State
Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida Prepaid (And
How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1072 (2001) ("[Sltate infringements of patents, copyrights,
and trademarks are likely in some cases to constitute takings of intellectual property that will
require the state to pay just compensation to the rightsholders."); see also Shubha Ghosh,
Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open After
College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000) (arguing that state
infringement of intellectual property might be remedied by takings suits, despite state sovereign
immunity).
42. See Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law?, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 136-45 (1999)
(analyzing the relationship between trade secret law and patent law).
43. For a classic study of the advantages of being a first mover, see Richard Schmalensee,
Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1982). See
also Cecelia A. Conrad, The Advantage of Being First and Competition Between Firms, 1 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 353 (1983); Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching
Costs, 97 ECON. J. 99 (1987). For an assessment of whether first-mover advantages would be
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acknowledged that many of their inventions would have been
developed even in the absence of patent protection, more in some
industries than in others. 44 A drawback of the patent system is that it
covers, perhaps by necessity, both inventions spurred by the promise
of a monopoly and inventions that would have been developed in any
event.45 Deadweight losses will exist not only for inventions that
would never have existed but for the patent system, but also for
inventions that would have existed anyway.
Nonetheless, it is at least theoretically plausible that the
benefits of the patent system exceed the costs, 46 and for the purposes
of this Article, we will assume this supposition to be true. Patent
advocates cannot end the inquiry here, though, because the question is
whether it is possible to provide incentives for the inventions that the
patent system offers without suffering the deadweight loss inherent in
monopoly pricing. One way that this outcome might be achieved is by
having the government provide funds for research and development
directly, with requirements that the results of the research be released
and shared with the public. If research is a public good, let it be
publicly produced, the argument goes. The government, of course, does
just this with basic research, conducting much basic research itself
and providing subsidies for other basic research. 47 Governments,
sufficient to spur innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, see F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 588-92 (3d ed. 1990). Calandrillo
specifically discusses first-mover advantages in considering the virtues of prize systems.
Calandrillo, supra note 20, at 318-21.
44. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173,
175 (1986). "Weighting the responses according to 1982 company-financed R&D expenditures in
the reporting groups, the aggregate loss of inventions without patent protection would have been
roughly 14 percent of those actually made." SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 43, at 629 (basing the
calculation on National Science Foundation data). For a more recent survey suggesting that
executives generally view patents as a relatively ineffective way of protecting intellectual
property, but that reliance on patents may have increased since the Levin et al. study, see
WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APROPRIABILITY
CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
45. Some commentators have suggested enforcing only patents on inventions that would not
have been developed in the absence of patent law. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness:
Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1989); see also
Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697 F.2d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (employing such
reasoning).
46. Even if the patent system imposes greater costs than benefits for run-of-the-mill
inventions, its benefits may exceed its costs once truly revolutionary inventions are taken into
account, since these may require "completely new marketing channels and production facilities."
A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism," 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 442 n.112 (1996) (quoting F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 448 (2d ed. 1980)).
47. The United States typically performs basic research itself instead of subsidizing
research when the research is aimed at direct government use-for example, for national
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however, may be unsuccessful at picking winners, 48 and in particular
at deciding what type of research is important and who is best suited
to perform it. 49 Even if the government knew what invention it would
like developed and who is best situated to develop it, Guell and
Fischbaum argue that inefficiencies in government contracting may
make direct procurement "a recipe for disaster. '50 Presumably, the
government encourages research with both patent protection and
subsidization of research because each approach is the more efficient
in its own sphere. I
Enter the proposal for a prize system. Instead of having the
government only choose ex ante what research projects to finance, the
government could allow the invisible hand to work, inventors to obtain
patents, and then pay the inventors for their patents. Guell and
Fischbaum propose simply "that the government buy prescription
drug patents at a price equaling the net present value of the profit
they would have generated and distribute the patents to U.S. drug
manufacturers."5 1 Assuming that the government could do this, it is
easy to see how this approach would solve the deadweight loss
defense. See Michael L. Doane, Green Light Subsidies: Technology Policy in International Trade,
21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 155, 160 (1995).
48. Michael Hart, for example, argues, "Governments do not have a good track record of
picking winners and losers, but losers have an excellent record of picking governments. When
governments are committed to picking winners, the losers will show up and insist on their
share .. " Michael Hart, The Chimera of Industrial Policy: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 19
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19, 36 (1993); see also Steve Charnovitz, Designing American Industrial Policy:
General Versus Sectoral Approaches, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 78, 85 (1993) (noting the difficulty
that the government faces in establishing adequate criteria for picking winners). One problem
with the critique that government is ineffective at picking winners is that the private sector has
its share of losers too, from the Edsel to New Coke. On the other hand, when the government
seeks to pick winners, even when it seems to be successful, it may have literally picked the
winners by creating an uneven playing field. See Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Joint
Production Ventures, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 253, 254-55 (1990).
49. For an extended argument against government financing of science, see TERENCE
KEALEY, THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (1996).
50. Guell and Fischbaum note that the government could accomplish procurement either
through fixed-cost pricing, in which a contractor agrees to do research for a set fee, or cost-plus
pricing. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 222. Fixed-cost pricing "can lead to cost
minimization without regard to quality." Id. It is particularly problematic for research whose
prospects are uncertain and for which assessments ideally should be made each step of the way
whether the research should continue or be scrapped as a sunk cost. Cost-plus pricing solves
some of these problems, but "invariably this results in cost overruns because the builder does not
share in the savings." Id. at 223. Government contracts law, of course, is all about trying to
overcome these problems, but agency costs may be substantial for some types of government
procurement. See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in
Government Contracting, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1806-07 (1996) (noting that while the
government may overcome agency costs by allowing whistleblower lawsuits, these lawsuits
entail agency problems of their own).
51. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 221.
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problem. By allowing free use of the patent by manufacturers, 52 the
government would invoke competitive forces, leading to production at
a level that normally would be higher than the monopoly output level
at a lower price. The inventors should be indifferent, assuming that
the government gives them precisely the difference between the
profits that they would have earned and the profits that they might
still earn from being one producer of the drug among many. As Figure
1 illustrates, the patent buyout benefits society as a whole by
eliminating deadweight loss, while leaving pharmaceutical companies
indifferent. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies might even benefit,
because free distribution of drugs might provide positive publicity for
them, or at least less negative publicity than they currently receive for
"price gouging."53
52. Guell and Fischbaum do not explain why only U.S. drug manufacturers would be
entitled to produce the drugs, though this approach could satisfy a protectionist motive. An
alternative nonprotectionist approach would be to distribute the patent to all manufacturers
producing the drug for distribution in the United States. This solution would allow the inventor
to obtain and enforce patents abroad, unless of course foreign countries also adopted a prize
system. Guell and Fischbaum do recognize the international nature of the patent system and
that the size of the U.S. economy may mean that the optimal solution for it is different from that
for a small country:
[Aln absence of a measurable effect of price controls on R&D in smaller markets
would not necessarily provide support for price controls in the United States because
these are clearly "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies, which allow other nations to benefit
from high U.S. prices. If high U.S. prices serve to motivate drug research globally, the
existence of price controls in a "small country" would have minimal impact on the
level of R&D investment in that country. Because the United States provides the
largest national market for pharmaceuticals, price controls here would have a very
different impact; it would induce a significant drop in R&D not only in the United
States, but elsewhere as well.
Id. at 222. Of course, even a small country might rationally adopt a patent system to achieve
reciprocity benefits for its own inventions. But see A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent
System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 (1987) (arguing
that membership in the international patent system may harm third-world nations).
53. See, e.g., Christopher Connell, Drug Prices Rising Faster Than Inflation, Senators
Complain, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 3, 1993, available at 1993 WL 4525594 (discussing
accusations that the drug industry was "price-gouging" consumers).
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Figure 1: Economic Effects of a Patent Buyout
A profit-maximizing patent holder will choose the monopoly price P. and quantity Q.. Rectangle
A represents a monopoly rent, the profits that the patent holder receives as a result of the
patent. The monopoly pricing produces a deadweight loss represented by triangle B, and
consumer surplus with monopoly pricing is equal to triangle C. In a patent buyout, the
government pays to the patent holder an amount equivalent to rectangle A, thus leaving the
patent holder as well off as it would have been before. The patent is then placed in the public
domain, and competition results in a price P, and quantity Q . Consumer surplus is now the sum
of A, B, and C. The patent buyout thus increases consumer welfare by the sum of A and B for a




Guell and Fischbaum's primary contribution is in setting forth
the analytic case for a prize system. It will be worthwhile, though, to
consider how Guell and Fischbaum propose implementing the scheme,
while in fairness recognizing that the specific proposal is not the
central point of their paper. Guell and Fischbaum suggest initially
that the government confiscate patents, much as it confiscates other
goods for public use and pays just compensation under the Takings
Clause. 54 This solution is analytically simple, placing aside the
54. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 225. There is historical precedent for the




question of how to create an administrative agency that would
determine which patents to take. It does not, however, explain just
how the courts would determine the amount of compensation, and
even Guell and Fischbaum do not have full confidence in the results of
eminent domain proceedings, characterizing the process as one in
which "wholly unqualified judges determine the 'just compensation'
based on two competing claims of value."55 As a result, Guell and
Fischbaum advocate "the possibility of a market appeal," in which a
drug would be marketed "in a specific test area," with the firm's
"scaled-up profits" used as "an indicator of the firm's true monopoly
profits had it kept the patent."56
This proposal has a number of problems. First, while the
market appeal is designed to offset the danger of judges "biased
against inventing firms,"' 57 there is the possibility that judges, whether
biased or not, sometimes might provide valuations that are higher
than necessary. 58 To offset that bias, one might allow the government
to use the market appeal too, but if that is so, then the eminent
domain process essentially reduces to a form of nonbinding
arbitration,59 perhaps useful but essentially just a first act to the
market appeal. Second, the market appeal will result in a delay in
selling the product. Guell and Fischbaum explain, "Because the drug
would be sold only within the test region, no one would leave the area
to buy the drug at a cheaper price."60 Thus, some consumers (including
some who would be willing to pay the monopoly price)61 would be
55. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 225.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Guell and Fischbaum contend that "[t]he purchasing agency would have an incentive to
state the [patent value] accurately because a history of being proved wrong in test markets
would lead judges to side more often with firms." Id. The purchasing agency, however, might
systematically provide overly generous offers as a way of avoiding market appeals. Even if the
purchasing agency tried to state the patent value accurately, however, the purchasing agency
sometimes might give overly generous offers inadvertently, and neither side would appeal in
such cases.
59. Nonbinding arbitration may be useful, for example by encouraging settlement. See, e.g.,
Steven A. Weiss, ADR: A Litigator's Perspective, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 1999, at 30, 30 ("From
my experience, nonbinding arbitration is only useful when the parties have litigated for a while,
discovery is mostly or completely finished, and the parties are trying to reach a settlement."); see
also Kathryn L. Hale, Note, Nonbinding Arbitration: An Oxymoron?, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 1003
(1993) (exploring the usefulness of nonbinding arbitration).
60. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 225.
61. Under current doctrine, the test market period would need to occur after or shortly
before the patent application is filed. See Jay David Schainholz, Note, The Validity of Patents
After Market Testing: A New and Improved Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 371,
371-72 (1985) (noting that market testing does not count as an experimental use permissible
more than one year prior to filing a patent application). To minimize the period during which the
drug would be available only in a test market, Congress might consider expanding the
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excluded for a time from obtaining the product, producing a
deadweight loss.
Third, and most significantly, it might be difficult to
extrapolate from the results in the test market. Perhaps the particular
geographic area in which the test market is conducted has different
demographics from the nation as a whole. Moreover, the test period
may not be representative. As Guell and Fischbaum themselves
recognize, "the ultimate effectiveness of [a] new drug is uncertain,"62
but they fail to recognize that a brief test market period may be
inadequate. A drug may initially be popular, but later prove less
effective than originally believed,6 3 or it may take time for a drug to
catch on among prescribing doctors. 64 Indeed, Guell and Fischbaum
note that a drug ultimately may prove beneficial for other than its
initially intended use,65 but such uses may take more time to become
apparent. Guell and Fischbaum urge that the pharmaceutical
company be encouraged to advertise the drug and that the price of
marketing efforts be taken into account in determining the profits
from the drug. But advertising expenditures may be quite different for
the initial introduction of a drug than they would be later.66
experimental use exception. Alternatively, the output-reducing effect of the test market could be
mitigated by allowing the patent holder to sell the drug nationwide until the buyout is
completed. Indeed, the test market could simply be a "test period" in which the drug was
marketed nationwide. Such sales, however, would still be at the monopoly price, thus implying
some welfare loss relative to a system that effected patent buyouts at the beginning of a patent
term.
62. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 224.
63. In an extreme case, a drug may be withdrawn because of unexpected safety problems.
See, e.g., Vanessa Fuhrmans & Gardiner Harris, Bayer Withdraws Major Cholesterol Drug,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, at A3 (reporting on Bayer's withdrawal of Baycol, a cholesterol-
lowering drug, after at least thirty-one deaths among patients taking the drug).
64. Capital markets, however, often react strongly to unexpectedly slow drug sales,
suggesting that initial sales may well be predictive of future sales. See Susan Pulliam & Thomas
M. Burton, Investors Focus on 'Scrip Sales' of New Drugs like Lilly's Evista, and Punish Slow
Takeoffs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1998, at C4 (discussing investors' consideration of "scrip sales,"
weekly reports on the sales of prescription drugs, particularly new ones).
65. "In medical research the unintended beneficial qualities of medicines are often as
important as the intended ones. Temin [1980], for example, relates how research on sulfa drugs
led to whole new classes of therapeutic agents, including tranquilizers and antihypertensives."
Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 224 (citing P. TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1980)). As this quotation reveals, not only might a
particular drug have beneficial but possibly unforeseen uses, but it also might serve as a building
block to another invention. A patentee can take advantage of this either by developing the
subsequent invention or by licensing, but the test market approach would not help to calculate
potential profits from such activities.
66. One commentator has argued that determining the value of patents in the prescription
drug contexts is complicated by the existence of insurance. See Arti K. Rai, The Information
Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the
Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 179 (2001) ("[Tlhe growing number of
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I do not mean to imply that these problems could not be
overcome or that they are so severe as to make Guell and Fischbaum's
proposal inadvisable. A government agency might be able to develop
detailed demographic models allowing it to extrapolate from a test
market to the country as a whole. Similarly, the agency might rely on
data about profits from pharmaceuticals in the past to estimate future
advertising and sales of a drug from the initial sales in a test market.
Moreover, one might argue, as long as the agency is not systematically
wrong, the system might produce the appropriate invention
incentives. 67 There is, however, the possibility that the agency will be
systematically wrong-that it will adopt a formula or procedure for
computing the value of a patent that is inaccurate in a predictable
way. Such a systematic error might have a substantial effect on
innovation incentives, either positive or negative, if it changes the
expected returns to research and investment. While Guell and
Fischbaum's proposal is a first step, they do not offer enough details or
argument to justify a belief that the agency would be able to manage
its task sufficiently well.
B. Shavell and van Ypersele's Reward Formula
The Shavell and van Ypersele model is in presentation nearly
the polar opposite of Guell and Fischbaum's proposal. While Guell and
Fischbaum explain their proposal primarily with words, using a figure
only to convey the concept of deadweight loss, the Shavell and van
Ypersele proposal is based on and developed through a mathematical
model. The motivation for the Shavell and van Ypersele project is the
recognition that the "principal difficulty with reward systems...
concerns the government's need for information to calculate
rewards." 68 Following an earlier model by Brian Wright,69 they worry
commentators who advocate publicly financed buyouts of important pharmaceutical patents as a
means of eliminating deadweight loss ignore the demand-side reality that for the most part,
individual consumers do not purchase individual drugs directly at the time they need them.")
(footnote omitted). Guell and Fischbaum might respond to this criticism by noting that it does
not matter from the perspective of the market test whether drugs are purchased by insurance
companies or by consumers. This response, however, only highlights the problem that insurance
companies' purchasing and reimbursement decisions in the test market might not be reflective of
their later decisions. An alternative response would be to prevent insurance companies from
providing the drug in the test market as a way of gauging consumer demand independent of
moral hazard.
67. This argument is quite similar to one that I will offer later. See infra text accompanying
notes 386-87.
68. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 526.
69. Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research
Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).
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particularly about asymmetric information. This focus is sound. If
both the inventor and the government have the same estimate of the
value of a patent, then a patent buyout at that value will be efficient
even if it turns out that the patent's estimated value is wildly
inaccurate. The government is less risk-averse than a private party,
and all that matters is providing equal value on average. What is
worrisome is that the private party might have a better sense of the
value of its patent than does the government. Systematic errors in
calculating the value of patents might distort innovation incentives,
perhaps enough to overwhelm the benefit from eliminating the
deadweight loss associated with a patent regime.70
Shavell and van Ypersele model the asymmetric information
problem by assuming that the inventor and the government have
different information about demand for the product. In particular, the
innovator knows the demand curve, but the government does not.71
The government can identify only a family of demand curves to which
the innovator's demand curve may belong, and it can calculate the
probability that any of these demand curves is the actual demand
curve.72 Given these assumptions, Shavell and van Ypersele compare
the surplus that would result in various possible regimes to the social
70. Shavell and van Ypersele offer the following explanation as a prelude to the model:
On one hand, the reward system is superior to patent in that deadweight loss due to
monopoly pricing is avoided under rewards. On the other hand, the incentive to invest
in research is imperfect under both systems, but in different ways. Under the patent
system, the incentive to invest is always inadequate because monopoly profits are less
than social surplus; but the incentive to invest is linked to actual social surplus
because the innovator knows the demand for the potential innovation. Under the
reward system, the incentive to invest is governed by the reward and thus is not
systematically inadequate; yet the incentive to invest is not linked to actual surplus
but only to the reward.
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 530 (footnotes omitted).
71. Shavell and van Ypersele recognize that in practice neither the innovator nor the
government will know the demand curve and that the innovator's information will merely be
better than the government's. They explain, however, that the assumption of perfect knowledge
on the part of the innovator is a useful simplification:
The assumption that the innovator has perfect information about demand (since he
knows t) and that the government does not is the simplest way to reflect the idea that
the innovator possesses superior information about demand. A more realistic
assumption is that the innovator's information about demand is not perfect but still is
better than the government's, and were this the assumption, it will be obvious that
the qualitative nature of our results would not be altered.
Id. at 532 n.25.
72. Mathematically, the inverse demand function d reports the price as a function of the
quantity of the product q and a parameter t. Id. at 531. The inventor knows the parameter t, but
the government only knows a minimum and a maximum possible value of the parameter,
denoted t. and tb, as well as the probability that any particular value within that range will be
the actual value, represented by the probability density function g(t).
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surplus that would result from the "first-best outcome, ' 73 in which a
potential innovator invests the socially optimal amount in seeking to
develop the innovation, and, if the innovation is successful, prices the
product at its marginal cost. 74 The surplus will be less than optimal in
a standard patent regime for two reasons, both familiar to the
economic literature on patents.75 The first reason is the deadweight
loss from the patent holder's pricing the product at the monopoly level.
The second follows from the first. Because deadweight loss is the
portion of consumer's surplus in competition not transferred to
producer's surplus, 76 the patent holder's profits will necessarily be less
than the social surplus in the first-best outcome. As a result, the
innovator will invest less in research initially than is socially
optimal. 77
The first original, contribution offered by Shavell and van
Ypersele is a comparison of the reward and patent regimes in their
model. If the government's information were identical to the
innovator's, 78 the government could achieve the first-best outcome
simply by paying the innovator the social surplus. The deadweight
loss would be eliminated, as the invention passes into the public
domain and is manufactured at marginal cost. 79 In addition, the
prospective innovator would invest the socially optimal amount in
seeking the innovation, because paying the innovator the full social
surplus allows the innovator to internalize the benefits of the
innovation.80 With imperfect information, however, the government
does not know the social surplus, and it can thus promise the inventor
73. Id. at 532.
74. Shavell and van Ypersele explain, "If there is an innovation, the first-best quantity,
denoted q(t), is such that the height of the demand curve is c, that is, d(q(t),t) - c." Id.
75. See TIROLE, supra note 28, at 399-400. For an additional treatment, see SCHERER &
ROSS, supra note 43, at 622-24.
76. For a graphical illustration, see WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC
PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 574 fig.19.5 (5th ed. 1992). The illustration shows that monopoly
pricing results in inputs that would have been devoted to the product being transferred to other,
less productive uses in the economy.
77. "Under the patent system, there are two sources of welfare loss relative to first-best
welfare: insufficient investment in research and insufficient quantity of the innovation product
sold, with accompanying deadweight loss, due to monopoly pricing." Shavell & van Ypersele,
supra note 19, at 534.
78. Shavell and van Ypersele note that this is "contrary to our assumption." Id. Differently
stated, this is the result that would obtain if t. = tb.
79. Id. (explaining that "the quantity produced is always optimal, q(t), under the reward
system").
80. Id. ("[Tihe innovator would then choose k(s*(t)), the first-best investment in research.").
The notation k(s*(t)) means that the innovator will invest an amount k corresponding to an
anticipated profit of s*(t), the social surplus given demand parameter t, if the research
successfully leads to an innovation.
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only what it expects the social surplus to be.8 1 That is, the government
calculates the probability of each possible social surplus, based on its
knowledge of the probability distribution of the demand parameter,
and it awards the inventor the average expected social surplus.
According to this approach, the prize system will continue to
eliminate the deadweight loss.8 2 It will, however, lead to an inefficient
amount of research. If the expected value of the social surplus for a
particular innovation is lower than the actual social surplus, then the
innovator will invest too little in the project. In such a case, the
innovator recognizes that the government will underestimate demand
for the product and thus anticipates a smaller-than-ideal reward. If,
however, the expected value of the social surplus is higher than the
actual social surplus, then the innovator will invest too much in the
project. In such a case, the innovator recognizes that government will
overestimate demand for the product and thus anticipates a higher-
than-ideal reward. Recall, however, that a patent regime also fails to
optimize investment in this model, systematically producing too little
of it.83 Thus, while Shavell and van Ypersele conclude as a formal
matter that either the patent or the prize system may be superior to
the other, the informal case for reward seems strong. Patent can
dominate reward in their model only if the investment inefficiency in a
prize system is so much greater than the investment inefficiency in a
patent system that it outweighs the benefit of the prize system in
eliminating deadweight loss. 8 4 Whether this is so depends on the
relative efficiency in producing optimal investment of the patent and
prize systems, as well as on the relative importance of calibrating
research incentives and eliminating deadweight loss.8 5
Shavell and van Ypersele's most important insight is that an
optional reward program can dominate patent. They suggest that the
81. Shavell and van Ypersele demonstrate that providing a reward equal to the expected
social surplus is optimal. See id. at 534-35.
82. Id. at 535 ("Under reward, there is no deadweight loss from insufficient production,
whereas there is under patent.").
83. See supra note 77.
84. Shavell and van Ypersele explain this as follows:
[1If the information that the government has about demand is sufficiently good, then
the reward system will dominate patent. Specifically, if the probability mass is
sufficiently concentrated about E(s*), it follows.., that reward will dominate patent.
This is because the research investment under reward will tend to be superior to (and
higher than) that under patent and deadweight loss from monopoly pricing will be
avoided.
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 536.
85. Id. ("[Ilf the need for well-calibrated incentives to invest in research is sufficiently
attenuated, then the reward system will dominate patent, because the factor of the elimination
of deadweight loss from monopoly pricing will be of dominating importance.").
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most intuitive way to understand this aspect of their model is to
compare a relatively simple optional reward program to patent.8 6 In
this simple program, the government calculates the lowest possible
social surplus, i.e., the social surplus corresponding to the weakest
possible demand function in the family of possible demand functions,
and it offers this social surplus to the innovator in exchange for the
patent. If the innovator turns down the offer, the optional reward
program acts just like the patent regime, so the only cases that
require analysis are those in which the innovator accepts the offer.87
In these cases, deadweight loss is eliminated. Moreover, the reward
must be greater than monopoly profits would have been; otherwise,
the innovator would not have opted for the reward. As a result, the
amount of investment will be greater than what would have been
generated by the patent system alone, which always creates too little
investment in this model. At the same time, the amount of investment
will be less than or equal to the socially optimal amount of
investment, because the reward offered is equal to the lowest possible
social surplus. So, this relatively simple optional prize system
eliminates deadweight loss and moves the amount of investment
closer (though not all the way) toward the optimal amount, and it
therefore must be superior to the patent system.
This simplest optional prize system is not necessarily the
optimal prize system. Increasing the reward to an amount somewhat
above the lowest possible social surplus will induce more innovators to
accept the optional reward. An increase in the optional reward will
make a difference for a particular innovator when the reward offered
becomes greater than monopoly profits. As long as the reward remains
lower than the actual social surplus, then the increase in the reward
for that innovator was worthwhile. Indeed, it will be worthwhile as
long as the reward is lower than the sum of the actual social surplus
and deadweight loss saved, less any loss from more inefficient
investment relative to the patent system. Awards offered past this
point for a particular innovator will result in a social loss, so erring on
the high side in general will have some benefits (inducing innovators
to accept the award where doing so is socially beneficial) and some
costs (inducing inefficient research by innovators in cases where the
reward is considerably greater than the amount of monopoly profits).
Shavell and van Ypersele show how to solve this optimization
problem, indicating how the government could calculate the "optimal
86. Id. at 539.
87. Id. ("[T]he patent system is equivalent to an optional reward system with r = n(t.)
[lowest possible monopoly profits], because then the patent would always be chosen.").
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optional reward"88 based on the probability distribution of demand
functions in a particular case.8 9 The superiority of the simple prize
system to the patent system means that the optimal optional prize
system is a fortiori superior.
Shavell and van Ypersele extend their model to support two
additional conclusions. First, a mandatory prize system might be
superior to the optional prize system, but it might not be.90 To see
why, first consider why a mandatory prize system may be better than
an optional one. In an optional prize system, some innovators will
choose patent rather than reward even though reward would be
socially optimal. The optimal optional reward will be lower than the
government's estimate of social surplus, 91 which is what the
government would pay in a mandatory system, and this estimate in
turn may be lower than the actual social surplus. When monopoly
profits are greater than the optimal optional reward but less than the
actual social surplus, the innovator would make the socially
undesirable choice of patent, and if this would occur frequently
enough, the mandatory prize system, by forcing the innovator to
accept the reward, will be superior to an optional prize system. At the
same time, we have seen that the mandatory prize system could be
worse than the patent system. 92 Because the optimal optional regime
is better than the patent system, in these cases the mandatory prize
system would be worse than the optimal optional system.
Second, Shavell and van Ypersele show that the government
could improve its performance in either the mandatory or optional
prize system by basing rewards on the quantity of the relevant
product sold. That is, after a patent was placed in the public domain,
the government would wait to determine the quantity of goods sold in
88. Id. (concluding that the optimal optional reward system must be superior to the patent
system).
89. Shavell and van Ypersele do not solve for the optimal reward, but they calculate the
first derivative of social welfare in an optional prize system. Id. at 538. Setting this derivative to
zero and solving for r would produce the optimal reward. The formula for the optimal reward
would be messy, but a computer program easily could be written to calculate r given variables
including the family of demand functions and the probability distribution of those functions.
90. Id. at 539.
91. Asymmetric information provides an intuitive explanation for this discrepancy. When
innovators choose whether to accept the reward, some will choose the reward in part because
they expect their monopoly profits to be lower than the government would have guessed. This
phenomenon pushes the optimal optional reward lower than the expected social surplus. The
optimization of the optional reward in effect takes into account the problem of adverse selection.
See infra Part II.C (discussing the adverse selection problem).
92. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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the market. 93 Observation of the quantity of goods is not by itself
sufficient to deduce the innovator's demand curve; it allows for
specification of one point on the demand curve.94 Nonetheless, this
information allows the government to improve its estimate of the
demand curve, narrowing the family of demand curves that the
government might consider in the absence of sales information. This
analysis recognizes that delay allows the government better to gauge
the quality of an innovation. Indeed, Shavell and van Ypersele suggest
that the government could revise rewards on an annual basis, "[als
events unfold and information flows to the government."95
Conceivably, the government's ex post information could be even
better than the innovator's ex ante information, in which case a
mandatory prize system necessarily would be superior to the patent
system in Shavell and van Ypersele's model.96
Although the Shavell and van Ypersele model elaborates and
refines intuitions about different prize programs, there are several
practical problems in using the Shavell and van Ypersele approach to
design an actual prize system, even apart from problems to be
93. This analysis depends on the assumption that "the government can observe quantity q
sold and base rewards on this." Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 540. Shavell and van
Ypersele do not give any indication of whether they believe government in fact would be able to
observe the quantity of goods sold, though presumably it could, with some error.
94. This conclusion assumes that the government also would be able to observe price.
Shavell and van Ypersele also suggest that the government could "estimate demand elasticities,
[and] undertake surveys to determine the character and frequency of use of, for example,
computer software, musical recordings, cinematic and television productions." Id. at 541-42.
Presumably, although a government agency trying to estimate demand curves could use such
information, it would be more complicated to develop a formula or algorithm for determining an
award based on such additional variables. Independent of this comment, which does not include
explanation of how the government would use the relevant data, Shavell and van Ypersele's
model may seem to reflect an assumption that the government's task must be a mechanical one,
even if that means that the government must overlook relevant information. But see infra Part
III.A (arguing that allowing the government to consider a variety of types of information not
reducible to a simple formula will not be problematic if innovators have no reason to think that
the government will err systematically in considering such information).
95. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 542. Shavell and van Ypersele argue that the
government "could appropriately supplement rewards, perhaps on an annual basis." Id. This
statement may reflect an assumption that the government would not be able to lower rewards by
demanding that innovators give money back. If this assumption were correct, the government's
optimal course would be to give initial awards based on pessimistic assessments of demand, with
later supplements as the invention proved itself. Shavell and van Ypersele do not consider the
possibility of having the government make a single reward determination well after the initial
innovation.
96. Id. at 542-43. Technically, of course, Shavell and van Ypersele's model does not allow for
the possibility that the government has superior information, since the innovator has perfect
information about the demand function. See supra note 71. Their analytic point holds, though, if
the knowledge of the innovator were more realistically specified.
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discussed below that are general to all such attempts. 97 Shavell and
van Ypersele acknowledge one caveat: that the "government's problem
of determining rewards is made more difficult when the value of an
innovation is in part that it leads to subsequent innovations."98 If the
government considers only sales data for a particular innovation, then
it will ignore that a patent holder might have licensed the patent to
someone who wished to use the innovation in a subsequent
innovation. 99 There is a partial solution to this problem, if we are able
to distinguish the initial innovation from subsequent innovations. The
patent could be placed into the public domain for the limited purpose
of allowing anyone to produce the specifically described invention, but
the patent holder would retain the right to license use of the patent for
subsequent innovations. This approach, however, could be
cumbersome, and it reduces the benefit of placing the patent into the
public domain.
Moreover, the problem is really just an example of a broader
problem that Shavell and van Ypersele do not acknowledge: that an
invention is not the same as a product. 100 A single product, say a
computer, may be based on a variety of patents, including some held
by the patent holder and some licensed from other patent holders.
Similarly, one cannot assess the demand for a business method patent
simply by assessing the demand for the product that the business
method produces.101 There may be some markets, such as for
pharmaceuticals, in which the invention and the product are
essentially the same, 10 2 although, as Arti Rai has pointed out in
97. See infra Part II.
98. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 543.
99. Shavell and van Ypersele observe that the reward system may solve some problems
associated with other intellectual property systems, where "subsequent innovations may be
stymied by refusal of holders of property rights to allow improvements." Id. Thus, this benefit
may balance or offset any costs of a reward system attributable to the government's failure to
account for the value of a patent for subsequent innovations.
100. Cf. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 713 (2001) (noting, in critiquing Shavell and van Ypersele, that "existence
of market demand ... does not establish that the invention itself would have been patentable").
101. Consider, for example, Priceline.com's controversial patent on its "name your price"
reverse auction system for purchasing plane tickets and other products. See generally Rui J. P.
de Figueiredo, Jr., Strategy, Structure and Regulation: Telecommunications in the New Economy,
2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 253, 271 (discussing the patent). The relevant market is not
the market for plane tickets, but how much Priceline and its competitors would be willing to pay
to license the patent if someone else owned it.
102. Even in these areas, though, the innovative product might be put to a number of
different uses over time, for example, as the government approves a medication for additional
uses. Although a doctor can prescribe an FDA-approved drug for any use, a manufacturer can
promote a drug only for approved uses. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion
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critiquing the Shavell-van Ypersele proposal, even in pharmaceutical
markets, the existence of insurance complicates estimations of
consumer surplus.10 3 When inventions cannot be mapped one-to-one
onto products, determining the demand for any particular invention
may be extraordinarily difficult. The government would have to
consider not only whether other companies would be likely to pay to
license an invention, but also how much the patent holder selling a
product based in part on the invention would have paid to license the
patent, if the patent had been held by someone else.10 4 In addition, the
government might wish to assess the value of a patent in extracting
settlements and licensing fees for competitors' products already
incorporating the patented invention. 105 Importantly, none of this
information will become clear over time, as the release of a patent into
the public domain will prevent any licensing fees or settlements from
being collected. We can wait to see sales of a particular computer, but
that will not allow us, even with the most refined equations, to
determine any better than initially the contribution of one innovation
embedded in that computer.
Shavell and van Ypersele might have defended their proposal
against the subsequent innovation argument and the broader
argument by noting that neither affects their analytic case for the
optional prize system. If government systematically undervalues
patents, by failing to take into account the value of a patent with
respect to licensing and the like, fewer innovators will accept the
government's offers to buy out the patent. The optional prize system
will still be better than the patent system-not as much better, but
Shavell and van Ypersele do not quantify the benefits of adopting the
Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 514 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that doctors may prescribe an
approved drug for any use).
103. See Rai, supra note 66, at 200. Rai explains:
[l]n the context of pharmaceuticals, the Shavell/van Ypersele proposal has limitations.
As contrasted with other goods, individuals do not generally purchase individual
pharmaceuticals at the time they need them. Rather, they enroll ex ante in insurance
plans that cover pharmaceuticals. These plans often do not differentiate their
insurance product on the basis of the pharmaceutical products they offer. Even when
plans do differentiate, it is at best a very rough differentiation (e.g., between plans
with no drug coverage, plans with a closed formulary, and those with an open
formulary).
Id.
104. One technique used to determine how much a company would pay for its own products
is known as transfer pricing, which is used for international tax purposes. See generally 1-2
TRANSFER PRICING HANDBOOK (Robert Feinschreiber ed., 2001); Terry Thompson, Comment,
Canada's Transfer Pricing Laws: Keeping Pace with an International Trend, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
311, 314-18 (1998) (providing an overview).
105. See, e.g., BroadVision Settles Suit Against Art Technology, Bus. J., Mar. 3, 2000, at 29
(reporting a settlement resulting in the payment of a licensing fee).
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system anyway. As long as the government limits itself to examining
observed demand for the innovation itself, whether that demand is
from consumers or other producers, the system will still work when
the government plugs in the variables it knows. In reality, though,
this observation may mean that the Shavell-van Ypersele model is
useful only, or at least mostly, for markets in which the innovation
and the product are essentially the same. When a sufficiently high
percentage of the value of a patent derives from something other than
sales of a product uniquely associated with the patent, inventors will
categorically not accept the government's offers.
There is a different answer that might be offered in defense of
the Shavell-van Ypersele approach. The government could make its
best effort to take all of these factors into account in calculating the
social surplus created by an invention. After all, Shavell and van
Ypersele never suggested that the government knows the demand
function, but only that it can estimate the probability that each of a
number of demand functions is in fact the demand function. Demand
may be difficult to estimate, but that merely means that there will be
a wide variety of possible demand functions. The government still can
do its best, and optional rewards will still dominate patent. When the
range of potential demand functions is wide, however, government
offers in the optional prize system will have to be low to prevent
innovators who know that their innovations are relatively useless
from cashing in high offers. 10 6 But the optimal rewards may end up so
low that no one with a valuable patent would accept them.
Part of the appeal of the Shavell-van Ypersele model may stem
from the observation that from the beginning, the government knows
a probability distribution of different demand functions. We are,
however, given no information as to exactly how the government
calculates this probability distribution, and our confidence in relying
on their model as a basis for a shift in public policy ultimately rests on
how well we think that the government can calculate this probability
distribution. Stripped of its mathematics, the Shavell-van Ypersele
model reduces to a simple argument: Providing a reward for a patent
eliminates deadweight loss. While rewards could improve innovation
incentives, there is a risk that rewards that deviate substantially from
actual social surplus could result in innovation incentives that are too
low or too high. The case for a mandatory prize system depends on
how much of a distortion in innovation incentives rewards produce, if
any. In principle, though, the government can make offers to buy out
patents that innovators can accept or reject, setting the offers to a low
106. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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enough level that overall society will benefit more than it will lose
from offers that are accepted. The government is most likely to make
adequate offers in areas in which an innovation and a product are
essentially the same thing and the government can use sales figures to
calculate demand.
That this argument is simple does not detract from its truth or
from Shavell and van Ypersele's achievement in modeling it formally.
It does, however, suggest that the benefit of Shavell and van
Ypersele's article is not that it produces a formula that the
government can use to determine rewards. After all, as noted above,
Shavell and van Ypersele do not give any indication as to how to make
the initial calculation of possible probability functions. If that is so,
the additional insight offered by the Shavell-van Ypersele approach
over, for example, the Guell and Fischbaum proposal, is modest. Its
main virtue may be in showing that, at least in certain markets, well-
motivated economists could use relatively standard economic
techniques to determine how large rewards should be. When they do
so, and properly take into account that rewards must be lower than
social surplus in the optional prize system, 107 an optional prize system
will be beneficial. When they are particularly good at calculating
demand, a mandatory prize system will be even better.
This reduction of the model, however, identifies an additional
problem, probably the most significant one, and the problem lies in the
words "well-motivated." If Shavell and van Ypersele have shown that
economic science provides tools that the government might use to
determine appropriate rewards, that does not show that government
in fact will do a good job of using those tools. One concern is that the
government officials charged with the task might make various errors
in calculating demand. Conceivably, a government official might
produce a family of demand functions that does not even include the
actual demand function. If the demand functions are all too low, then
little harm done-just one more inventor sticking with the patent
system. 08 But if there are a number of cases in which the demand
functions are all systematically too high, the prize system could be
quite expensive. The Shavell-van Ypersele optimization only works if
the probability distributions are accurate. 109 If the government thinks
107. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
108. Shavell and van Ypersele note that "the fear that government would act suboptimally,
and give unduly conservative rewards, would be less an issue under an optional reward scheme
because innovators can always obtain intellectual property rights." Shavell & van Ypersele,
supra note 19, at 544.
109. Conceivably, the government might recognize that the probability distributions are
systematically inaccurate and mandate some transformation to convert the economists'
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that a low value is one percent likely when a more competent
evaluation would indicate that it is ninety percent likely, the reward
program may be problematic.
The problem, however, is less likely to be the competence of the
government employees than their motivations. Shavell and van
Ypersele's model produces an image of objective bureaucrats doing
their best, but administrative law and public choice scholars have
been skeptical about this image for over fifty years. 110 Suppose, for
example, that the agency were "captured" by industry.111 It might
systematically offer extraordinarily generous buyouts by starting with
generous estimates of the demand function. Or, we might worry that a
particular presidential administration would advance some agenda
through a reward program. In a mandatory reward regime, we might
worry that an administration hostile to industry interests would buy
out patents at very low prices. Or, we might worry that certain
industries would do well at the expense of others in a particular
administration. The creation of a reward regime might in effect allow
presidential control over innovation, with research flowing chaotically
depending on assessments of the agenda of the particular
administration or agency and shifting abruptly with transitions in
power.
As with my analysis of the Guell-Fischbaum approach, I do not
mean to imply that the Shavell-van Ypersele approach must be
rejected. To some extent, these problems might be averted by forcing
the agency to rely on proxies in calculating social surplus, for example
by specifying precise procedures for calculating the family of demand
functions. At least it might be possible to devise such constraints for
some industries. Much work would be needed, however, to determine
what these proxies should be, and there is no guarantee that Congress
would create the agency with the appropriate set of constraints, even
if academic agreement on them could be achieved. Perhaps there are
some areas in which concerns about distorted agency incentives might
be less severe, but again more work would be needed to identify those
areas. In fairness, Shavell and van Ypersele recommend only "serious
study of the possibility of reward systems,"11 2 not adoption of a system
probability estimates into more appropriate estimates, which presumably would entail a wider
range. It is difficult, however, to determine how systematic errors in probability distributions
would be identified or corrected.
110. For an early work alleging that administrative agencies might not act on behalf of an
objective view of the public interest, see Samuel Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The
Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 467-70 (1952).
111. See generally Merrill, supra note 25, at 1050-52 (discussing the rise of capture theory).
112. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 545.
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that they claim to have fully specified. Nonetheless, unless one can
develop a way of overcoming these problems, the Shavell-van
Ypersele approach can be considered only a preliminary blueprint.
C. Kremer's Market Mechanism
Michael Kremer's proposal is similar to Shavell and van
Ypersele's model in that it seeks to identify a means of objectively
pricing patents so that the government can effect buyouts. Like
Shavell and van Ypersele, Kremer suggests an opt-in approach rather
than a mandatory reward regime. The mechanism he suggests,
however, could not be more different. Instead of relying on
government bureaucrats to calculate the optimal patent prize, Kremer
suggests use of a market mechanism. 113 The mechanism, in simplified
form, would work as follows. 114 After a patent holder decides to apply
the mechanism, bids for the patent would be solicited at a sealed-bid
auction, with any private party permitted to bid. The government
would then offer to purchase the patent at the price determined by the
auction. If the patent holder accepts the offer, the government would
execute a randomization function. With some probability (say, ninety
percent of the time), the patent would be placed in the public domain.
The rest of the time, the high bidder would be required to purchase
the patent.
The chief virtue of Kremer's proposal is that it allows the
government to harness private information. Private parties will
submit bids at the auction because they recognize that there is some
probability (ten percent) that they will be permitted to purchase the
patent. Competitors and potential competitors of the innovator may
have better information than the government about the patent's
113. Kremer's proposal is but one of a number of recent proposals in a variety of legal fields
to supplant existing institutions with institutions based on market mechanisms. See Michael
Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 327 (1999) (describing a
number of recent proposals); Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public
Policy, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 178 (1985) (urging the use of auctions to identify private enforcers
of public policy); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 105-16 (1991) (recommending the use of auctions in class action and derivative
litigation); A.C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for Allocating
Criminal Appellate Counsel, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1161, 1170-76 (1997) (urging that the right to
serve as appellate counsel for convicted indigent defendants be auctioned, with the high bidder
receiving a contingency fee if successful).
114. See Kremer, supra note 21, at 1147 & fig.I.
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value. 115 As Kremer recognizes, the use of an auction is valuable not
only because it gives government officials more information, but also
because it constrains their discretion. 116 At least in the simplified
version above, the governmental role would be minimal, limited to
overseeing the auction, a task that experience suggests the
government is capable of performing.1 7  Even without any
investigation at all, the government could rely on private parties' bids,
because the private parties will be well incentivized. As in any sealed-
bid auction, private parties will consider their own interests in
bidding. If a private party bids too low, then it will not win the
auction, making the entire effort a wasted expense; if the private
party bids too much, then it may end up paying too much for the
patent.
A potential limitation of the market mechanism that Kremer
anticipates is that the value of a bid may be too low as a basis for a
prize, because the social value of the patent may exceed the private
value. Indeed, this problem animates Kremer's proposal, as he reviews
a literature "suggest[ing] that social returns to innovation far exceed
the private returns." 8 Rather than purchase patents at their private
value, as revealed by the auction, the government could offer to
purchase patents at the private value multiplied by some markup,
which Kremer indicates might be between 2.5 and 3.33.119 The
government would purchase the patent at this high markup even in
115. Id. at 1146 ("While the value of potential inventions may be private information of the
researcher before research is conducted, other firms in the industry are likely to have at least
some information on the private value of the invention after inventions are patented.").
116. Id. at 1138 ("Allowing government officials wide discretion to set payments to inventors
ex post may lead to rent-seeking and to expropriation of investors after their research costs are
sunk."); see also id. at 1138-39 ("One problem with allowing broad administrative discretion over
the patent buyout price is that this may lead to purchases at confiscatory prices, and thus reduce
incentives for innovation.").
117. Government frequently holds auctions, for example to sell forfeited property. See, e.g.,
21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(B) (2001) (providing for disposition of property in a "public sale"); Shanxi's
First Public Property Auction, XINHUA ENG. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 11, 1997, available at 1997 WL
15760495 (describing a forfeiture auction in China).
118. Kremer, supra note 21, at 1141 (citing M. ISHAQ NADIRI, INNOVATIONS AND
TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4423, 1993));
MANUEL TRAJTENBERG, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRODUCT INNOVATION: THE CASE OF CT
SCANNERS 11-44 (1990); see also Timothy F. Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers from Technical
Advance: Mainframe Computers in Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 742, 753 (1986);
Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907
(1981); Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations,
91 Q.J. ECON. 221, 234 (1977). Kremer concludes that social rates of return to research and
development are generally about fifty percent, in comparison with private rates of return of
about twenty-five percent. In individual circumstances, social returns may be much higher.
Kremer, supra note 21, at 1141.
119. Kremer, supra note 21, at 1142.
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those cases in which it sells the patent to a private party, thus
ensuring the inventor the benefit of the markup in all cases, whether
the patent is randomized to the public domain or not. The existence of
this markup would provide a strong incentive for inventors to offer
their patents to the market mechanism rather than retain their
patent right and exploit it in the market.
The markup also helps solve problems associated with the
"winner's curse,"' 20 which refers to the tendency of winners of auctions
to find that they have paid too much. First, Kremer worries that
without the markup, no one would bid. After all, without a markup, if
the inventor accepts a bid, it is presumably because the bid is higher
than the actual value of the patent, which the inventor is likely in a
better position to know than any of the bidders. 121 One solution would
be to prevent the inventor from rejecting the highest offer, but this
solution is not necessary given Kremer's approach. A sufficiently high
markup will solve the problem, because with the government
effectively subsidizing bids, bidders will recognize that an inventor
might accept the offer even if the high bidder offered less than the
patent value.
Second, the markup could be applied to a bid other than the
highest bid to determine what the government must pay for the
patent. The highest bid, after all, might be an outlier, perhaps
reflecting the one firm that made a severe miscalculation in
estimating the value of the patent.122 The need for this crude system-
Kremer recommends a "simple rule" in which the patent holder would
be offered a "multiple of the third highest bid"' 23-is less clear than
the need for a markup. Bidders, after all, have incentives to shave
their bids in anticipation of the winner's curse, 124 and Kremer would
make the highest bidder the winner in cases in which the government
120. See generally Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse, in THE WINNER'S CURSE:
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50-52 (1992) (characterizing the winner's curse
as an example of irrational market behavior); E.C. Capen et al., Competitive Bidding in High-
Risk Situations, 23 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 641, 643 (1971) (providing an example of the winner's
curse); Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An Empirical Study of an Auction with
Asymmetric Information, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 865, 882 (1988) (assessing the extent to which
individuals can learn to overcome the winner's curse).
121. Kremer does not conclude that no one would bid, only that "patent owners would never
sell their patents" because bids would be too low. Kremer, supra note 21, at 1149.
122. Id. at 1148 & n.8.
123. Id. at 1148.
124. See, e.g., Stuart E. Thiel, Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 884,




sells the patent. 125 Presumably, the purpose is to save the government
from the folly of the occasional irrational bidder, but the government
is relatively risk-neutral, and there is no reason to think that the
highest bids will be systematically too high. The purpose may also be
to ensure that the patent holder receives a relatively accurate bid. But
it is not clear that some multiple of the third bid will be more likely to
be accurate than the highest bid.
This last criticism may seem petty, in part because Kremer
attaches little importance to using the third bid. 126 It points, however,
to a broader problem. Kremer recognizes, correctly, that the highest
bid in an auction may not represent the proper valuation of a patent.
But the development of an algorithm to determine the appropriate
valuation is difficult, and merely using the third-highest bid is hardly
a perfect solution. The less competitive the auction, the more severe is
the problem. If there are only three bidders on a patent, the third-
highest bid will in fact be the low bid. It is certainly plausible that
some auctions would generate very few bidders, for two reasons. First,
there may be only a small number of firms ideally positioned to exploit
the patent. Second, the high cost of investigation of a patent's
prospects to determine the bid will discourage some bidders. In all
auctions, bidders risk that their investigation costs will buy them
nothing, as someone else emerges the high bidder. Wasted
investigation costs are of particular concern here, given that the
government often places patents in the public domain instead of
selling to the high bidder.
125. The high bidder would pay the bid of the second-highest bidder. Kremer, supra note 21,
at 1147. This is known as a Vickrey auction, after Nobel laureate William Vickrey, who
developed it. See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed
Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 20-23 (1961); see also James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Designing a
Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure, 53 J. PUB. ECON.
127, 135-36 (1994) (discussing this auction approach); cf. David Lucking-Reiley, Vickrey Auctions
in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2000, at 183, 185 (demonstrating that Vickrey auctions were used
among stamp collectors even before Vickrey was born). In such a second-price, sealed-bid
auction, each competitor will bid her own valuation of the good, without shaving her bid
downward in the hope of still winning the auction at a lower price.
126. Kremer states only that "it might be best for the government" to use such a rule.
Kremer, supra note 21, at 1148. In addition, Kremer states, "If the government knew the prior
distribution of valuations, it would be able to aggregate the information of all bidders to estimate
the private value of the patent." Id. at 1147-48. One way to understand the intuition that the
government should not simply average all bids in determining its offer to the inventor is to focus
on very low bids. Someone may bid $1 on the off chance that no one else will bid, yet this $1 bid
conveys very little information. More generally, some bidders may do less research than other
bidders and correspondingly shave their bids by a greater amount than those other bidders
because of the winner's curse. These low bids also convey relatively little information.
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Imprecision, of course, is not fatal to Kremer's market scheme;
even with a very small number of bidders, as long as the bidders have
sufficiently strong incentives to bid accurately, we may still have more
confidence in private bids than in government assessments. An
additional concern, to which Kremer devotes considerable attention, 127
is the problem of collusion. A seller of a patent would have an
incentive to bribe potential bidders to enter high bids. Suppose, for
example, that Company A auctions a patent that in fact is worthless.
Company A might promise to pay Company B $200,000 to bid
$1,000,000 for the patent. As long as the probability that the
randomization function leads to a purchase is sufficiently less than
twenty percent to overcome any risk aversion by Company B,
Company B should accept the offer. If, for example, the probability
that the private bid will be accepted is ten percent, Company B's
expected payment for the worthless patent will be $100,000, and its
average profit from the transaction will be $100,000. The deal also
benefits A, which will receive $1,000,000 ninety percent of the time for
a cost of just $200,000. Similar bribes, of course, might be possible
with valuable patents to make them even more valuable. Once the
government ignores the private bidding some percentage of the time,
there will be opportunities for mutual gains from trade between
patent owners and bidders.
Kremer offers several possible solutions to the collusion
problem. 128 First, reliance on the third-highest bid, as described above,
would make collusion more difficult by forcing a company to bribe
three different bidders. 129 This provides a better argument for the
third-highest-bid approach than Kremer offered earlier, but it may not
be foolproof. If the three bidders cooperated, after all, relatively small
bribes would be needed for the second and third bidders, since they
would recognize that they would never have to pay for the patent.
Second, the agency might respond to suspicions of overbidding by
skipping the randomization function and forcing the high bidder to
purchase the patent. 130 The problem, of course, is that the agency
127. Id. at 1157-62.
128. For a different solution to collusion problems with market mechanisms, see
Abramowicz, supra note 113, at 390-93.
129. Kremer, supra note 21, at 1158 ('The original patent holder would therefore have to
bribe three companies instead of one to ensure a substantial increase in the buyout price.").
130. Id. Kremer also suggests that the agency should reduce the markup when it detects
collusion. Id. This would presumably require a costly hearing, as patent holders would argue
that they had not in fact bribed bidders. While the decision to accept the high bid should be
neutral to a patent holder and a bidder that have not overbid, lowering the markup or
eliminating the patent holder's ability to decline to sell the patent is essentially a penalty. At the
least, the government would have to provide adequate predeprivation protections to prevent such
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would need to be able to identify suspicious activity, and false
positives would reduce the effectiveness of the regime by reducing the
number of patents ultimately placed into the public domain. Third,
"[t]he government could develop lists of suspect bidders by checking
whether winning bidders made money, since systematic overbidders
would incur big losses."'' 1 Once again, this approach is perhaps sound,
but also costly, time-consuming, and imperfect.
Kremer's most developed proposal for combating collusion
recommends the adoption of "ceiling prices."'1 2 Such prices would
represent the maximum that could be paid for a patent and would be
determined in several complementary ways. First, "[a] waiting period
of several years could be required before patents were bought by the
government, and ceiling prices could be set as a multiple of annual
revenues prior to the patent buyout."'133 Second, "patents could be
capped by total sales of the drug following the patent buyout, times an
administrative estimate of the social value of the drug per dose or per
patient."134 Interestingly, these rules make Kremer's proposal closer to
Shavell and van Ypersele's, with the attendant strengths and
limitations of that approach. The government would monitor sales,
both before and after the patent buyout, while at the same time using
some method to extrapolate the social value of the drug. The
proposals, of course, are not identical. Shavell and van Ypersele would
use such data to calculate a relatively low offer for the patent
holder, 135 while Kremer would use sales data as a cap on market price.
penalties from being applied inappropriately. See generally Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976) (providing a three-part test for determining whether a governmental procedure
violates the due process of law).
131. Kremer, supra note 21, at 1158.
132. Id. at 1159-62.
133. Id. at 1159.
134. Id. at 1160. Kremer also offers a third, slightly more elaborate proposal. Id. at 1160-61.
Under this proposal, inventors would be paid only if the randomization function led the patent to
be sold to the high bidder. Id. at 1160. In this case, the inventor would receive an amount equal
to the monopoly profits earned by the high bidder, multiplied by the inverse of the probability
that the patent would be sold to the high bidder. Id. at 1160-61. This proposal has two
limitations. First, there would be a substantial risk that the patent holder would receive nothing.
Presumably, a patent holder might try to insure against this risk, but the insurance could be
expensive. Second, and more significantly, there would still be an incentive to manipulate the
system ex post. Kremer notes that one might do so by "bribing the high bidder to boost sales
artificially through tie-ins with other products." Id. at 1161. More generally, any falsification of
sales figures would be profitable. Alternatively, the original patent holder might just buy lots of
the product (or pay third parties to do so), especially if the probability of the patent being
randomized to the high bidder is sufficiently low (and thus the inverse sufficiently high). Once
again, the government could try to protect against these schemes, but it may not do so
successfully.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
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Nonetheless, the more government must make discretionary decisions,
the less attractive Kremer's market mechanism becomes.
Perhaps the government could be successful in combating
explicit collusion, either through one of Kremer's approaches or
through some other approach, such as rigorous criminal enforcement
of a ban on such collusion and bounties for private parties who expose
collusive behavior. 136 Nonetheless, even if the government can
eliminate all explicit collusion between patent holders and bidders, it
still might face the problem of implicit collusion.137 Consider two drug
companies. One company might offer a large bid for the other
company's patent in the hope that the other company will reciprocate,
and if the companies are repeat players, they might start offering
generous bids on each other's patents without even communicating
directly with each other. 138 Again, the government might be successful
in identifying such behavior, but it would be especially difficult to
police on the margins, where the companies' bids are high but not
absurdly so. The government might combat collusion, either implicit
or explicit, by reducing markup prices accordingly, 139 but this
adjustment is a crude solution that will lead some markups to be too
high and some markups to be too low.
Kremer does not recognize the possibility of this form of
implicit collusion, but he does recognize another form. A company
might make a routine practice of buying back its patents from the
high bidders at a generous price. This strategy would work only for a
frequent player, especially if relatively few patents are randomized to
the high bidder rather than to the public domain. A company that
acquires such a reputation, however, would receive high benefits and
thus benefit in all the cases in which the patent is randomized to the
public domain. Kremer's solution is that "inventors would be
136. For a related proposal in the antitrust context, see William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy
and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st Century, 9 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 97 (1997).
137. Implicit, or tacit, collusion presents a substantial challenge to antitrust lawyers. See
Michael Freed et al., The Detection and Punishment of Tacit Collusion, 9 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP.
151 (1997) (reporting a conference on the problem of implicit collusion).
138. The challenge is for the parties to solve the prisoners' dilemma, as each of the two
companies would benefit most by having the other company help it without itself providing help
to the other company. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 31-35 (1994)
(providing an introduction to the prisoners' dilemma). Here, the prisoners' dilemma would occur
over multiple rounds, making it potentially tractable. See David M. Kreps et al., Rational
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982)
(providing a model leading to cooperation in finite-period prisoners' dilemmas).
139. See Kremer, supra note 21, at 1162 ("For example, if the optimal markup was three (as
seems plausible), and if collusion were thought to raise prices by up to 50 percent, then the
government could simply offer a markup of two.").
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prohibited from buying back the patent from the winning bidder."'140
The government might be able to enforce this successfully, but it does
have costs. As Kremer recognizes elsewhere in his article, the original
patent holder may be the lowest-cost producer, 141 so the proposal
would mean that when patents are randomized to the high bidder, it
will be owned not just by a monopolist but by an inefficient
monopolist. The cost of such inefficiency might be reduced by lowering
the probability that the patent is randomized to the high bidder, but
this solution will decrease the number of bidders and increase the risk
of collusion.
Collusion is not the only potential problem for Kremer's
system. Just as Shavell and van Ypersele's model worked best when
each innovation corresponded to a single product, 142 so too Kremer's
proposal works most smoothly when the sales of each invention are
independent of the sales of all other innovations. When one product is
a substitute or a complement of another, incentives will be distorted.
As an example of the complication that arises from substitutes, 43
Kremer explains that "people would bid less for the patent on Prozac if
they expected that the patent on Zoloft would be put in the public
domain."'144 That is, the Zoloft patent will be worth less because of the
possibility that Prozac will end up in the public domain, and the
reverse is true as well. If Prozac and Zoloft are perfect substitutes and
can be manufactured for zero marginal cost, then the value of each in
the auction will be discounted by the probability that the other will be
placed in the public domain. Thus, if there were a ninety percent
chance of placement in the public domain for each of the drugs by the
market mechanism, then each would fetch only ten percent as much
as if the other drug did not exist.
Complementary products present the opposite problem.
Suppose that a new drug cocktail for a disease consists of two
independently patented drugs, Drug A and Drug B, which again can
be produced for zero marginal costs. A and B are perfect
complements,145 so that a pill of A is worthless without a pill of B and
vice versa. If these complements are auctioned independently, the
140. Id. at 1159.
141. Id. at 1150-52.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05.
143. Economists define products as substitutes if they are "related such that an increase in
the price of one will increase the demand for the other or a decrease in the price of one will
decrease the demand for the other." EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 30, at G-20.
144. Kremer, supra note 21, at 1154.
145. Complements are "[p]roducts that are related such that an increase in the price of one
will decrease the demand for the other or a decrease in the price of one will increase the demand
for the other." EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 30, at G-4.
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private bids for the two independently will be greater than the value
of the two together. A bidder for the A patent will reason, using the
same probability for randomization as before, that there is a ninety
percent chance that B will be placed in the public domain. Thus, if A is
randomized to a bidder, there is a ninety percent chance that the
owner will be able to extract the full monopoly profits for the combined
cocktail. There is just a ten percent chance that the owner will have to
enter into some arrangement with the new owner of the B patent and
thus receive only about half of the monopoly profits. 146 Thus, the
bidder on patent A, if risk-neutral, will bid ninety-five percent of the
value of the monopoly profits of the two drugs combined. Using
precisely the same reasoning, the bidder on patent B will do the same.
If both are randomized to the public domain, the government will pay
1.9 times monopoly profits, even before the markup. And the problem,
of course, will be more severe with a three-drug cocktail.
Kremer offers a neat solution to the substitute and complement
problems, but the solution is an imperfect one. The trick is to jointly
randomize groups of such patents, 147 so that either all are placed in
the public domain or all are randomized to private bidders. Doing this
coordinated randomization would solve the problem, since the
distortions above arise only when one innovation is placed in the
public domain while the other is not. The difficulty is that the
government must identify substitutes and complements. Substitutes
are easier, 148 since holders of substitute patents would have every
incentive to present their patents for joint randomization, and, as
Kremer points out, joint randomization of patents that are not really
substitutes would do no harm. 149 The challenge, however, would be
146. Kremer gives a similar example, though in his example, the patents are auctioned at
different times:
[C]onsider an example in which two complementary inventions each have private
value 0.1x individually but have value 71 together, and suppose that the social value of
the patents alone or together is twice their private value. If one patent is put in the
public domain, then the reward for invention of the other patent will be 0.9n times the
markup. This implies that under separate patent buyouts the developers of each
patent can expect to receive approximately 0.9n times the markup, since bidders for
the first patent will anticipate that the second patent is likely to be put in the public
domain and by the time the second patent has been invented, the first patent will
probably be in the public domain. This will create excessive incentives for creation of
the pair of inventions, since the social value of the pair is only 2R.
Kremer, supra note 21, at 1156.
147. See id. at 1154-55 (proposing joint randomization for substitute patents); id. at 1155-57
(proposing joint randomization for complementary patents).
148. Professor Rai, however, notes, that in the pharmaceutical market, "[g]iven the
pervasiveness of me-too pharmaceuticals ... Kremer's proposed regime would effectively result
in mandatory buyouts for many innovator patents." Rai, supra note 66, at 201.
149. There is, however, a problem that Kremer does not recognize. Kremer explains:
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greater for complementary patents, since companies would have no
incentive to come forward. 150 Kremer suggests that the government
would be able to identify "very strong complements."'15' The approach,
however, would require bureaucrats at least to recognize that a patent
might be complementary to another,15 2 and the method might not
work for weaker complements.
The market mechanism's susceptibility to gaming, either
through collusion or in the case of complementary patents, does not
necessarily rule it out as a useful method for valuing patents. It is
especially useful when other methods for valuing patents, such as
those described in the preceding sections, would be ineffective. For
example, when a patent holder would obtain value from the patent
primarily by licensing it to other companies that would incorporate
the patent into their own inventions, the market mechanism provides
Note that joint randomization does not require a bureaucracy to judge whether goods
are substitutes. Any patent holder could claim that his or her patent was a substitute
for a new patent, and request that it be jointly randomized with the new patent. Even
if the new patent was not in fact a substitute for the old patent, jointly randomizing
the old patent together with an unrelated new patent would create no harm and
would have the advantage of possibly transferring another patent to the public
domain.
Kremer, supra note 21, at 1155. The problem is that once a patent is randomized to a bidder, the
bidder should not be able to place the patent through the system again. The reason is that
bidders in the initial auction would anticipate being able to place the patent back up for auction
and receive the markup. Suppose, for example, that the monopoly profits for an innovation will
be $1 million and the markup is two. In Kremer's system, if the patent is randomized to the high
bidder, then the high bidder will pay the amount of the second highest bid and receive the
patent; the original patent owner, meanwhile, will receive the benefit of the markup. But if the
high bidder could then reauction the patent and receive the markup, then the initial bid would
be around $2 million rather than $1 million. Indeed, it would be higher, since the bidder would
anticipate that the bidder in the next round would anticipate being able to reauction the patent,
and so on ad infinitum. Happily, the problem is not a fatal one. The solution is simply to
eliminate the markup for patents that are reauctioned. As this example reveals, however, the
Kremer system cannot be relied on to place virtually all patents in the public domain, since the
patents that are randomized to bidders will likely stay with bidders, rather than being
repeatedly auctioned until being placed in the public domain. The example also shows that it
may be difficult to anticipate all possible ways that a particular approach might be exploited.
150. Indeed, a company would seek to market different components of the same product
separately if multiple patents could be obtained. See id. ("It would also create an incentive for
inventors to divide up inventions into multiple complementary patents.").
151. Id. at 1157.
152. Kremer explains that "[i]f a set of patents are complements, the sum of the bids for
subsets will be less than the bids for the entire set." Id. The government thus must have
sufficient suspicions of complementarity to allow bidding on a set of patents in addition to
bidding on the individual members of the group. If patents are being auctioned at the same time,
the government might allow bidders to bid on any combination of patents, resulting in joint
randomization if the bid on whatever combination a bidder chooses is higher than the highest
bids for the patents individually. This market solution, however, will not work, at least without
substantial elaboration, when patents are auctioned at different times-which inventors of
complementary patents accordingly would have an incentive to do.
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a useful means of obtaining an objective valuation. Nonetheless, the
mechanism does not eliminate the need for human supervision, either
in the form of a bureaucracy or through some sort of litigation, to
identify instances in which gaming of the system might lead to
inaccurate results. At the same time, the mechanism will be less
useful when it is imperative to transfer a particular patent to the
public domain with complete certainty or when the existence of
complementary patents complicates the valuation process.
D. Lichtman's Coupon Scheme
Douglas Lichtman's proposal in Pricing Prozac differs from
those of the other three authors in that he does not suggest buying out
patents. 153 Indeed, Lichtman's article begins by discussing Kremer's
proposal, and while complimentary of it, 154 Lichtman suggests that
deadweight loss might be eliminated far more cheaply. 155 Under
Kremer's proposal and the others discussed so far, the government
would buy out the patent, thus paying in an opt-in regime at least the
monopoly profits that the patent holder would have expected to
receive. Lichtman argues that a full buyout is not necessary to
eliminate deadweight loss. Instead, Lichtman suggests that the
government subsidize the purchase of patented products such as
pharmaceuticals. In essence, the government would give discount
coupons to the consumers who would be willing to pay more than
marginal cost for the drugs but would not be willing to pay the
monopoly price. Astonishingly, Lichtman demonstrates that, under
certain stylized assumptions, a well-executed program might cost only
one-eighth as much as a patent buyout. 15 6
Before arguing that patent buyouts nonetheless might be
superior to coupon schemes in some circumstances, I will trace
Lichtman's argument. First, however, it may be worthwhile to identify
a principle that provides an intuitive basis for why a coupon scheme
can eliminate deadweight loss. It is a familiar concept from
introductory microeconomics courses that there will be no deadweight
loss from a monopoly if the monopolist can perfectly price
153. See Lichtman, supra note 22.
154. See id. at 124 ("The proposal has much to recommend it. Unlike more conventional
approaches, Kremer's suggestion balances the twin goals of encouraging private research and
increasing the availability of new pharmaceuticals." (footnote omitted)).
155. For Lichtman, the purpose of limiting the government's expense is to limit the
deadweight loss associated with the distortionary effects of taxation. See id. at 124, 136; infra
Part II.D. 1 (discussing the distortionary effects of taxation).
156. Lichtman, supra note 22, at 135.
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discriminate. 157 A monopolist who price discriminates charges each
consumer who values the product at more than its marginal cost the
maximum that this consumer will pay for the product. Even the
consumer who values the product at just one cent above marginal cost
is worth selling to if the sale does not affect the price paid by the other
consumers. Perfect price discrimination eliminates consumer surplus,
but it eliminates deadweight loss too. 158 Just as a monopolist that can
perfectly price discriminate eliminates deadweight loss, the
government might use coupons to eliminate deadweight loss even if a
monopolist charges the same price to everyone.
Some consumers, of course, will be willing to purchase the
product at the monopoly price, but some will not. For consumers who
place some value on the product but not so much as to buy it at the
monopoly price, a coupon can make the difference. For example, if the
price of a drug is $5 and a consumer values it at $4, then the
consumer will be willing to purchase the drug with a $1 coupon. If the
government can give each consumer who values the drug at between
marginal cost and the monopoly price just the right size coupon, then
the government will have eliminated deadweight loss relatively
cheaply. "Give him just one dollar," Lichtman explains, "and you will,
in effect, be increasing the producer's revenue by five dollars."159
Moreover, the government might get by with an even smaller coupon,
if it can induce the monopolist to lower its price to capture additional
consumers. For example, if a number of consumers valuing the drug at
$4 had $0.75 coupons, the monopolist might lower the price to $4.75
rather than lose these customers altogether, benefiting both these
consumers and others. In contrast, a buyout would require the
government in effect to spend the full $5 to provide the consumer
surplus in the example above.
The government's ability to reduce deadweight loss and induce
the manufacturer to lower price is contingent on its ability to
determine the size of coupons that individual consumers should
receive. Moreover, Kremer argues in a footnote rejoinder to
Lichtman,1 60 the government must have better information than the
157. See, e.g., NICHOLSON, supra note 76, at 574.
158. In addition, because the monopolist will capture the full social benefit of the invention,
the monopolist has the proper incentive to invest the appropriate amount in an innovation. See
supra note 77 and accompanying text. But see infra text accompanying notes 256-59 (arguing
that patents might promote excessive incentives to innovate).
159. Lichtman, supra note 22, at 125.
160. Kremer, supra note 21, at 1139 n.1 (stating that targeting subsidies "requires that the
government have lots of information"). Kremer is able to respond to Lichtman because
Lichtman's article was a response to an early version of Kremer's article. See MICHAEL KREMER,
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monopolist. After all, if the monopolist knew how much each consumer
valued the product, it presumably would be perfectly price
discriminating itself, saving the government the trouble. Lichtman
anticipates this argument in two ways. First, he suggests in a footnote
that the government might be better positioned to give coupons than a
monopolist would be to price discriminate. "Clues that are available to
the government (tax returns, voluntary disclosures made for the
purpose of qualifying for health and welfare programs, etc.) are, for
good reason, not available more broadly."161 In addition, "even where
price discrimination is practical, such behavior is sharply restricted
under both antitrust and patent misuse doctrine."162 Second, Lichtman
falls back on the conclusion that a well-executed scheme would cost
only one-eighth as much as a patent buyout. "[S]o long as one in every
eight dollars is placed in the hands of an appropriate consumer, the
consumer subsidy scheme will be the most effective option."16 3
The first of Lichtman's claims is difficult to assess without a
detailed empirical analysis. On the one hand, the government might
have access to some data that a company either does not have access
to or cannot take advantage of, but it is also true that the company
may be able to price discriminate in ways that the government cannot.
This observation, however, does not undercut Lichtman's proposal. A
company's price discrimination and the government's distribution of
coupons can be complementary, with the first eliminating some
deadweight loss and the second eliminating some more or perhaps
even all deadweight loss. Indeed, the existence of some price
discrimination by patent holders strengthens Lichtman's argument by
PATENT BuY-OUTS: A MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING INNOVATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6304, 1997).
161. Lichtman, supra note 22, at 133 n.25.
162. Id. But see Kieff, supra note 100, at 727-32 (arguing that patent holders often reduce
deadweight loss through price discrimination). Lichtman's allusion to antitrust is presumably a
reference to the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994), which makes it "unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality." Enforcement of the Act, however, has long been on the
decline, in part because of the recognition that price discrimination may promote efficiency. See
Rudolph J. Peritz, The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the
Monopolization of Price Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205, 1210-11 (1984); see also
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229-30 (1993) (requiring
proof of generalized injury to competition in certain types of price discrimination cases). It is
true, meanwhile, that some courts have found patent misuse based on price discrimination even
in the absence of a finding of an antitrust violation. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc.,
601 F. Supp. 62, 65 (N.D. 111. 1984). The Federal Circuit, however, sharply limited the doctrine of
patent misuse in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992), by
holding that use restrictions beyond the scope of a patent grant would be evaluated under
antitrust law's rule-of-reason analysis.
163. Lichtman, supra note 22, at 136.
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leaving the government with less to do on its own. Suppose a company
can effect perfect price discrimination with a representative half of its
consumers and cannot price discriminate at all with the other
consumers. Then, a well-executed scheme to eliminate deadweight loss
should cost only half as much as before, or one-sixteenth as much as
the cost of a patent buyout if the government has perfect information
about consumers' price preferences. And even if the government does
not have perfect information, Lichtman's logic suggests that as long as
one of every sixteen dollars is placed in the hands of a consumer who
needs it, the scheme will be as cheap as a patent buyout.
Surely Lichtman is right that a one-in-eight "ratio seems
exceedingly achievable" for pharmaceuticals,1 64 and a one-in-sixteen
ratio even more so. Thus, the strength of Lichtman's proposal
ultimately depends on his second fallback argument. Lichtman is
indeed correct under his stated assumption that if the government has
perfect information, then, ignoring administrative costs, 165 a coupon
scheme will be one-eighth the price of a buyout scheme. I will argue,
however, against his intuitively appealing inference that the coupon
scheme must be judged as successful as a buyout scheme if only one in
eight dollars is placed in proper hands. This inference would be correct
if the incorrectly allocated dollars are used on other products
altogether-groceries or movie tickets, for example. Such misuse,
though, is presumably easy to prevent with coupons. 166 But it is not
correct if the government awards coupons to people who will use them
to purchase the drugs but who are not the people who would have
received the coupons had the government executed the scheme
perfectly. When someone who would purchase the product anyway
receives a coupon, Lichtman's conclusion is incorrect. To justify this
fully, I will need to fill in more of Lichtman's argument and explain
how Lichtman calculates the one-eighth figure.
164. Id.
165. See infra Part II.D.2.
166. In defending the proposition that the "opportunity for abuse is small," Lichtman argues
that "[t]his would be especially true if subsidies were ultimately implemented in a very precise
manner-a $5 non-transferable coupon given to consumer A, usable only toward this month's
purchase of Prozac." Lichtman, supra note 22, at 136. I agree that we probably need not worry
too much about the possibility that A will get around this limitation by, say, falsifying a receipt
for Prozac. A greater concern might be that A would sell the receipt to someone who does not
need it or that pharmacies might facilitate fraud, similar to current problems with food stamps.
Cf. FOOD & CONSUMER SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., THE EXTENT OF TRAFFICKING IN THE FOOD
STAMP PROGRAM (1995) (discussing the black market in the food stamp program). I will assume,
however, that even this type of abuse could be addressed.
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To understand Lichtman's calculation, consider Figure 2, which
includes two panels nearly identical to figures in Lichtman's article. 167
Both panels assume a linear demand function and zero marginal cost
of production. 168 Under these circumstances, a monopolist who can set
only a single price will sell to half of all consumers who assign some
value to the product,' 69 because doing so maximizes monopoly profits,
the shaded area in the left panel. Such a monopolist would be equally
well off if it could sell its product to all the consumers at half the
monopoly price, as indicated in the right panel. The problem, of
course, is that this point is above the demand curve. In the absence of
government intervention, at that price, only three-quarters of
consumers would buy the product. 170
167. See Lichtman, supra note 22, at 131 fig 1, 135 fig.4.
168. Id. at 130.
169. Id. at 132 n.21 ("When facing linear demand and zero marginal cost, a monopolist
maximizes profit by selling to exactly half the consumers.") (citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON &
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 583 (13th ed. 1989)). Lichtman's figures, unfortunately, are
not drawn to scale, making it appear that the monopolist would be selling to more than half of all
consumers. I have tried to correct this problem in the diagram above.
170. This follows from the assumption of linear demand. If at the monopoly price half of all
consumers would buy the product, and all of the consumers would take the product if it were
free, then at half the monopoly price, three-quarters of consumers will buy the product.
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Figure 2: The Coupon Alternative to Patent Buyouts
As in Figure 1, a profit-maximizing patent holder will choose the monopoly price Pm and quantity
Q,, in the absence of a buyout program or coupon scheme. Because marginal cost is assumed to
be zero, the shaded area in the left panel represents the patent holder's profits. This is the
minimum amount that the government would have to pay the patent holder to buy out the
patent and leave the patent holder just as well off as with the patent system. In the absence of a
buyout, the patent holder could make equal profits by selling at half the monopoly price to twice
the number of consumers. The point representing this combination, however, is above the
demand curve, because the lowest-valuing quarter of consumers does not value the patent at
even this much. By providing just a large enough coupon to each of these consumers, the
government in effect fleshes out the demand curve. The shaded area in the right panel is the cost





Qm 2Qr, Q, 2Qm
Quantity Quantity
The government's task then is simply to give coupons to the
remaining quarter of consumers (which is equal to half the number of
consumers who would be served by the monopolist). Moreover, the
government does not have to give a full coupon, equal to half the
monopoly price, to every one of these consumers. If the government
has perfect information, then it can give some consumers just a penny
coupon, so that the average coupon needed amounts to just one-half of
one-half of the monopoly price. Paying an average of one-fourth of the
monopoly price to one-half of the consumers who would be served by a
monopolist is equivalent to paying one-eighth of monopoly profits.
Indeed, the subsidy triangle in the right-hand panel is one-eighth the
size of the producer's surplus box in the left hand panel.
Lichtman's reasoning on this point is sound. To assess the
limitations on this observation, however, begin by considering what
the monopolist would do if the government were able to effect its
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perfect coupon scheme. Assuming with Lichtman that the monopolist
must set a single price, the monopolist should be indifferent between
selling at the monopoly price and selling at the lower price that, with
the coupons, will produce an identical profit. Thus, even if the
government issues the coupons to the proper consumer, the
monopolist could still choose the monopoly price. Presumably, the
monopolist would not do so for reputational reasons, though the
monopolist might if the government is not able to give all of the last
quarter of consumers coupons. As soon as a single consumer who
needs a coupon does not receive one, the monopolist will be better off
selling at the monopoly price.
This example, however, reveals two things. First, the
government cannot ensure cooperation from monopolists in pricing
their drugs if they fail to execute the coupon scheme perfectly. Second,
it is important for the government to ensure that all consumers who
should qualify for coupons do in fact receive such coupons. In the
absence of perfect information, however, a government intent on
accomplishing this objective is likely to give coupons to some people
who should not receive the coupons, and indeed it may become
necessary to give coupons to all consumers. This allocation in turn will
lead monopolists not to cooperate in pricing. When relatively high-
valuing consumers receive coupons, the monopolist is less likely to set
the price to the lower value. Indeed, giving coupons to consumers who




Figure 3: The Effect of a Universal Coupon Scheme
Providing coupons to all consumers shifts out the demand curve from the patent holder's
perspective. The patent holder will respond by serving twenty-five percent more consumers at a
price twenty-five percent higher than in the monopoly case. The deadweight loss triangle, shaded
in both panels, is reduced from half the monopoly profits in the standard monopoly case to 9/32,
a reduction of just forty-three percent.
Demand Demand
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To see why the monopolist might raise its price in response to
the award of coupons, consider the case in which the government gives
all consumers of a particular drug a full coupon, that is the amount
that would be needed to induce the consumer who least values the
drug (but still values it more than zero, the marginal cost) to purchase
it in a perfectly executed subsidy scheme. This is, of course, the only
way that the monopolist can ensure that all of the consumers in the
last quartile receive coupons. The government's generosity effectively
shifts out the demand curve, as illustrated in Figure 3. A profit-
maximizing monopolist will respond by raising the price and, even
with the shifted out demand curve, serving only a few more consumers
than before. The monopoly profits will be greater than previously, but
the government will not have accomplished its aim. Many consumers
will still not use their coupons because the coupon is insufficient to




This example shows the fallacy in Lichtman's inference that
the government can misspend seven dollars for every dollar it spends
correctly and still achieve the same benefit that a patent buyout
program would bring. Here, the government misspends seven dollars
for every dollar that it spends correctly (including the excess from
granting full rather than partial coupons to the lowest-valuing quarter
of consumers), and much of the benefit of the program is lost. This
flaw is not fatal,171 as the government might award coupons only to
those consumers it believes to be in the bottom quartile and
compensate by paying the monopolist a bonus for every coupon
cashed. Thus, the government might pay the company $2 for a coupon
worth $1 to induce the company to price its product at the low level
where coupons will make an impact. As long as the government gives
low-valuing consumers coupons with sufficient producer bonuses to
make up dollar-for-dollar revenue lost from low-valuing consumers
who do not receive the coupons, the patent holder will choose the
lower price rather than the monopoly price.
Similarly, the government could increase the redemption value
of just some coupons, those that will go to consumers who the
government is most confident are in the last quarter of consumers. To
what extent must the government increase the producer's redemption
value of such coupons to make up for relatively high-valuing
consumers who mistakenly receive coupons? The theoretical analysis
is complex. Giving a coupon to a consumer will have no effect on the
monopoly price if the amount that the patent holder would have to
raise the price to increase its revenues from this consumer is less than
the amount that the patent holder would lose from decreased
output. 172 On the other hand, giving a coupon to some consumers may
require the government to make up for this coupon more than dollar
for dollar.1 73 A further complication is that the amount that the
171. The observation does, however, pose a problem with Lichtman's argument that the
government might choose "to pursue a mixed strategy, allowing some of the deadweight loss to
remain but eliminating the remainder by means of a consumer subsidy." Lichtman, supra note
22, at 138. While it is possible for the government to eliminate just some deadweight loss,
distributing only a few coupons without using the "bonus" approach suggested above is unlikely
to induce the monopolist to lower its price.
172. For example, awarding coupons of up to the difference between the monopoly price and
the desired low price to only the very highest-valuing consumers, those in the first quartile,
would have no effect on the monopoly price or producer welfare at all. Raising the monopoly price
by up to that amount would not affect the amount that these high-valuing consumers will end up
paying and would cause the patent holder to lose revenue from the second quartile. The only
effect would be distributional.
173. Take, for example, the consumer who values the product at one penny less than the
monopoly price. If that consumer is given a one-penny coupon, then the consumer will buy at the
monopoly price. Thus, the monopolist's profits from selling at the monopoly price instead of at
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government must make up for giving one coupon erroneously may
depend on to whom else the government has erroneously awarded
coupons. This makes it difficult to develop a simple formula for how
much the government will have to provide in coupon bonuses for the
producer to compensate for imperfections in the government's
calculations.
To generate at least tentative calculations, I designed and
executed a computerized simulation. The simulation featured five
thousand consumers whose valuations ranged linearly from $0 to
$1.00. The simulated government was able to estimate the maximum
amount that each consumer would pay for the product with some
error. The simulation calculated the government's estimates by adding
to each consumer a stochastic error term with a specified variance. For
every consumer that the government estimated would be willing to
pay less than $0.25-that is, for consumers that appeared to the
government to be in the bottom quartile-the government granted a
coupon equal to the amount that the government estimated would be
necessary to induce the consumer to purchase the product at $0.25.174
(Recall that $0.25 would be the price at which the government would
seek to induce pricing in Lichtman's model to eliminate all deadweight
loss if coupons are allocated correctly.) Thus, if the government
estimated that a consumer would be willing to pay $0.05, the
consumer would receive a $0.20 coupon. 175 In addition, for consumers
whose willingness to pay the government estimated at less than
$0.125, the government added a producer's bonus to the coupon. The
producer's bonus would not change the price to the consumer but
would result in a government payment to the patent holder at the
specified price.
Table 1 shows the results of the simulation.1 76 The first column
shows different values for the variance of the error term; lower
variance means the government has a greater ability to estimate
the lower price will rise by the full amount of the monopoly price. To make the lower price
attractive, the government will have to make up for the full amount of the monopoly price.
174. I also ran simulations in which the government gave all consumers in the bottom
quartile slightly more than the government estimated would be necessary. This approach proved
to be less cost effective than giving consumers exactly what it appeared they needed.
175. Because of the stochastic error term, the simulated government estimated the
maximum that some consumers would pay as a negative number. For these consumers, the
government granted a $0.25 coupon. Presumably, consumers who in fact have negative
reservation prices would not take the product even for free, so giving $0.25 coupons to all
consumers who seem to have such negative reservation prices would be an appropriate policy.
Consumers who really do not want the product presumably would throw the coupons out
(assuming away the risk of arbitrage, see supra note 166), and consumers whom the government
has misplaced in this category would be able to use the coupons.
176. The computer file containing the simulation is available on request from the author.
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consumers' willingness to pay. The second column indicates, for that
variance, the minimum producer's bonus needed in the simulation for
it to be more profitable for the patent holder to price the product at
$0.25 rather than at $0.50. The third column indicates the total cost to
the government of redeeming the coupons and paying bonuses to the
patent holder at that level, as a percentage of how much it would cost
the government to effect a buyout by paying the original monopoly
price. The fourth column indicates the total cost to the government as
a percentage of deadweight loss eliminated, taking into account that
some consumers who value the product above marginal cost still will
not purchase the product with the coupon provided by the
government. Note that because the government expenditures are
transfers and reductions of deadweight loss are efficiency gains, a
coupon program would still advance social welfare relative to the
status quo beyond one hundred percent. Finally, the fifth column
reports the relative cost efficiency of coupons and a perfectly executed
buyout scheme. For example, a cost efficiency of 0.50 would indicate
that $0.50 spent on a coupon scheme with the specified degree of error
would eliminate as much deadweight loss as a dollar spent on such a
buyout scheme.
Thus, the first row shows that if the government can estimate
individual consumers' demand perfectly, then it need pay only a penny
in producer's bonus to induce pricing at 0.25 rather than 0.50, and the
total cost of the coupons to the government as a percentage of the
original monopoly profit is thirteen percent. Note that this is one-in-
eight dollars, just as Lichtman's model predicts. 177 For higher
variances, the government's total cost grows, with the cost efficiency of
subsidies exceeding the cost efficiency of a patent buyout when the
variance reaches approximately 0.26. (Recall that with linear demand,
the cost of a buyout is the monopoly profit, which is twice deadweight
loss, so buyouts and coupons are equally effective when the total costs
to the government of a coupon scheme as a percentage of deadweight
loss is two hundred percent.)
177. The percentage will be exactly 12.5% if the government does not pay any producer's
bonus. As indicated above, however, this would leave the monopolist indifferent between pricing
at $0.25 and $0.50. See supra text preceding note 171.
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Table 1: Simulation of Coupon Program Effectiveness Based
on Quality of Government Information
Variance of Minimum Total Cost to Total Cost to Cost
Error Term Producer's Government Government as Efficiency
(in Dollars) Bonus Needed as Percentage Percentage of of Coupons
(in Dollars) of Cost of Deadweight Relative to
Buyout Loss Buyouts
Eliminated
0 0.01 13% 26% 0.13
0.01 0.35 24% 54% 0.27
0.1 0.49 57% 130% 0.65
0.2 0.56 77% 177% 0.89
0.25 0.59 86% 197% 0.98
0.3 0.60 92% 211% 1.06
0.4 0.63 103% 235% 1.18
0.5 0.64 110% 252% 1.26
This simulation analysis thus indicates that when the
government has sufficiently good information for distinguishing high-
valuing from low-valuing consumers, subsidies are indeed
considerably cheaper than buyouts. Of course, the simulation hardly
provides the final word on which approach is superior, even if it were
possible to determine precisely the variance of the error term for a
particular product. The approach of giving producers' bonuses to just
the bottom eighth of the population may not be optimal. In addition, to
ensure pricing by the patent holder at the lower level, the government
would have to give somewhat higher producers' bonuses. The analysis
does not take into account the cost of administering a coupon scheme,
which might well be far greater than the cost of administering a
buyout program. With real world products, moreover, demand may not
be linear, and marginal cost may not be zero. Finally, the comparison
is between a flawed coupon scheme and a perfectly executed buyout
program. The government may sometimes spend more on patent
buyouts than necessary to compensate patent holders. Of course, the
government also might pay excessive producers' bonuses in a coupon
program, so the ultimate question is in which program excessive
payments are more likely.
In the end, Lichtman's analysis might establish that the
optimal regime is a cross between buyouts and coupons. Instead of
seeking to induce pricing at a relatively low level, the government
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might negotiate directly with a patent holder to price the product at a
certain level, and in exchange for this agreement, the government
would provide the patent holder with some combination of cash and
coupons for relatively low-valuing purchasers. 178 If the government
and the patent holder manage to arrive at just the right price, the one
that by itself would result in three-quarters of consumers being served
if the demand curve is linear, and if the government can police the
price agreement successfully, then Lichtman's conclusion that only
one of eight dollars needs to be spent correctly will hold. This proposal,
of course, has its own risks. The government might agree to too high a
price, perhaps even a price above the monopoly price.1 79 At least
patent buyouts guarantee that the product will be priced at marginal
cost, 180 while price ceiling agreements potentially could have no
impact at all18 1 and, unless the government is successful in identifying
all who would benefit from coupons, will leave some potential
consumers unserved. Depending in part on the government's ability to
determine a satisfactory price ceiling, this negotiated coupon plan
might be superior, or a pure buyout or induced coupon scheme might
be.
II. HURDLES FOR PATENT PRIZE SYSTEMS
This part introduces additional complications for any prize
system. These complications reveal that even if a prize system could
determine with perfect accuracy the social value of an invention, it
might be inadequate or incomplete. In each section that follows, I
explore one set of such complications and examine how they might
differentially affect various proposals for prize systems. Part II.A
addresses functions of the patent system beyond promoting
178. This would be an opt-in version of the system, giving the patent holder the right to turn
the government down. A mandatory version would feature a combination of government price
controls and coupons.
179. The situation might be similar to that illustrated in Figure 2.
180. But cf. infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text (noting that even if a product is placed
in the public domain, the existence of a natural monopoly may prevent pricing at marginal cost).
181. If prices are directly set, rather than by the government agreeing to price ceilings, the
government agency conceivably could be used as a means of achieving cartelization by holders of
patents for substitute products. Cf., e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, Cooperation,
Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the "Jusen" Problem, 29 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1, 12 (1997) (defining a "regulatory cartel" as one "in which both the regulated
and the regulators cooperate in order to enforce market segmentation, control entry, regulate
output, and allocate the gains of the cartel's activities among the various participants"); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 725




innovation, while Part II.B considers whether prize systems might
ameliorate or exacerbate existing limitations of the patent system,
such as its tendency to promote wasteful patent races and "inventing
around." Part II.C discusses the danger that an opt-in prize system
would lead to prizes being granted for worthless inventions or
inventions that would be developed in the absence of a prize system.
Finally, Part II.D analyzes the costs of prize systems, including the
costs of the prizes themselves, as well as administrative, litigation,
and rent-seeking costs.
My aim is partly to establish a foundation for assessing the
costs and benefits of any particular proposal, including the proposals
that I will introduce in Part III. It is also, however, to extend the
generalizations of Part I. The previous part established that, although
an effective prize system could produce social benefits by eliminating
deadweight loss and perhaps by increasing innovation incentives, the
task of calculating prizes may be more difficult than commentators
have suggested. Even the best formula or algorithm may be
insufficient to ensure that optimal prizes are given, and the best
approach to reducing deadweight loss in one situation may be
different from that in another. In assessing the various proposals, I
will make a preliminary case that I will extend explicitly in Part III.
The argument is that a flexible prize system, allowing and
incentivizing inventors to adopt various techniques for avoiding
deadweight loss, may be superior to any system based on criteria and
procedures set forth in advance in a statute.
A. Patent System Incentives Beyond Invention
F. Scott Kieff offers the only sustained analysis of recent
proposals for revolutionizing the patent system.18 2 Kieffs analysis
covers a great deal of ground, ranging from a critique of Ian Ayres and
Paul Klemperer's interesting proposal to limit patent holders' rights in
exchange for a lengthening of the patent term,18 3 to an assessment of
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg's proposed modifications of the
patent system to prevent excessive patenting from suppressing
scientific research.18 4 In one section of the article, Kieff argues against
182. See Kieff, supra note 100.
183. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999), cited in Kieff, supra note 100, at 732. An aspect of the Ayres-
Klemperer proposal is discussed infra text accompanying notes 427-28, 433.
184. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 ScI. 698 (1998), cited in Kieff, supra note 100, at 719-
23. Kieff explores the issue further in F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual
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proposals to replace the patent system with a reward-based system,
focusing particularly on the Shavell-van Ypersele proposal.18 5 Kieff,
however, approaches the task from a different vantage point than I
have; instead of inquiring as to whether the proposals would make
possible accurate valuations of patents, Kieff assumes that they would
and then asks whether accepting the proposals would deprive patent
law of other functions. This section considers the two such functions
that Kieff identifies.
1. Commercialization
Kieffs first argument against prize systems is that even if they
are successful in stimulating inventive activity, they may fail in
encouraging entrepreneurs to commercialize the inventions.18 6 Science
in academic journals may be valuable in part because it contributes to
our self-awareness in much the same way as research in the
humanities,18 7 but it is also valued because it leads to practical
applications. If there were no incentive to convert pure science into
applied science, then our innovative policy would be a failure indeed.
The reward proposals discussed in Part I assume away this problem,
expecting that release of a patent in the public domain will lead to the
production of an invention at marginal cost. This, however, must be a
simplification, as firms will enter an industry only if they expect to
recover their fixed costs in addition to their marginal costs.188 The
Property Rights and the Norms of Science-A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
691 (2001).
185. See Kieff, supra note 100, at 705-17.
186. Id. at 707-12.
187. A problem in debates concerning the appropriateness and level of government funding
of the humanities is the difficulty of ascertaining whether such funding has been successful. One
commentator, for example, concludes that "the NEH has advanced scholarship in America" but
cites in support of this claim only that the number of scholarly publications in the humanities
"exploded in the period following the creation of the NEH," an explosion that might have had
other causes. See Alvaro Ignacio Anillo, Note, The National Endowment for the Humanities:
Control of Funding Versus Academic Freedom, 45 VAND. L. REV. 455, 461-62 (1992). Even if the
effect of government funding on the level of academic research could be established, this would
leave unanswered the social value of this increase in research. Developments in literary theory
are presumably socially valuable for more than their instrumental value (itself almost impossible
to ascertain), but quantifying the value of such a public good is largely subjective, given the
absence of revealed preferences. Such difficulties, however, should not necessarily prevent
government funding, and reward systems easily could be used to foster innovation in the
humanities. One virtue of applying the proposal developed in Part III to such funding is that the
proposal allows for largely subjective determinations without making funding determinations
depend heavily on the preferences of any single individual. See infra Part III.A.
188. The dilemma is common to provision of all public goods. See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, The
Market for a Semipublic Good: The Case of the American Economic Review, 61 AM. ECON. REV.
665, 665 (1971) (discussing the difficulty of achieving zero marginal cost pricing of public goods).
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paradox of reward proposals is therefore that if they were truly
effective in reducing the price of products to their marginal costs, then
as long as there were any fixed costs, no one ever would produce the
products. This problem, of course, is often solved, typically with what
economists call imperfect competition;18 9 we do, after all, have markets
with prices close to marginal cost even in areas without intellectual
property or other forms of monopoly protection.
There may, however, be products and markets that would exist
but for the inability to keep out imitators. As Kieff observes, "[s]econd
movers generally enjoy numerous advantages over the first movers
against whom they compete." 190 A first mover takes the risks
associated with the uncertainty of demand and identifies solutions to
both anticipated and unanticipated difficulties. 191  Suppose, for
example, that Company X has developed a pharmaceutical product
but is not yet sure whether it is safe and effective. X must decide
whether to invest resources in conducting tests of the drug and
seeking FDA approval.1 92 If X anticipates that the drug is so cheap to
manufacture that X would be able to sell the drug only at or just above
marginal cost, X will have no incentive to invest the original
resources.
The argument is an important one, and it bears a distinguished
lineage. In perhaps the most important and famous modern article on
patent law, Edmund Kitch offered a rationale for the patent system
supplemental to the classical one that the system offers incentives to
innovate.1 93 Kitch compared patents to prospecting systems for
189. See, e.g., EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 30, at 284 (defining "imperfect
competition").
190. Kieff, supra note 100, at 708.
191. Id.; see also Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 825 (1986) (providing a formal model suggesting the
existence of a second-mover advantage in a market in which products may be "sponsored").
192. The FDA approval process is an expensive one for pharmaceutical companies. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1753, 1754 (1996) ("The expense of the studies FDA requires before granting approval-
coupled with the substantial time spent conducting these studies and waiting for agency
approval-is among the common explanations for the cost of new treatments."); Charles J. Walsh
& Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices:
Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 937-39 (1996)
(arguing that the FDA review process is "hindered by its entrenched bureaucracy," which results
in "duplicative" testing of new drugs and devices). The burdens attendant FDA approval have led
to some proposals for self-regulation and privatization of the FDA process. See Vivian I. Orlando,
The FDA's Accelerated Approval Process: Does the Pharmaceutical Industry Have Adequate
Incentives for Self-Regulation?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 543, 561-63 (1999) (discussing such
proposals).




mineral rights.194 In such a system, a prospector who finds minerals
on public land could stake a claim to the land and extract minerals
from it. In the absence of such a system, no one would have an
incentive to search for minerals on public land, because as soon as one
found the minerals, others would join to dig out what they could.
Kitch's metaphor of the patent holder as prospector has a number of
important implications, some of which will be considered below, 195 but
for present purposes, his most important observation is that "the
patent owner has an incentive to make investments to maximize the
value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will
produce unpatentable information appropriable by competitors."'196
Kitch concludes, "Only in the case of a patented product is a firm able
to make the expenditures necessary to bring the advantages of the
product to the attention of the customer without fear of competitive
appropriation if the product proves successful." 197
Before considering the application of this insight to prize
systems, it is worth noting that if patent law's concern is to ensure
commercialization of inventions, then it is both overinclusive and
underinclusive.1 98 Patent law is overinclusive because sometimes first-
mover advantages will outweigh second-mover advantages.1 99 Studies
indicate that being the first entrant in a field raises the product's
reputation for quality.200 A first mover may solidify this reputation
through brand advertising. The continued value of a brand like
Tylenol, despite the existence of generic acetaminophen alternatives,
attests to this phenomenon. 201 Patent law is underinclusive because
commercializers of unpatentable inventions also face the prospect of
194. Id. at 271-75.
195. See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text (noting the danger of rent dissipation by
excessive development of the innovation).
196. Kitch, supra note 193, at 276.
197. Id. at 277.
198. Kitch devotes a section of his article to explaining how specific aspects of patent law
reflect his theory. Id. at 267-71. Advancing considerably past Kitch's initial insights, Mark Grady
and Jay Alexander offer a more robust positive economic theory of patent law. See Mark F.
Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992).
199. See sources cited supra note 43.
200. See William T. Robinson & Claes Fornell, Sources of Market Pioneer Advantages in
Consumer Goods Industries, 22 J. MARKETING RES. 305, 308-09 (1985).
201. See, e.g., Lance W. Rook, Listening to Zantac: The Role of Non-Prescription Drugs in
Health Care Reform and the Federal Tax System, 62 TENN. L. REV. 107, 119-20 (1994) ("Tylenol
first began to be sold OTC during Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration. Nonetheless, its
annual sales are $719.7 million, even though the same medication is widely and inexpensively
available in generic form."). For a study of the diffusion of generic drugs into pharmaceutical
markets, see Andrew Tat Tin Ching, Dynamic Equilibrium in the U.S. Prescription Drug Market




copying.202 Even an obvious commercial product might not be
developed if second-mover advantages are sufficiently strong. These
observations, of course, do not necessarily argue for the abolition or
extension of patent protection, but they emphasize that the possible
existence of second-mover advantages is not necessarily sufficient to
overcome any advantages of a prize system alternative to patent.
Kieff appropriately does not claim that commercialization
necessarily dooms any reward proposals, but he emphasizes that prize
systems should take them into account. Critically, it may be
appropriate for rewards to be deferred until after there has been some
time for commercialization. For example, he acknowledges, the
Shavell-van Ypersele approach might still work, especially if the
reward is based on "data from actual sales," 20 3 as they suggest would
be desirable. 20 4 Kieff worries, though, that if "the moment of
entitlement to the reward is pushed later along the commercialization
timeline,"20 5 the length of races to achieve and commercialize
innovations will be inefficiently extended. 20 6 Moreover, he maintains,
"[t]he shift down the commercialization timeline of the entitlement to
the reward will also increase the uncertainty over who will be a
reward recipient."20 7 Such uncertainty might lead both of two firms
arguably responsible for an innovation to refrain from
commercializing it.208
These are important concerns, but they are not fatal. If
multiple firms were unsure about which would ultimately receive the
benefit of a reward, they would have strong incentives to cooperate.
For example, they might enter into an agreement to commercialize the
invention jointly and split the proceeds according to agreed-upon
proportions. 20 9 Moreover, the problem may vanish if the prize system
202. As Douglas Lichtman argues, the absence of protection for such inventions is becoming
increasingly problematic given the decreasing cost of copying technology. See Douglas Gary
Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV. 693,
732-33 (1997).
203. Kieff, supra note 100, at 710.
204. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing Shavell and van Ypersele's
proposal to consider sales data).
205. Kieff, supra note 100, at 710.
206. Id. at 710-11; see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing patent races).
207. Kieff, supra note 100, at 711.
208. Moreover, anticipating this outcome may lead to less investment. Id. ('The [desirable],
invention-inducing power of the reward may decrease, or the undesirable rent-dissipating power
may increase.").
209. Such a result would not be uncommon. See, e.g., Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of
Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Rewards of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 937, 944 (1993) ("[R]ivals may collaborate in a joint venture precisely because they wish to
reduce the risk of being left behind in a technology race.").
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is an adjunct to the patent system. If the reward regime is opt-in, as
Shavell and van Ypersele suggest might be optimal, inventors simply
will not opt in if rewards are based on sales and if they expect that the
buyout of the patent would lead no firm to have an incentive to
commercialize the invention. Similarly, if an investor retains a right to
receive a patent before commercialization, with rewards then deferred
until such time that the patents literally may be bought out, there will
be no uncertainty in such a case about who will benefit from
commercialization. 210
Once the uncertainty problem is overcome, an innovator will
have an incentive to commercialize in a prize system. As Kieff
recognized, an innovator will have an incentive to commercialize
before offering a patent into the public domain in exchange for a
reward, because doing so will make the patent more valuable. Even
after giving up a patent, though, an innovator will have an incentive
to commercialize if the ultimate reward depends on the success of
commercialization. Kieff notes correctly that "the size of the reward
will have to increase to cover the costs of some commercialization
activity in addition to inventive activity,"211 but if the reward is based
on sales, it will do so automatically. An innovator will have the same
incentive to advertise and commercialize in such a regime as in the
patent regime.21 2 The ultimate reward will depend on the full
investment, including both the research and the efforts at
commercialization before and after the patent is placed in the public
domain.
Although Kieff focuses his commercialization argument on a
critique of the Shavell-van Ypersele proposal, the above discussion
reveals that, with appropriate design choices, the concern may be
overcome with such an approach, because rewards depend on ultimate
sales in a competitive market. It is a greater concern with proposals in
which the value of the reward depends on the value of a patent to a
210. It is not clear whether this is the approach that Shavell and van Ypersele envisioned.
See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 534 (referring simply to a "reward paid by the
government for an innovation").
211. Kieff, supra note 100, at 711.
212. Economists observe that the amount of advertising will be greater in a monopoly than
in a competitive market. See, e.g., SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 43, at 592-94. Producers in
competitive markets sometimes seek to overcome this obstacle by lobbying for requirements that
all producers contribute to joint marketing funds. Cf. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405 (2001) (invalidating a program requiring all mushroom growers to contribute to a fund
advertising mushrooms as a violation of the First Amendment, where the program was not
ancillary to a more comprehensive program involving elements other than advertising).
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monopolist. Under the Guell and Fischbaum approach,21 3 the value of
the reward would depend on profits in a test market, in which the
patent holder would be permitted to advertise. 21 4 This might overstate
the eventual value, since the patent holder would have little incentive
to advertise after receiving an award based on the test market. If such
advertising is important and socially beneficial, 215 their proposal may
need revision. Similarly, in the Kremer approach, the winning auction
bid would depend on how much a monopolist would be able to earn
from a patent. 216 It is thus possible that the original patent holder will
receive the monopoly profits even though the innovation will not be
commercialized in a competitive market. Even market-based rewards
ideally should be contingent on a demonstration that the product will
be or already has been commercialized.
2. Screening
Kieff also critiques the Shavell-van Ypersele proposal for
failing to screen valid from invalid patents.217 Measuring the sales of a
product to determine demand for that product, Kieff correctly
observes, "does not establish that the invention itself would have been
patentable." 218 The problem stems in part from the difference between
a product and an innovation. I noted earlier that the Shavell-van
Ypersele proposal would have difficulty when a product arguably
included a number of different innovations; 21 9 Kieffs point is that it
may not be possible to determine whether a product reflects even a
single innovation. In the patent system, by contrast, "[t]he same core
legal rules that drive the patent system simultaneously provide the
system with its own method for deciding which inventive activities are
eligible to receive the benefit of a patent."220 The patent system seeks
213. See supra Part I.A. This concern might be relatively slight in the pharmaceutical
context with which they are specifically concerned, since the cost of producing pharmaceuticals is
low. Note that Guell and Fischbaum assume that the patent buyout would take place only after a
drug is approved and test-marketed in a limited location. Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at
225.
214. See Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 29, at 225.
215. Some commentators argue that advertising of pharmaceuticals may in fact be socially
harmful. John Rizzo, for example, shows empirically that advertising tends to make consumers
more price inelastic, thus leading them to pay more for drugs. See John A. Rizzo, Advertising and
Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, 42 J.L.
& ECON. 89 (1999).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
217. Kieff, supra note 100, at 712-17.
218. Id. at 713.
219. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
220. Kieff, supra note 100, at 714.
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to ensure that an invention is useful,221 novel,222 nonobvious, 223 and
fully disclosed.2 24 These would all be potentially relevant in a prize
system as well, but they cannot necessarily be determined just by
examining market conditions.
The problem, moreover, is one that cannot be solved merely by
anchoring the prize system to the existing patent system. If inventors
were required to obtain patents that they then would formally yield
for a reward, then the existence of the patent would reveal that the
Patent and Trademark Office believed that the invention met the
criteria of patentability. The patent system, however, does not rely
just on the Patent and Trademark Office, as the issuance of a patent
provides only prima facie evidence of patent validity. 225 In the existing
system, potential infringers have strong incentives to seek out
evidence that might undermine a patent's validity, for example by
"scouring public and private sources around the world" for prior art,226
or even identifying prior art in their own files of which the patent
holder might not have been aware. 227 Finding evidence that proves the
invalidity of a patent will allow activity that otherwise would be
infringement, and preparing a case that might lead to invalidation
may allow a competitor to enter an agreement to license the patent at
a relatively low rate. 228 In a prize system, once a patent is released
221. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (allowing patents for "new and useful improvements thereof"'). In
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981), the Supreme Court noted that the usefulness
requirement limits the potential scope of patentable subject matter. In particular, the Court
found that abstract ideas are not "useful" in the sense specified by § 101. Id.; see also In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (analyzing § 101).
222. § 102(a) (requiring that for a patent to be obtained, the invention not be "known or used
by others ... before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent").
223. § 103(a) ("A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains.").
224. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention.., in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and use
the same .... ).
225. See § 282 ("A patent shall be presumed valid."); Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 740 F.2d
1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (requiring "clear and convincing" evidence to overcome the
presumption of validity).
226. Kieff, supra note 100, at 713.
227. Id. at 712-13. A practioner's guide to defending an infringement action suggests, "Don't
forget to review your client's own files for pertinent prior art." David A. Dillard & Gary J. Nelson,
Presentation ofInvalidity Defenses, 493 PRACTICING L. INST. PAT. LITIG. 519, 535 (1997).
228. On the relationship between threats to sue and patent licensing, see Jin-Li Hu,
Choosing Litigation and Patent Licensing: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between the Legal




into the public domain, there will be no incentive for anyone to argue
for its invalidity.
Patent validity, however, need not be the sine qua non for
receipt of a prize. The criteria that a prize system employs could be
different from those in the patent system. Some classes of patentable
inventions might be excluded from a prize system, perhaps because
prizes for those classes might be too difficult to calculate. At the same
time, prizes might be offered for some innovations or activities that
would not qualify for patent protection. The purpose of providing such
prizes could not be to reduce deadweight loss from patents, but prizes
could be used to reward other useful activities. Prizes, for example,
might be useful to encourage commercialization of products that
otherwise would not be commercialized. 229 If patent and copyright
laws provide inadequate protection and thus production of innovation
in, say, fashion,230 a prize system conceivably could be used to fill in
the gaps. The first designer to repopularize bell-bottoms, thus
stimulating a market that otherwise would not have existed, would
receive a prize when other labels followed suit. Perhaps we would not
want a prize system in this area; innovation in fashion arguably is a
social cost rather than a social benefit, leading everyone to wasteful
replacement of wardrobes. The case for and against providing
incentives for this form of innovation, however, may be different in a
world of patents than in a world of prizes.
Similarly, a prize system might well differ from a patent
system in not producing black-and-white validity judgments at all. A
patent either is or is not valid, or at least a court hearing a validity
challenge must make one determination or the other on every patent
claim.231 It may be useful for patent law to make binary judgments
229. Commercialization might not occur in the absence of a prize because of second-mover
advantages, even if the product idea was not innovative. See supra text accompanying notes 190-
92. Indeed, to make Kitch's comparison of patents and prospecting complete, a prize system
might be an alternative to prospecting systems, at least if the only aim is to ensure adequate
incentives for prospecting. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 240-44 (discussing other virtues
of the prospecting approach).
230. I choose fashion because fashion patterns generally cannot be copyrighted. See
Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costumes Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1989). For a critique of the
current regime as inconsistent with general principles of copyright law, see Leslie J. Hagin, A
Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion Works: Renewing the Proposal for
Folding Fashion Works into the United States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 341, 387
(1991).
231. Different courts, of course, might come to different conclusions. Indeed, in a recent
empirical analysis of over ten thousand patent cases, Kimberly Moore concluded that patent
holder win rates differed considerably by district. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in
Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 916-20 (2001). For
example, the infringer won seventy percent of cases in the District of Massachusetts and only
thirty-two percent of cases in the Northern District of California, a discrepancy which was highly
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even if the world exhibits shades of gray. Innovations may be more or
less nonobvious, but it is presumably impractical for the patent office
to grant two-thirds of a patent.232 It might not be so impractical to
provide partial prizes when an innovation would be close to the
patentability line. In addition, it may be impractical for the patent
office to consider whether and when an innovation likely would have
been developed and commercialized in the absence of the applicant's
discovery, a criterion that some have suggested that the patent office
should apply.233 The benefits and costs of including such an analysis in
a prize system might be different, depending on the form that the
prize system would take. In a modification of the Shavell-van
Ypersele proposal, for example, government officials might try to
estimate the portion of sales of a product that would not have existed
but for the claimed innovation.
These considerations, of course, do not undermine the need for
a prize system to have some screening mechanism to identify
worthwhile innovations, but reveal that the mechanism need not
necessarily be the patent system itself.234 Ultimately, a prize system
must have some means of distinguishing worthwhile from other
inventions, but the success of the patent system in distinguishing
innovative products from retreads does not imply that no other system
could accomplish the same task. Sometimes, anchoring a prize system
statistically significant. Id. at 917 tbl.8. Such discrepancies suggest that the probability of
victory depends greatly on the identity of the judge, and even with a particular judge it is
possible that there is some randomness in outcomes.
232. The notion of two-thirds of a patent may not be as absurd as it sounds, given the
possibility of varying the patent term length on a patent-by-patent basis. Most scholars who have
tried to determine the optimal patent length, however, have not considered making patent life
determinations on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH,
AND WELFARE 76-86 (1979); C. Michael White, Why a Seventeen Year Patent?, 38 J. PAT. OFF.
SoC'Y 839, 839 (1956). The current approach to patent terms is sometimes called "variable," since
the term is twenty years from the date of filing. The patent term, however, does not depend on
the novelty of the invention. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty- Year Patent
Term, 22 AIPA Q.J. 369, 385 tbl.1 (1994) (providing a numerical assessment of mean patent
length with fixed and variable terms). A recent commentator has argued that patent term should
vary depending on factors such as the interest rate at the time the patent is issued. See Frank
Partnoy, Finance and Patent Length (Univ. San Diego Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19,
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=285144 (last visited Oct.
25, 2002). In any event, uncertainty about enforcement of a patent can in effect create a partial
patent. See generally, Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 183, at 987-88 (indicating that uncertainty
can increase "the chance that invalid patents will be enforced").
233. See sources cited supra note 45.
234. Kieff acknowledges that a prize system need not require a patentable invention. For
example, he states, that the Shavell-van Ypersele system "may be indifferent between new
technologies and revived ones." Kieff, supra note 100, at 713. Kieff worries, though, that "[e]very
market having large demand would generate droves of reward claimants each asserting to have
made some contribution." Id.
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to the patent system may be the simplest and best approach. Even
though Kieff shows that the issuance of a patent cannot be sufficient,
he acknowledges that Kremer's approach avoids the objection, because
bidders "will be sure not only to acquire information about the market
demand for the information claimed in the patents but also about
patent validity."235 Other prize systems will need to adopt some other
approach, one that will assure that decisions on prizes take into
account all considerations relevant to that system, ranging from the
innovativeness of the inventions to the accuracy of claims about sales
data and consumer demand.
B. The Common Pool Problem
So far, we have explored two vices of the patent system, its
tendency to impose deadweight loss and its resulting dampening of
innovation incentives, and two virtues, its effectiveness in encouraging
commercialization of innovations and in screening prospective patent
recipients to ensure sufficient innovativeness. This alignment of
pluses and minuses is misleading, however, most importantly because
the patent system can produce both benign and malign innovation
incentives. Both types of incentives are associated with what is known
as the "common pool" problem, discussed frequently in the context of
fisheries.236 As H. Scott Gordon noted, in "sea fisheries the natural
resource is not private property; hence the rent it may yield is not
capable of being appropriated by anyone."237 That is, even though a
fishery conveys some social benefit, the competition for the benefit will
produce a fully offsetting cost.23 8 To switch metaphors, if I promise
that I will distribute $100,000 among all who come to a particular
stadium, the total time costs of those who come will amount to about
$100,000.239
235. Id. at 715.
236. The term "common pool" itself is an old one, referring to the analogous situation of
common pools of oil shared by multiple drillers. See, e.g., R.F. Kahn, Some Notes on Ideal Output,
45 ECON. J. 1, 18 (1935).
237. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62
J. POL. ECON. 124, 130-131 (1954).
238. Gordon explains:
[S]ince average cost is the same for all grounds and the average productivity of all
grounds is also brought to equality by the free and competitive nature of fishing, this
means that the inframarginal [fishing] grounds also yield no rent. It is entirely
possible that some grounds would be exploited at a level of negative marginal
productivity.
Id. at 131-32.
239. Rent dissipation, however, need not use up the entirety of the $100,000, if different
people would suffer different costs from attending the event. Suppose, for example, that there are
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This problem animated Kitch's comparison of the patent
system to a prospecting system. 240 Kitch, as we have seen, revealed
that a patent would give a patent holder incentives to commercialize
an invention that otherwise might not be developed because of second-
mover advantages. 241 In the absence of patent protection, no one will
have any incentive to search for a common pool if finding the pool will
not allow the finder to exploit it. Kitch, moreover, recognized that the
patent system also was a solution to the problem of how to manage a
pool once it is found. Just as a prospector will have incentives to limit
the number of people who can mine for a mineral, so too will a patent
holder have an incentive to limit the number of inventors who can
seek to improve upon the original patent.
Emphasizing that "a patent 'prospect' increases the efficiency
with which investment in innovation can be managed,"242 Kitch notes
that "the patent owner [is] in a position to coordinate the search for
technological and market enhancement of the patent's value so that
duplicative investments are not made and so that information is
exchanged among the searchers."243 Though Kitch does not develop
the point fully, 244 a patent holder owns the pool and therefore is in a
position to prevent competing factions from emptying the pool. Once a
particular innovation is developed, it might be clear that
improvements to it would produce an estimated $100,000 in additional
benefit exploitable by the developers, but if that is so, about the same
amount will be spent if there is competition to secure pieces of this
social benefit. A patent holder, by contrast, can ensure that the
marginal benefit of expenditures is equal to the marginal cost.
So far, this discussion simply shows another benefit of the
patent system. Patents, however, do not entirely solve the common
51,000 individuals for whom the time cost of the event is $1, and for everyone else, it is $2. With
perfect information, the 51,000 will attend and each receive slightly less than $2, for a surplus of
almost $1 each. Nobody else will attend. A similar effect could exist with any common pool
problem. Because some people with relatively low costs will necessarily participate, fewer of
those with higher costs may participate than would be necessary to consume the common pool
entirely. Risk aversion may also limit the extent of rent dissipation. See Arye L. Hillman &
Eliakim Katz, Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 94 ECON. J. 104
(1984) (providing a formal model of the effect of risk aversion on rent-seeking).
240. Indeed, Kitch begins his article by citing an essay by Yoram Barzel that "points out that
the exploitation of technological information has much in common with fisheries, public roads,
and oil and water pools-all resources not subject to exclusive control." Kitch, supra note 193, at
265 (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 348
(1968)).
241. See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
242. Kitch, supra note 193, at 276.
243. Id.
244. The point is developed by Grady & Alexander. See supra note 198; see also infra notes
252-54 and accompanying text.
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pool problem for two reasons. First, in solving the ex post common pool
problem, patents may create an ex ante common pool problem, as
multiple inventors compete for the right to own the patent in the first
place. Second, because a patent is not infinitely broad, competitors
may "invent around" the patent, developing cumbersome alternatives
to the initial patent. The following sections explore these problems
and consider their implications for prize systems. While these are
problems associated with the existing patent system, various prize
proposals might exacerbate them. At the same time, a prize system
may strengthen its case by ameliorating the problems.
1. Patent Races
That the patent system might solve one common pool problem
at the expense of another was noticed shortly after Kitch published his
initial article. Characterizing Kitch's argument, Donald McFetridge
and Douglas Smith acknowledged that "[t]he patent as a prospect
prevents competitive dissipation of these private returns by
homogeneous rival inventors,"245-for example, by allowing the patent
holder to prevent "premature commercial introduction" of the
product.246 The "surplus-increasing" effect of patents, however, "is
dissipated in a resource-using rivalry for the patent itself."247 The
basic intuition is simple. If a patent holder is given ownership of a
common pool of a certain value, the incentive to become a patent
holder increases by the same amount. Therefore, the same
"homogeneous rival inventors" who would have competed in improving
an invention will compete in the initial development of it, dissipating
the patent rents.248
In a reply to the McFetridge-Smith critique, Kitch noted that
potential inventors might overcome the common pool problem by
making agreements amongst themselves to limit excessive
innovation. 249 Offering a Coasean efficiency story, Kitch observes that
with zero transaction costs, "the rent dissipation problem
245. Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus:
A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198 (1980).
246. Id. The focus on premature commercial introduction, as opposed to excessive research
and development of improvements, follows from Barzel, supra note 240.
247. McFetridge & Smith, supra note 245, at 198.
248. Surprisingly, full rent dissipation is possible even if in equilibrium, only one firm
innovates. For a formal model with this result, see Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz,
Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266, 284-87 (1980).
249. Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J.L. & ECON.
205, 205 (1980).
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disappears."250 Although transaction costs are positive, Kitch argues
that they will be lower "[a]t the early stages of innovation,"251 and
patent law appropriately solves the common pool problem later, where
private ordering is less likely to achieve a satisfactory solution. A
separate possibility, developed by Mark Grady and Jay Alexander, is
that patent law seeks to provide a balance between the common pool
problems. 252 Thus, the developer of "an invention likely to inspire a
number of slightly modified duplicates" will tend to receive a broader
patent than one whose invention does not signal likely
improvements, 25 3 because in the former case the danger of the ex post
common pool problem is greater than in the latter case. 254
250. See id. at 205. Kitch supports this argument with the following quote from Barzel:
The fact that many information situations have the potential for waste does not
necessarily mean that waste actually occurs. If, in the aggregate, these actions
produce a negative product, arrangements that successfully restrain them or reduce
their impact will generate a positive return. An implicit, but crucial, assumption of
the model is zero costs of transacting.
Id. at 250 n.3 (quoting Yoram Barzel, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs,
20 J.L. & ECON. 291, 292 (1977)).
251. Id. at 205-06. Kitch supports this argument by claiming that "the number of firms with
the necessary comparative advantage to exploit the inventive possibility will be small and the
uncertainties attached to each possibility make it easier to agree upon a division of activities,
since the value of what any one firm is either giving up or gaining is unclear." Id. at 206. This
argument is not persuasive. The number of firms that might exploit a possibility will presumably
be smaller after an innovation is initially made. Moreover, uncertainty about relative prospects
may make agreements more difficult to achieve, particularly if each firm is overconfident about
its own prospects. Such overconfidence might occur frequently, given the existence of
overconfidence and overoptimism biases. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of
Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 & n.22 (1998) (citing an unpublished
bibliography listing over two hundred articles on unrealistic optimism). See generally David
Dunning et al., A New Look at Motivated Inference: Are Self-Serving Theories of Success a
Product of Motivational Forces?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58 (1995) (assessing the
source of self-serving biases); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,
1091-95 (2000) (examining the effect of overconfidence bias in legal contexts); Neil D. Weinstein,
Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980)
(providing an early study of such biases).
252. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 198, at 316-21. For a useful summary of the theory,
see Matthew Erramouspe, Comment, Staking Patent Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards
and Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REV. 961, 976-79 (1996). For comments and criticisms,
see Donald L. Martin, Reducing Anticipated Rewards from Innovation Through Patents: Or Less
Is More, 78 VA. L. REV. 351, 351-58 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent
Districts: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 359-81 (1992); A.
Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 267, 284-85 (1996).
253. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 198, at 318.
254. Grady and Alexander develop their positive economic theory by arguing that the scope
of patentable subject matter and the requirements of patentability are best explained by the
desire to minimize rent dissipation. See id. at 322-49.
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Regardless of how effectively the patent system achieves a
balance between the two common pool problems, however, patent
races will occur. Patent races present three related problems. The first
is excessive innovative activity. 255 This concern may seem strange
given the concerns of prize system proponents that the patent system
produces too little inventive activity. Shavell and van Ypersele, for
example, show that any given inventor will invest too little because
she will not anticipate that she will be able to capture the full social
benefit of her innovations. 256 The problem is that Shavell and van
Ypersele assume a single inventor pursuing a particular prospect,
rather than multiple inventors competing.257 These two models are
ultimately reconcilable. The common pool from the perspective of
potential inventors will be smaller in a patent system as a result of
patent holders' inability to capture social benefits above monopoly
profits, 258 but the competition among multiple inventors will lead to
the consumption of a greater portion of this smaller pool than if one
inventor owned the entire pool.259
The two effects thus pull in competing directions. On one hand,
the ability of a patent holder to appropriate only monopoly profits and
not the full social benefit will decrease the amount of research
activity. On the other hand, each competitor's concern with the private
rather than social marginal benefits and costs of its research
endeavours will tend to lead to excessive research activity. Even if the
two effects happen to offset one another, producing just the right
amount of investment in social innovation, there remains a second
problem with patent races-that research efforts may be duplicative.
When many different inventors work independently toward the same
goal, society's resources may be inefficiently channeled. Kitch himself
recognized this danger in the ex post common pool problem with his
255. As Professor Rai notes, though without elaboration, "the greater the reward associated
with patent rights, the greater the possibility of patent races that produce excessive or
duplicative investment." Rai, supra note 66, at 199.
256. See, e.g., supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
257. Shavell and van Ypersele do briefly acknowledge the problem of patent races. See
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 542-43. They conclude simply that "[b]ecause the race
to be first is a factor that afflicts both [patent and reward] systems, and because the information
needed to address it under either seems to be of the same character, consideration of the race to
be first does not seem to bear on the comparison between reward and patent." Id. at 543.
258. For an early formal model suggesting that there will be too little research-and-
development activity for this reason, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation
of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619-22 (1962).
259. The result of competition may thus be technical progress that is greater than the social
optimum. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta et al., Invention and Innovation Under Alternative Market
Structures: The Case of Natural Resources, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 567, 579 (1982).
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observation that a patent owner can ensure that "duplicative
investments are not made,"26 0 but the problem in research leading to
patent awards is equally significant. The problem is similar to one
often noted in connection with securities markets, that securities
analysts will have incentives to engage in excessive and duplicative
research because the private value of such research is greater than the
social value. 261
A third problem with patent races is that they may reinforce
inefficient industrial structures. Richard Gilbert and David Newbery
have argued, for example, that a monopolist will expend resources on
wasteful research and development simply as a means of protecting its
market position, even if potential rivals in a patent race might be
more efficient. 26 2 The problem is most prominent in an asymmetrical
race, in which the monopolist has more at stake than any other
inventors. 26 3 In such a race, a potential competitor may be deterred
from even participating, "because the strategic interactions between
the players are such that the incumbent would outdo any reasonable
effort made by the challenger in order to stop the challenger being
first to reach the finishing line."26 4 Anticipating a lack of competition,
the monopolist will proceed at the pace it would have taken in the
260. Kitch, supra note 193, at 276.
261. The seminal article making this point is Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value
of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 563-67 (1971). See
also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 667-71 (1995) (providing a useful discussion of
Hirshleifer's argument). As Jules Coleman similarly explains, "From an individual's perspective,
the value of new information, and hence of investing in generating it, derives from technology,
gains from allocating resources more efficiently, and distribution, wealth transfers that follow
from price changes." JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 151 (1992). Hirshleifer offers a brief
but incomplete application to patent law, noting that even in the absence of a patent regime,
inventors might be able to profit by speculation, so that, for example, Eli Whitney might have
sold cotton futures. See Hirschleifer, supra, at 570-72.
262. See Richard J. Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence
of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 518 (1982). For a critique of the model, arguing that the
possibility of licensing will undermine "preemptive patenting," see Stephen W. Salant,
Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 247, 247-50
(1984). Salant argues that "[i]f such transactions are permitted, entrants who can develop
technologies more efficiently than the incumbent always win the patent race, preemptive
patenting never occurs, and-while production will again be monopolized-there is no more
reason to expect that the incumbent will acquire the entrant's patent than that the entrant will
acquire the incumbent's patent." Id. at 247.
263. See, e.g., Christopher Harris & John Vickers, Patent Races and the Persistence of
Monopoly, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 461, 461-62 (1985).
264. See id. at 461. Harris and Vickers acknowledge that challengers will not always be




absence of any competition. 265 This outcome may be desirable, as
redundant research is eliminated. Whether one favors it depends in
part on one's view of how long it will take inefficient monopolists to be
overcome by the process that Joseph Schumpeter has called "creative
destruction."266
Even in a patent regime, patent holders may avoid some of the
harmful consequences of a patent race by disclosing some or all of
their research activities. In a recent article, 267 Gideon Parchomovsky
argues that "in many patent races the superior strategy for one or
more of the competing firms would be to prevent other firms from
winning the race by publishing their research findings." 268 A laggard
in a patent race might not have developed sufficient research findings
to support a patent, but these research findings may be sufficient to
make a competitor's minor improvements over them insufficient for
patenting. By preemptively publishing, the laggard may help its
"financial ability to engage in other research projects in the future"
and allow the laggard to "use the information it published in future
projects at no cost."269
Parchomovsky's thesis is controversial. Douglas Lichtman,
Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus argue that because American patent law
awards a patent to whoever is the first to conceive of an invention,
laggards in a patent race are unlikely to publish preemptively. 270 The
same principle, however, leads them to observe that leaders in a
patent race may strategically disclose information before filing a
patent application, because "while such disclosures hurt the leader,
they also benefit him by driving laggards out of the race and in that
way decreasing the chance that one of those laggards will leapfrog the
leader and win the patent."271 Rebecca Eisenberg, meanwhile, has
argued that preemptive disclosure is more likely by potential users of
265. For a model showing that the winner of a patent race will proceed as if he is the only
player in the race, see Christopher Harris & John Vickers, Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a
Race, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 193, 193-209 (1985).
266. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83-84 (3d ed.
1950) (referring to innovation as part of a process of "creative destruction" through which a
dominant leader eventually is overcome).
267. Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000).
268. Id. at 927.
269. Id. at 930.
270. See Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 2175, 2178-79 (2000).
271. Id. at 2179.
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an innovation, such as pharmaceutical companies hoping to use DNA
sequences, than by competitor producers.272
Regardless of the ultimate resolution of this debate, strategic
disclosure does not eliminate the patent race problem, for two reasons.
First, while strategic disclosure may prevent some duplicative
research effort prospectively, it does not eliminate any research
redundancy occurring prior to the strategic disclosure itself. Second,
Parchomovsky recognizes that the net social welfare effects of
strategic disclosure may be equivocal. On one hand, Parchomovsky
argues that strategic disclosure "circumvents the troublesome
tradeoff' that leads to patents but also to deadweight loss. 273 At the
same time, however, "[t]he availability of preemptive publication
reduces the expected average payoffs of the race participants and may
consequently diminish, in some cases, the ex ante incentive to engage
in R&D." 274 If strategic disclosure were to occur and prevent patents in
all cases, the patent system's incentives to innovate would be
eliminated altogether.
The possibility of early disclosure of patents is thus a
promising antidote to one of the patent system's ills, but one that the
patent system itself may be unable to promote fully. Prize systems,
however, may offer an answer. Conceivably, a prize system could be
used to compensate parties for releasing information even if that
information would be insufficient for patentability. 275 If researchers
have the option of obtaining a reward by releasing preliminary
information, research could become more of a cooperative process than
a competitive one.276 As long as the eventual reward for an innovation
is distributed among contributors to it based on information released
by those contributors, researchers will have incentives to release
information immediately, rather than waiting to achieve the threshold
of completeness that the patent system requires.
This step may not eliminate the redundancy of a patent race
altogether, because it might create a number of smaller research
272. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publication to Create
Prior Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2358, 2369-70 (2000).
273. See Parchomovsky, supra note 267, at 944.
274. Id. Parchomovsky also argues that strategic disclosure may lead to inefficient
expenditures by race participants on "monitoring competitors' research activities," which, while
"not entirely wasteful,... [are] an additional cost that will slow down the development of new
products and processes." Id. at 944-45.
275. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
276. Calandrillo makes a distinct but related point. "Kitch's discussion of the patent system
implies that the negative effects of socially wasteful duplicative effort can be mitigated if
property rights (or rewards) are bestowed relatively early on in the process so as to shorten the
period of simultaneous investment by multiple parties." Calandrillo, supra note 20, at 353.
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races. Thus, researchers would compete for the prize for each part of a
larger project. Different researchers, however, might be able to
specialize in different parts of a project that could lead to only a single
profitable patent, either by explicit agreement or by implicit
cooperation. 277 Moreover, a prize system might penalize researchers
who fail to cooperate by reducing the overall level of the prize to just
enough so that only one team of researchers (or whatever number of
teams provides an optimal balance between the goals of fostering
competition and reducing redundancy) would have an incentive to
work on it. This is analogous to imposing a sufficiently large tax on oil
extraction so that the optimal amount of oil extraction from a common
pool occurs, or to letting the person who picks low-lying fruit keep only
half the apples so that a second person will have an incentive to climb
a ladder rather than fight for the more accessible apples.
Alternatively, a prize system might reduce the level of the prize if the
party that should have bowed out of the patent race turns out to win
it, although this approach would require some way of identifying the
rightful team, which might not be the first team to begin the research.
Some proposals for patent rewards would be more conducive
than others to encouraging cooperation by sharing prizes and
discouraging redundancy by reducing prizes. It would seem difficult to
integrate this approach with Kremer's system, for example, because
the patent holder in his system receives the full social value of the
patent. It is more plausible as an adjunct to the Shavell-van Ypersele
approach, as the government agency responsible for rewards could
calculate the overall demand for an innovation and then distribute
rewards among all contributors. The task of determining how much to
give to each contributor is not a trivial one, however, and the task of
determining an appropriate penalty for failure to cooperate or
reduction in the optimal size of a prize is still more difficult to model.
Anticipation of inefficient choices in distributing rewards among
participants might hamper efficient allocation of research spending.
In the end, shared rewards and reduced prizes in common pool
situations may be more appropriate in some contexts than in others.
Shared rewards, for example, may be superior to rewards that give the
entire prize in a patent race to a single winner when the amount of
277. Such division of the market potentially could raise antitrust concerns. See, e.g., United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc, 405 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972) (striking down as per se illegal a
division of territories by members of a cooperative association). Antitrust law, however, is often
sensitive to efficiency justifications. See Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and
the Rule of Reason: In Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 775 (1998)
(characterizing an FTC decision not as claiming "that conduct is never per se illegal" but as
saying "that the courts should always listen to justifications"). Congress in any event could
specify in the legislation creating a prize system that such agreements are permissible.
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duplication in research is likely to be high and when determining
relative contributions is relatively straightforward. Winner-take-all
prizes may be superior in other situations, as well as when patent race
competitors may be able to eliminate some of the problems of a patent
race through private bargaining. 278 The proposals for patent prize
systems explored in Part I cannot be faulted for causing redundant
research relative to the existing patent systems. But they can be
faulted for failing to exploit an opportunity to overcome a weakness of
the patent system. An ideal prize system would allow for shared
rewards in contexts in which shared rewards are more efficient than
the alternative.
2. Inventing Around
The problem of inventing around has much in common with the
problem of patent races. Imagine a patent race in which two different
companies are seeking to achieve the same practical goal-say,
developing a cure for a disease. Now, change the hypothetical in two
different ways. First, the companies are pursuing different means, for
example by pursuing medicines based on different perceived
vulnerabilities of an infectious agent.279 Second, one company has
already won the race, having received a patent on its invention and
commercialized its invention, charging monopoly profits. If the other
company continues its work, it may be said to be trying to "invent
around" the first company's patent, trying to produce the same benefit
but in a new way. The phenomenon of inventing around is thus the
same as the phenomenon of a patent race, except one participant has
already won the race and the other participant is seeking to achieve
the same goal in another way. Inventing around presents similar
problems of excessive and functionally redundant innovative activity
as patent races.
Some commentators have treated the problem of inventing
around as benign. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has even trumpeted inventing around as a benefit of the patent
system, reasoning that patent protection stimulates innovation by
278. See, e.g., Parchomovsky, supra note 267, at 948-50 (discussing the effect of private
bargaining on a patent race).
279. For example, the HIV virus might be attacked through protease inhibitors as well as by
vaccines seizing on different mechanisms. Even though protease inhibitors have shown promise
in allowing many individuals infected with HIV to live normal lives, work continues on an AIDS
vaccine, in part because of the high cost of protease inhibitor treatment. See Philip A. Leider,
Comment, Domestic AIDS Vaccine Trials: Addressing the Potential for Social Harm to the
Subjects of Human Experiments, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1185, 1190-97 (2000) (discussing the need for a
vaccine despite recent advances in treatment).
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encouraging inventing around.280 Accordingly, inventing around is
permitted, although under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement
cannot be avoided by insignificant changes to the patent.281 This
doctrine may reflect an appropriate balance in patent policy, 28 2 but
commentators have been skeptical of the claimed social benefits of
inventing around. Louis Kaplow, for example, notes that "[s]uch
invention provides no social benefit if the new invention is no better
than the first."28 3 Even if there is a possibility that the new invention
might be better than the original one, the private benefit to the new
inventor might be considerably greater than the social benefit and
thus social resources might be channeled inefficiently toward
reinventing the wheel and away from other research.28 4 In addition,
while inventing around ultimately may result in lower prices to
consumers, "there might be a serious diminution in incentive to come
up with the [original] invention in the first place."28 5
280. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520
(Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The ability of the public successfully to design around-to use the patent
disclosure to design a product or process that does not infringe, but like the claimed invention, is
an improvement over the prior art-is one of the important public benefits that justify awarding
the patent owner exclusive rights to his invention."), rev'd, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); State Indus., Inc.
v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("One of the benefits of a patent
system is its so-called 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even when
they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.").
281. The court has explained the distinction this way:
Although designing or inventing around patents to make new inventions is
encouraged, piracy is not. Thus, where an infringer, instead of inventing around a
patent by making a substantial change, merely makes an insubstantial change,
essentially misappropriating or even "stealing" the patented invention, infringement
may lie under the doctrine of equivalents.
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
282. On the relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and inventing around, see Paul
N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Impact on "Designing Around," 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 315,
315-39 (1994). One reason to allow inventing around is that otherwise there -might be a perverse
incentive to seek out nonobvious solutions to problems when obvious solutions were possible.
Patent law would be more difficult to administer if a patent's validity depended on whether there
were any obvious solutions to the relevant problem, rather than on whether the particular means
of solving the problem was nonobvious.
283. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813,
1869 (1984).
284. See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 450, 455 (1969). A potential counterargument is that funds allocated to inventing around
would not necessarily have been allocated to other research-and-development activities. If
research and development have large social benefits that inventors are unable to internalize,
inventing around conceivably could on average have benefits larger than costs. Encouraging
inventing around, however, is a crude means of encouraging research and development.
285. Kaplow, supra note 283, at 1870.
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Despite theoretical models suggesting that the possibility of
licensing should make inventing around rare, 286 empirical evidence
indicates that inventing around is widespread 2 7 and costly. 28 8 A prize
system, at least on initial inspection, promises to ameliorate the
problem. If a patent is placed in the public domain, then there will be
no incentive to invent around it. To be sure, there will remain an
incentive to invest research funds in possible improvements, for
example in pharmaceutical products that have fewer side effects or
that serve different segments of the population, though the incentive
will be less than before. Private incentives should be aligned more
closely with social ones, as inventors will pursue research if and only if
it improves upon what is already in the public domain.
There are, however, two significant concerns. First, a prize
system may increase the incentive to invent around a patent that has
not been placed in the public domain-for example, because the
original inventor decided not to opt into an optional prize system. If a
prize system pays an inventor more than the monopoly profit that she
could earn on an invention, 28 9 as suggested by some of the reward
proposals, the incentive to invent around will be greater than it
otherwise would have been. Anticipating this outcome, the original
inventor may invest less in research, anticipating a reduction in
appropriable benefits from innovating. As Kremer has noted, allowing
the original inventor to opt for the prize system once the substitute
product is invented may provide one solution. 290 The solution is an
imperfect one, though no worse than the existing patent system. The
creation of a perfect substitute, for example, would mean that the
original and subsequent inventors each would receive half of the prize.
Thus, wasteful inventing around will still occur, and this inventing
around will decrease ex ante incentives to innovate.
An alternative, though messier, solution would be to provide
smaller or no rewards for those who have invented around. For
example, if the inventor of a perfect substitute sought a reward, no
reward would be appropriate, because there would be no social benefit
from the research. Although placement of the perfect substitute into
286. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure, and Innovation:
Chakrabarty, Rohm, and Haas, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 464 (1982).
287. See Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON.
J. 907, 913 (1981).
288. For figures on the costs of inventing around, see Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating
the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, in 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 783, 807-12 (Martin N. Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1987).
289. Or, more accurately in this context, more than the duopoly profit that the inventor
would earn, since the inventor will have to compete with the original patent holder.
290. See Kremer, supra note 21, at 1154-55; supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
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the public domain would lower prices for consumers and eliminate
deadweight loss, it would hurt the original inventor and thus decrease
that inventor's innovation incentives, which the patent system
presumably optimized. A partial substitute, such as a product that
was better in some ways than the original, would receive some reward,
but a lesser one. Assuming it is possible to calibrate rewards based on
such criteria, the prize system at least will not increase incentives to
invent around, though many inventors presumably would respond by
not opting out of the patent system, if given the choice. The patent
prize proposals discussed in Part I, however, would need modification
to allow such calibration.
Second, while placing a product in the public domain
eliminates the incentive to invent around, it may lead to inefficient
excessive research into improvements on the initial invention. We
have come full circle back to the common pool problem and to the
observation that if an improvement on the initial invention is
promising, there may be excessive research that dissipates the rent
achievable from such improvements. 291 Patents allow the monopolist
to limit the amount of subsequent innovation, but placing patents in
the public domain eliminates this ability. Conceivably, the inefficiency
from excessive investment in improvements could offset or even
swamp the efficiency benefits of the prize system for a particular
innovation. The only proposal that does not suffer from this problem is
Lichtman's coupon scheme, though we have seen that this approach
may be inferior to patent buyouts in some instances. 292 Thus, the
common pool problem once again indicates that an ideal prize system
would lead to patent buyouts in some instances and coupon schemes
in others. And even where a patent buyout is optimal, an ideal patent
buyout scheme would calibrate prizes so that any economic loss from
excessive investment is deducted from prizes.
C. The Adverse Selection Problem
While the common pool problem affects both patent and prize
systems, the creation of a regime in which inventors may choose
between patent protection and prizes, as the prize system proposals
reviewed earlier suggest, 293 presents a new problem-that of adverse
291. See supra text accompanying note 244.
292. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
293. All of the proposals discussed in Part I are opt-in, though Shavell and van Ypersele note
that a mandatory system might have advantages over an optional one. See Shavell & van
Ypersele, supra note 19, at 539-40; supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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selection. 294 Inventors presumably will choose the system that will
offer them the highest returns, also taking into account the relative
uncertainties of remuneration in both systems.295 Inventors may
choose prizes because they believe, possibly on the basis of information
not available to the administrators of the prize system, that their
returns from the prize system will be unusually high relative to the
patent system. The result is similar to what George Akerlof observed
of the used car market, that the selection effect will produce a high
number of "lemons."296 The following sections explore two ways that a
prize application might be a lemon.
1. Prizes for Commercially Unattractive Inventions
The most obvious aspect of the adverse selection problem is
that prizes might be paid to inventors with commercially unattractive
inventions. 297 As with all adverse selection problems, the greater the
degree of asymmetric information, the more severe the problem. 298 To
294. "Adverse selection" is a phrase common in the insurance context. See KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1986)
(defining "adverse selection" as "the process by which low-risk insureds tend to purchase less
coverage, and high-risk insureds tend to purchase more coverage than they would if prices were
more accurate").
295. Uncertainty in a prize system would not be fatal to it, though a high variance of
outcomes might reduce the effective prize to inventors. See infra notes 386-87 and accompanying
text.
296. George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons. Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970).
297. Commercially unattractive inventions are not inherently problematic, if the inventions
have public good properties that would prevent them from being privately exploited. One
criticism of current U.S. technology policy is that it sometimes allows private parties to both
receive government grants and then obtain patents on the resulting products. See Bayh-Dole Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3018-27 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§
200-11 (2000)) (allowing businesses to obtain patents on government-sponsored research); see
also Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The
Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving
in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 (2001) (urging
enforcement of legal requirements that inventions supported by federal funding be sold at
reasonable prices); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) (arguing
that allowing patentability of government-sponsored research may interfere with technological
progress). In theory, such a regime can be justifiable if the research can be partly exploited by
private parties, but government grants are needed to complement already existing private
research incentives to overcome public good problems. See, e.g., Richard E. Romano, Aspects of
R&D Subsidization, 104 Q.J. ECON. 863, 867-72 (1989) (developing a theoretical model in which
the government sometimes increases social welfare by subsidizing private investment leading to
grants of patents).
298. On the connection between adverse selection and asymmetric information in the
securities context, see Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 804-05 (2001).
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consider an extreme example, suppose that the inventor of a drug has
private information that the drug will alleviate the symptoms it
targets for only the first year of use, but this information has not been
made public.299 Because the administrator of the prize system does not
have access to this information, the prize awarded presumably will be
higher than it otherwise would be, given the importance of this
information. It is possible that the effect of high prizes will be benign,
if they simply provide generally increased incentives to engage in
research-and- development activities. The excess prizes, though,
consume social resources that might be targeted more effectively.
Moreover, anticipation of such high prizes might conceivably distort
research investment, with funds channeled toward areas in which
possession of asymmetric information is relatively likely.
There are two basic strategies that a prize system can use to
address the problem. The first is to take it into account by offering
lower prizes than otherwise would be given. Just as buyers of used
cars implicitly take the lemons problem into account by recognizing
that used cars often have more problems than comparably aged cars
not sold on the used car market, 300 the administrator might give lower
prizes based on the possibility of asymmetric information than it
otherwise would give. Though Shavell and van Ypersele do not discuss
the adverse selection problem directly, their model implicitly takes it
into account, awarding smaller prizes than they would otherwise
because inventors' asymmetric knowledge about demand will make
those with poor prospects more likely to take the prize.30 1 Similarly,
the government could examine market test results skeptically in
calculating a patent buyout price in the Guell and Fischbaum scheme.
Kremer's approach, meanwhile, automatically would result in lower
prizes, because auction bidders, like used car buyers, would recognize
the problem of adverse selection, 30 2 though if competitors have better
information than the government, the depression might be relatively
minimal. Lowering rewards would be more difficult for Lichtman's
coupon scheme, which requires that the coupons be great enough to
299. This may be unlikely given rigorous FDA disclosure requirements. See 21 U.S.C. §
355(b)(1)(A) (1994) (requiring "full reports of investigations which have been made to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use").
300. For an explanation of the lemons problem concluding that "consumers do not overpay,"
see Timothy J. Muris, California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission: The Revenge
of Footnote 17, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 265, 288 (2000).
301. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 539; supra text accompanying notes 88-
89.
302. In addition, Kremer emphasizes that the markup would lessen the adverse selection
problem by giving even inventors with commercializable inventions incentives to accept prizes.
See Kremer, supra note 21, at 1149-50; supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
2003]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
enable low-valuing users to purchase the product and to incentivize
the monopolist to offer it at a low price.
The second strategy is to wait for more information before
awarding a prize. This approach is integral to Shavell and van
Ypersele's suggestion that the government might adjust rewards on an
annual basis, basing adjustments on revised calculations of demand
from actual sales data.30 3 Waiting would be more difficult with the
Guell and Fischbaum approach, since eventually the market test must
end so that actual sales of the drug can begin. As Kremer describes his
proposal, money would be paid immediately after the auction, thus
eliminating the benefit of delay. Finally, Lichtman's proposal does not
allow for delay. The government must be able to determine in advance
the size of coupons and to whom they should be awarded. Similarly, in
the suggested modification to his proposal in which the government
would agree with the patent holder on a set price, 304 the government
must be able to calculate this price in advance.
In making these comparisons, my intention is not merely to
add to the dizzying list of considerations needed to compare prize
system proposals. Rather, it is to show that the list is dizzying, as
would be any final empirical comparison of different proposals, even
taking into account only the adverse selection consideration addressed
in this section of the Article. The analysis also suggests that
sometimes it might be worthwhile to use some combination of
approaches. For example, Kremer's proposal might be modified so that
the high bid is just one factor, along with the success of the product
once placed in the public domain, used to determine compensation for
inventors. Similarly, the government administering a coupon scheme
might allow the patent holder to set its own price, promising to pay an
eventual cash prize dependent on the results achieved. These
considerations suggest again that there will be a benefit to flexibility
in administering a prize system, a benefit that we ultimately will
balance against any costs of flexibility. 30 5
2. Unnecessary Prizes
This reasoning suggests that we should be wary when someone
chooses a prize over a patent because that choice may indicate that
the inventor did not believe that patent protection would be valuable.
Even if the government can address this problem by estimating the
value of patents, some prize applicants might have decided not to price
303. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 541-42; supra text accompanying note 96.
304. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
305. See infra Part III.A.
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their products monopolistically even if the patents were valuable. In
the extreme case, a patent holder might have released the patent to
the public domain even in the absence of a prize system; in a less
extreme case, a patent holder might license a patent at a relatively
low cost. A patent holder might do this for reputational reasons-for
example, because the patent owner might expect criticism for fully
exploiting its patent.306 Some such patent holders, however, might
apply for prizes anyway, meaning that tax dollars will be spent on
what otherwise would not have been a government-sponsored
program. Similarly, some patents may never be licensed even if they
represent true advances, and holders of such patents might request
prizes even though they would not have exploited the patents.307
The flip side of the dilemma is that a company might release a
patent to the public domain because doing so will not prevent the
company from achieving monopolistic pricing. If the company had a
patent on a complementary product as well, the company might decide
to exploit the combined set of patents through high prices for one
rather than for both.308 Giving a prize to the company for releasing the
patent that it otherwise would not have exploited may not be
necessary. Similarly, a patent holder might be a natural monopoly
producer of the product it has patented, 30 9 or it might be able to
306. This is hardly naive speculation. Some pharmaceutical companies, for example, have
allowed their patents to be used for free in third-world countries without payment. See, e.g.,
Helene Cooper et al., Patents Pending: AIDS Epidemic Traps Drug Firms in a Vise: Treatment
vs. Profits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at Al (discussing drug companies' dilemma whether to
allow generic copies of their drugs in poor countries); Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South
Africa Suit over AIDS Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at Al (reporting that the
pharmaceutical industry bowed to "mounting public pressure" by dropping a lawsuit that sought
to prevent uncompensated use of patents on AIDS drugs). For conflicting editorial views on
patent enforcement by drug companies in poor countries, compare South Africa's AIDS Victory,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at A18 (cautioning drug companies "not to start new efforts to block
access to cheaper drugs" in poor nations), with Robert M. Goldberg, Fight AIDS with Reason, Not
Rhetoric, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2001, at A22 (asserting that the South African settlement "is part
of a strategy to impose price controls and limit patent protection" that will "ensure that this
current generation of AIDS drugs is the only one we have for a long time to come").
307. For an explanation of why patent licensing rates are likely quite low, see Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1503-08 (2001).
308. This observation is central to Kremer's concern that companies might be
overcompensated for complementary patents under his system. See Kremer, supra note 21, at
1155-57; supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
309. A natural monopoly is "[a] monopoly in which the relation between industry demand
and cost structure makes it possible for only one firm to exist in the industry." EKELUND &
TOLLISON, supra note 30, at 255. Some commentators and courts have analogized all patents to
natural monopolies, urging that patent holders be regulated in a manner similar to the price
regulation techniques used for utilities. See generally John W. Schlicher, If Economic Welfare Is
the Goal, Will Economic Analysis Redefine Patent Law?, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., June 1992, at 12,
15-16 (discussing such theories). If a patent were placed in the public domain, however, there
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credibly threaten potential entrants into a market with either
predatory pricing310 or litigation. 311 If so, then the patent holder
surrenders nothing by releasing the product into the public domain,
and paying the patent holder for doing so will fail to reduce
deadweight loss.
The welfare consequences of awarding patent prizes to those
who have not fully exploited their patents are equivocal. It may make
sense to award prizes for innovations that a company would decide not
to exploit for publicity reasons, as a way of ensuring that there are
continued incentives for the development of research into such areas.
On the other hand, the positive reputational effect of releasing a
product into the public domain without a prize may be sufficient by
itself to stimulate research in some cases, so the government may end
up subsidizing some research that would have been performed even in
the absence of the prize system. The welfare consequences of paying
prizes in the case of the inevitable monopolist are less equivocal. It is
possible that the prizes will provide companies an additional incentive
to invest in research and development, 312 but such prizes will be of no
help in limiting deadweight loss. Moreover, companies that have
nothing to lose from placing a patent in the public domain will be
more likely than others to seek prizes.
might or might not be a natural monopoly for the corresponding product, depending largely on
the startup costs for building a plant to produce the product.
310. Whether predatory pricing is in fact a viable strategy for avoiding competition is a
much-debated question in the economics literature. Compare JOHN R. LOTT, JR., ARE PREDATORY
COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE?: WHO [sic] SHOULD THE COURTS BELIEVE? 18-60 (1999) (arguing with
empirical evidence that profit-maximizing firms rarely engage in predatory pricing), with Peter
H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models of Predation, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 437, 442
(2000) (reviewing LOTT, supra) (citing empirical analysis supporting the existence of predatory
pricing). A significant early work offering a model in which predatory pricing might occur is Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280,
284-302 (1982) (offering a model in which predatory pricing might occur).
311. Intimidation through litigation is rarely sanctioned under the antitrust laws, as a result
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, unless the litigation is a "sham." See Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144-45 (1961) (finding action by railroad
companies to obtain favorable governmental action not illegal under antitrust laws); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (holding that "joint efforts to influence
public officials" are not illegal even if "intended to eliminate competition"); James B. Perrine,
Comment, Defining the "Sham Litigation" Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity
Doctrine: An Analysis of the Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries
Decision, 46 ALA. L. REV. 815 passim (1995) (exploring the "sham" exception to the doctrine).
312. Other schemes, such as tax breaks for research-and-development expenses, might be
better targeted. See Stephen A. Jones, Note, The Danforth-Baucus Proposal to Restructure the
Research and Development Tax Credit: Providing a More Reliable Incentive for Commercial
Experimentation, 42 TAX LAW. 1089, 1093-1100 (1989) (considering the strengths and
weaknesses of research-and-development tax credits).
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The first three proposals discussed in Part I are not directly
responsive to the problem. The Guell and Fischbaum proposal, for
example, would base a prize on monopoly profits extrapolated from a
test market, but the prize recipient would be able to continue to
charge monopoly prices in other markets. In the Kremer market
proposal, a bidder may bid a great deal for monopoly rights, which
would allow exclusion of the original patent holder, even if the original
patent holder would continue to dominate the market if the product
were randomized to the public domain. Even the Shavell and van
Ypersele proposal, while considering subsequent sales data, is based
on calculation of the demand curve, rather than the supply curve. To
address the problem, all of these proposals would have to be modified
to allow some ex post check that the product's placement into the
public domain has had a meaningful effect.
The problem, though, would not affect the Lichtman proposal.
After all, the Lichtman proposal imagines that a single seller would
continue to sell the product. If a single producer has a natural
monopoly, in order to eliminate deadweight loss the government must
provide appropriate incentives to the producer, rather than use a
mechanism that would allow others to join the market. Thus,
ironically, Lichtman's proposal, which was least flexible in addressing
the adverse selection problem discussed in the previous section, is best
insulated from the adverse selection problem addressed in this
section. This observation underscores the difficulty of identifying a
single best proposal. Moreover, the severity of the problem discussed
here might vary from market to market, applicable more to industries
with high fixed costs and to products with high marginal costs of
production. This variability emphasizes again the virtues of a system
that encourages different approaches depending on which is the most
efficient in the particular context.
D. Costs of a Prize System
A prize system cannot be assessed merely by examining the
prizes ultimately rewarded and determining whether those awards
will tend to encourage or discourage innovative activity. The costs of
operating any prize system must also be considered. The government
will incur costs from paying prizes, of course, but it also may incur
costs in the administration of the prize system. Indirect costs incurred
by inventors are also relevant-including the costs of any litigation
that results from disputes over prizes, as well as investors'
expenditures on political rent-seeking activities. The patent system, of
course, may result in costs in some of these categories, and prize
2003]
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system costs will be additional to the patent system's unless the prize
system lessens the costs of the patent system. This section considers
the implications of these various types of costs for a prize system.
1. Financing Costs
For government prizes to substitute for monopoly power in
rewarding innovation, the government must pay money for
innovations. An immediate objection might be that it is naive to think
that the government would devote a sufficient amount of money to a
patent prize system for it to make any difference. 313 Calandrillo
responds to such critiques by arguing that the government could raise
sufficient funds if Congress desired.314 A different response would be
that a smaller federal program might well produce more in benefits
per dollar than a larger program. This is so for two reasons. First, a
relatively small program could be used to relieve the burden
associated with the patents that impose the greatest loss per dollar of
monopoly profit. Second, the last marginal dollar in profit that a
monopolist receives imposes more of a deadweight loss than any
earlier dollar, 315 so a proposal seeking to lower prices partly, but not
completely to marginal cost, might produce almost as much gain as
one seeking to eliminate deadweight loss altogether. Of course, only a
very large federal program could produce revolutionary changes, but
this would be an argument against the proposal only if small-scale
implementation were infeasible.
Assuming that the program is of optimal size, it might appear
that the government will necessarily improve social welfare if a prize
program is sufficiently accurate. When giving putative patent holders
what would have been their monopoly profits, the government saves
consumers this amount, plus what would have been deadweight loss to
boot. A dollar spent achieves more than a dollar in benefits, thus
seeming to pass a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis. 31 6 The problem
313. Cf. Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56
AM. ECON. REV. 421, 436-37 (1966) (comments of Robert W. Frase) (arguing that it would be
impossible to raise sufficient funds for a copyright prize system).
314. Calandrillo, supra note 20, at 344-45.
315. For an explanation, see Ian Ayres, Pushing the Envelope: Antitrust Implications of the
Envelope Theorem, 17 MISS. C. L. REV. 21, 22-24 (1996).
316. Some commentators might argue that because patents on products like drugs involve
health, cost-benefit analysis is an inappropriate, commodificationist tool. See, e.g., ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 190-95 (1993). Several scholars in recent years
have defended cost-benefit analysis against this line of critique. See Matthew Adler,
Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371. 1376-77, 1383-89 (1998);
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 194-
225 (1999); Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1037,
200 [Vol. 56:115
2003] PERFECTING PATENT PRIZES
with this analysis is that, under the traditional economic wisdom,31 7 a
proper evaluation of a social program should count a dollar as more
than a dollar, because government funds cost money to raise. Taxation
causes economic distortions. 318 Taxing apples will lead consumers to
eat fewer apples and more oranges; taxing income may lead taxed
entities to make less of it.319 In addition, greater levels of taxation lead
to increased expenditures on tax avoidance, for example, by hiring of
accountants and tax lawyers.320  Governments can finance
expenditures with deficit spending instead of taxation, but this
financing has its own problems. 321 The various means of fundraising
do not obviate the need to consider the distortionary cost of each
additional dollar in federal spending.
The distortionary effect of taxation is integral to Lichtman's
analysis. Recall that Lichtman showed how a coupon scheme might
achieve the same decrease in deadweight loss as a patent buyout at a
fraction of the cost. 322 One might ask, though, why the difference in
costs matters. The reduced costs to the government in Lichtman's
scheme come at the expense of consumers, who provide the rest of the
funds needed to make up what would have been monopoly profits, so
1045-51 (2000); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1059, 1076-77 (2000) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is best justified as a tool for
helping to overcome biases due to cognitive heuristics).
317. Concern with the relevance of the distortionary effect of taxation for funding of public
goods dates at least to ARTHUR C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 33-34 (3d ed. 1947). Some
of the most important subsequent work, however, ignored the problem. Most notably, Paul
Samuelson, simply assumed a lump-sum tax that would impose no economic distortion. Cf. Paul
A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 388 (1954).
318. A policy-induced economic distortion is a government policy that causes individuals to
alter what would otherwise be their preferred behavior. For a useful vocabulary and typology of
distortions, see Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting from a "Negligence"
System to a "Strict-Liability" Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and
Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 30-32 (1998).
319. A consumption tax causes distortions in individuals' allocation of time between work
and leisure, while an income tax also distorts individuals' allocation of income between savings
and consumption. See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition
Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 24-25, 25 n.119 (1992) (concluding that a
consumption tax may be less distortionary than an income tax "if the work-leisure boundary is
less elastic than the savings-consumption boundary").
320. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAx 174-75 (1986)
(emphasizing the high costs of such tax avoidance). Higher taxes also might induce more tax
evasion. See, e.g., Nehemiah Friedland et al., A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion, 10 J.
PUB. ECON. 107, 111, 114 tbl.3 (1978) (offering a simulation in which higher tax rates produce
more tax evasion). See generally FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE
ECONOMICS OF EVASION 72-73 (1990).
321. A seminal article exploring the benefits and costs of deficit financing is Robert J. Barro,
On the Determination of the Public Debt, 87 J. POL. ECON. 940 (1979).
322. See Lichtman, supra note 22, at 135; see also supra text accompanying notes 176-78
(arguing that a coupon scheme sometimes might be more expensive than a patent buyout).
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the total amount being paid by the government and consumers
remains the same. The answer is that the government's expenses are
of greater concern because of tax distortions. Lichtman guesses that
the deadweight loss attributable to tax collection is thirty cents on the
dollar. 323 Because the deadweight loss from monopoly under his
assumptions would be fifty cents on the dollar, a patent buyout would
save twenty cents per dollar relative to the patent system, but a
properly implemented consumer subsidy of only about four cents per
dollar.3 24 The precise estimates that he uses are not relevant. As long
as there is some distortionary effect of taxation, a program that
results in less government expenditure, even at the expense of
consumer expenditure, should be preferred.
A recent literature, however, emphasizes that while the tax
system as a whole is distortionary, some increases in taxes may not
be.325 One reason is that while taxation may distort relative prices,
once an economy is already distorted by taxes, the adoption of a new
tax conceivably might bring relative prices more closely into line.326 If,
for a simple example, the investment tax credit is distortionary, then
repeal of the credit may both raise revenue and improve efficiency. 327
This analysis, however, is presumably relevant only if a proposal for a
prize system were accompanied by a specific tax proposal. The second
reason is generally applicable to income taxes. It is that an increase in
income taxes may lead workers to work more rather than less, 328 if the
income effect of the tax (the tendency of workers to work more because
323. Lichtman, supra note 22, at 133 & n.26 (citing Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The
Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 355 (1997)
(estimating the deadweight loss from a marginal increase in taxes to be between seventeen and
fifty-six cents per dollar raised)). Thompson in turn obtains these numbers from Charles L.
Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the
United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128, 136 (1985). Later work by Ballard, however, has called
these conclusions into question. See infra notes 325-28 and accompanying text.
324. Lichtman, supra note 22, at 135 & tbl.5.
325. For an overview of this literature, see Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton, Distortionary
Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 1992, at 117, 124-25,
129.
326. See, e.g., Jean Dr~ze & Nicholas Stern, Policy Reform, Shadow Prices, and Market
Prices, 42 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 43 (1990).
327. See Ballard & Fullerton, supra note 325, at 129 (citing Don Fullerton & Yolanda K.
Henderson, The Marginal Excess Burden of Different Capital Tax Instruments, 71 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 435, 441 (1989)). Another example is that of "a Pigouvian, externality-correcting tax." Id.
(citing Charles L. Ballard & Steven G. Medema, The Marginal Efficiency Effects of Taxes and
Subsidies in the Presence of Externalities: A Computational General Equilibrium Approach
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Michigan State University)).
328. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Partha S. Dasgupta, Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and
Economic Efficiency, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 151, 159 (1971); see also Ballard & Fullerton, supra
note 325, at 122-24.
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the lower wage decreases demand for normal goods, including leisure
time) outweighs the substitution effect (the tendency of workers to
work less because the tax decreases the opportunity cost of leisure). 329
Intuitively, a worker who is paid less may work more to maintain a
given standard of living.330
For at least two reasons, the recent literature should not
encourage complacency about the distortionary effects of taxation.
First, the literature generally ignores the tax system's administrative
and compliance costs, 331 the latter of which, in particular, might
plausibly be impacted by tax rate increases. Second, the literature
does not explicitly consider that the provision of a public good itself
may have a negative effect on labor supply. People care about their
income because their level of income will affect their ability to
purchase goods. If a number of goods suddenly become free (or much
cheaper), income will be less significant. To take a reductionist
example, suppose the only two goods in the economy were food and
prescription drugs. If prescription drugs suddenly became free, then
there would be a reduced incentive to work, because the money
previously spent on drugs might make a smaller contribution to utility
if spent entirely in the food category. How strong this effect is in a real
economy depends on the context. 332
In the absence of a consensus that in our actual tax system
increases in taxes will decrease tax distortions, it would be hazardous
to disregard the concern about the potentially distortionary effect of
increased income taxes. It at least seems reasonable that government
329. On income and substitution effects, see NICHOLSON, supra note 76, at 135-37. For a
review of the literature suggesting that the elasticity of labor supply may be negative for certain
groups of earners, see Gary Burtless, The Work Response to a Guaranteed Income: A Survey of
Experimental Evidence, in LESSONS FROM THE INCOME MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENTS 22, 34 tbl.3,
35-38 (Alicia H. Munnell ed., 1987).
330. Whether this is true for a particular worker may depend on the current income of that
worker, if the labor supply curve is "backward-bending." See generally GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR
ECONOMICS 43, 43-46 (1996) (explaining backward-bending labor supply curves).
331. See Ballard & Fullerton, supra note 325, at 118-19 ("Although these costs are doubtless
important, they have generally been ignored by the economists studying the marginal cost of
public funds since the 1970s.").
332. A relevant part of the context is whether individuals care more about their ability to
purchase goods because these goods are inherently valuable to them or because these goods are
valuable to them primarily because others possess them. Robert H. Frank has argued that the
answer depends on the goods at issue and has used the terms "nonpositional goods" (in which
category he includes education and health care) and "positional goods" to refer to the respective
types. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF
EXCESS passim (1999); see also Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 370-71 (2001) (exploring the significance of the
distinction for cost-benefit analysis). Frank's identification of health care as a nonpositional good
suggests that free distribution of drugs would not have as great a negative effect on the supply of
labor as it would if it were a positional good.
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programs costing less should, all else being equal, be preferred to
government programs costing more. One possible response to the
distortionary effect might be to tax specifically those who benefit from
a patent prize system in a particular context. As Louis Kaplow shows,
if a public good is funded by a tax allocated to the benefit each
individual receives from it, then there is no tax distortion from it.3 Of
course, if a patent buyout were funded by an excise tax, the tax would
defeat the purpose of the buyout, raising the price of the product back
to the monopoly price.334 On the other hand, the government might
fund a patent prize system by relying on proxies indicating who would
benefit from it. For example, to fund a patent prize system designed to
buy out patents on agricultural technology, the government might tax
all farmers, regardless of whether they subsequently decided to
purchase products containing the technology. Such taxes often will be
politically unattractive, however, because in the absence of excellent
proxies, they will result in heavy levies being imposed on some
individuals who do not benefit at all.
Prize systems thus ordinarily would likely be funded from
general tax receipts, with some presumed tax distortion effect. In
comparing any particular prize system proposal, however, an
individualized evaluation of any redistributive benefit from the
proposal should accompany an analysis of the distortionary tax effect.
Louis Kaplow observes that a prime reason that income taxes are
distortionary relative to a hypothetical lump sum tax is that they are
progressive. 335 "But if this assumption is to be made," Kaplow argues,
"the distributive benefit of the more progressive tax/expenditure
333. Kaplow explains this intuition by imagining an individual for whom a public goods
program produces benefits exactly equal to one percent of income, where the program is funded
by a one percent tax:
For each additional dollar an individual might earn, he will have one cent less than
otherwise available for private consumption, 69 cents instead of 70 cents. However,
the individual will benefit in an amount worth one additional cent due to the
availability of the public good, raising his aggregate marginal benefit from earning a
dollar back to 70 cents. That is, his net utility benefit from earning an additional
dollar will be precisely what it was before-without the public good and the tax
adjustment. Because each individual's net benefit from any level of labor effort is thus
unchanged, labor supply will be unaffected, and each individual's utility will be the
same as it was before.
Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49
NAT'L TAX J., 513, 515 (1996).
334. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 544 (noting that "commodity taxation...
is essentially equivalent to granting intellectual property rights"). The patent buyout program
must pay the patent holder monopoly profits. Thus, if the program is to be funded by purchases
of the product, each purchaser must pay monopoly profits divided by the number of purchasers.
The number of purchasers will be the same as the equilibrium under monopoly, since the next
marginal potential consumer would not be willing to pay the excise tax required.
335. Kaplow, supra note 333, at 521.
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system should be included in the final account."336 Even apart from
the point that redistributive benefits should be counted at least
insofar as they offset distortionary costs, 337 redistributive benefits are
potentially relevant to an assessment of a patent prize system.
Although many commentators urge that redistribution should
generally be accomplished through the income tax,3 8 patent prize
proposals may accomplish redistribution other than Robin Hood
reallocation of resources from the rich to the poor. For example, a
patent prize system for prescription drugs might redistribute from the
healthy to the sick, and it might accomplish this goal more efficiently
than could an alternative tax provision aimed at this goal.339
Two general points, potentially offsetting, emerge from the
above analysis. First, Lichtman's observation that cheaper means of
eliminating deadweight loss should be preferred is probably a useful
generalization, but with the awareness that the importance of the
effect can be exaggerated. Second, more expensive alternatives
nonetheless should be considered if they produce redistributive
benefits. Even if a buyout program were eight times more expensive
than a coupon scheme (and I have shown that this will be unlikely),340
it might be desirable for the government to adopt the costlier proposal.
The difference in social cost, which depends on the distortionary effect
on taxation, will likely be considerably less in any event than the
difference in the government's costs. Of course, redistributive benefits
may vary from program to program, or even patent to patent. A patent
buyout for a "lifestyle drug" might be viewed as having neutral or even
negative redistributive consequences.3 41  Once again, these
336. Id.
337. In a separate work, written with Steven Shavell, Kaplow has emphasized the
importance of concerns about the distribution of income to welfare economics. See Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961, 989-98 (2001).
338. See, e.g., id. at 993 ("[W]hen legal rules do have distributive effects, the effects usually
should not be counted as favoring or disfavoring the rules because distributional objectives can
often be best accomplished directly, using the income tax and transfer (welfare) programs.").
339. Anne Alstott has analogously argued that institutional constraints on the tax system
may make the earned income tax credit a less appealing alternative to welfare programs than it
might at first appear. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of
Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARv. L. REV. 533, 535, 564-89 (1995).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
341. In the United Kingdom, critics of the National Health Service have argued that it
should not devote resources to Xenical, an anti-obesity pill that they claim is a lifestyle drug. See
Valerie Hannah, Drug Giant Under Investigation over Side Effects of Cholesterol Pill, HERALD
(Glasgow), Sept. 5, 2001, at 3, available at 2001 WL 26585561. Of course, there is considerable
debate about which drugs are lifestyle drugs. Dave Hill, Viagra Nation, INDEPENDENT (London),
July 15, 2001, at 22, available at 2001 WL 23539167 (quoting a doctor as saying that calling




observations suggest skepticism about a one-size-fits-all patent buyout
program.
2. Administrative Costs
In addition to paying prizes themselves, the government would
need to pay the costs of running the administrative agency overseeing
the prize system. Consideration of these costs may seem to make
proposals that vest the agency with little discretion more attractive.
We have seen, however, that none of the proposals can be
implemented in a truly mechanical way, if basic problems are to be
overcome. The test market results from Guell and Fischbaum's
proposal would need to be considered individually before being
extrapolated to other geographical areas and into the future.342
Shavell and van Ypersele derive a formula, but an administrative
agency would be needed to consider an individual patent's
contribution to a product. 343 Similarly, in Kremer's proposal, the
agency would need to identify complementary products.344 While
Lichtman identifies on an economic chart which consumers should
receive coupons, the procedure for identifying these consumers almost
surely necessitates great administrative discretion. Finally, if the
government agency is to consider many of the factors considered in
this part, it is difficult to imagine a statute specifying just the right
mechanical procedure to follow.
If the government were to consider adopting a proposal that
binds an agency to calculating prizes in some predetermined way,
such as one of the ways suggested in Part I, it would presumably be
for some reason other than administrative cost. Once bureaucrats are
involved in making individualized considerations for particular prize
applications, the cost savings from formalizing the overall process
seem unlikely to be great. A process that specifies the means by which
government officials should consider each of a hundred factors easily
could be more expensive than one that orders the officials simply to
consider all relevant factors. The empirical comparison is uncertain, of
course, but there is little theoretical reason to favor complex
mechanical formulas to open-ended decisionmaking on cost grounds.
Even if a mechanical formula could be devised, the government agency
at least would need some latitude to verify the correctness of data
submitted to it, such as industry sales figures used to justify a claim
for a large prize, thus reducing the benefits of automation.
342. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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While Congress would surely need to consider the costs of
operating an administrative agency to distribute patent rewards,
there is little reason to think that some proposals for structuring an
agency will be cheaper than others. A government truly intent on
reducing costs might offer a fixed allocation to the agency, perhaps
even making part of the agency employees' compensation contingent
on finishing the job assigned. 345 Perhaps of greater import is the effect
of different proposals on the Patent and Trademark Office, whose
costs are not trivial,346 without even considering the cost to firms of
prosecuting patents before the Office. Proposals that require
applicants to obtain patents before buyouts will not affect the
operation of the Office. Proposals, by contrast, that would allow
compensation for innovations without demanding receipt of a patent
could save the government administrative costs. There would be
benefits to requiring prize applicants to obtain patents, particularly
verification of nonobviousness and adequacy of disclosure, though the
patent administrative system is designed to provide such verification
functions only in conjunction with the patent litigation system.347 For
some patents, these benefits would likely be worth the cost in the
prize context, while for others they might not be. A patent system that
did not require applicants to obtain patents conceivably could result in
net administrative cost savings.
3. Litigation Costs
Reasonable people might disagree about how large a prize an
applicant should receive, and such disagreement might be resolved
through some type of litigation process. For example, an applicant
disappointed with a prize might be allowed to sue the agency in
federal court, 348 and the agency itself might offer some form of appeals
345. Agencies often miss statutory deadlines. While one commentator has responded by
proposing the abolition of such deadlines, see Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal
Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit Appraisal, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 200-04
(1987), an alternative approach would be to create compensation-based incentives.
346. The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks recently complained that the PTO's final
fiscal year 2000 budget of $871 million was too low. See Remarks of Q. Todd Dickinson at PTO
Day Annual Conference on Patent & Trademark Office Law and Practice, 82 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 219, 226 (2000).
347. See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining the importance of having a system for distinguishing
valid patents from invalid patents).
348. If the organic statute creating the prize agency did not establish a standard for review,
the courts would presumably apply the relatively deferential substantial evidence test in
reviewing agency decisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994) (setting forth the "substantial
evidence" test); cf. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (requiring the Federal Circuit to
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process. 349 Alternatively, a prize system might encourage private
whistleblowers to reveal fraud in prize applications. 350 Regardless of
the form of the system adopted, the costs of such litigation, including
both the cost to the parties and the cost to the executive and judicial
branches, are social costs that offset any benefits of the prize system.
Whether these costs are worthwhile depends on the benefits litigation
offers-for example, in improving the accuracy of the prize system, in
preventing excessive rewards based on faulty data, or even in assuring
the due process rights of prize applicants. 351
Because the authors of patent prize proposals have not
described whether and what type of litigation over patent prizes would
be permitted, comparison of their proposals is difficult. Some may
have simply assumed that decisions by the agency charged with
granting patents would be so formulaic as to be uncontroversial. We
have seen, though, that no patent prize system can be entirely
mechanical; judgment calls must be made. 352 Even patent prize
systems that provide a formula to be used for calculation of a prize
will need factfinders to determine the value of variables to be plugged
into the formula. More mechanical proposals, in any event, need not
necessarily produce greater litigation than less structured proposals.
For example, if a statute implementing Lichtman's coupon proposal
gave an agency a lump sum to spend on coupons for prescription
drugs, current law would allow little latitude for challenges.35 3 A
statute permitting litigation over the amount of prizes surely could
lead to large litigation costs, but the size of such costs will depend
more on the rules governing litigation than on the rules governing
prizes.
evaluate fact-finding by the Patent and Trademark Office using the substantial evidence test
rather than the clearly erroneous test used to assess fact-finding by district courts).
349. A model might be the appeals process used by the Social Security Administration. See
42 U.S.C. § 405 (2000).
350. The design of a suitable whistleblower system itself is not a simple matter. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) (critiquing the operation of whistleblower
programs).
351. I am skeptical of the concern with the due process rights of prize applicants, aside from
the formal need for any proposal to pass constitutional muster. The reason for my skepticism is
that the dignitary rights of inventors are less important than, say, the dignitary rights of Social
Security applicants. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52 (1976) (criticizing the Supreme Court for not considering the
importance of dignitary rights in defining due process).
352. See, e.g., supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193-94 (1993) (holding that the decision on how




Patent proposals may differ, however, in the extent to which
they reduce litigation associated with the existing patent system. If a
prize system produces patent buyouts that place patents in the public
domain, there ordinarily will be no need for a prize recipient to enforce
its patent with infringement litigation. 3 4 Although a patent buyout
system might not substantially reduce litigation in some situations,
for example, when only one of several related patents is placed in the
public domain, the overall potential savings are considerable. 35 5 Prize
systems that encourage release of information about innovations
without requiring acquisition of patents also might reduce litigation,
though litigation could ensue should someone else subsequently obtain
a patent arguably derivative of the earlier innovation.3 56 Proposals
that encourage price reduction by patent holders, by contrast, would
not necessarily reduce litigation. Consideration of the effects on future
litigation therefore adds yet another variable to the mix needed to
compare approaches. And again, the optimal solution may depend on
the properties of the particular innovation, as some innovations may
be less likely than others to produce the type of confusion or ambiguity
that would lead to litigation.
4. Rent-Seeking Costs
We have already seen that a patent system can dissipate rents,
as potential patent holders compete to win a patent race, 357 and can
prevent dissipation of rents by consolidating ownership of
improvements on an invention in a single monopolist. 358 In these
examples, the "rent" is either the monopoly profit that a patent holder
can capture or the social wealth that competitors can capture, and
competition tends to erode the benefit. There is another, more familiar
type of rent-seeking that can be associated with a patent system or
with a prize system: rent-seeking through regulation. 35 9 Given the
possibility of receiving a government benefit, whether a patent or a
prize, private companies might invest resources to influence the
354. See Calandrillo, supra note 20, at 333 (noting criticisms that the patent system, unlike
reward systems, produce "litigation and accompanying administrative costs").
355. The average patent infringement case costs an estimated $1.2 million to litigate. See
Dee Gill, Defending Your Rights: Protecting Intellectual Property Is Expensive and Often Crucial,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at 6 (referring to an unidentified "industry survey").
356. Even if unpatented, however, information released would be relevant as prior art to
defeat a subsequent patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (detailing the prior art requirement).
357. See supra Part II.B.1.
358. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
359. For an overview of rent-seeking in general and this form of rent-seeking in particular,
see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229-38 (1989).
2003] 209
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
government's decision. Such activity in itself is socially wasteful, and
it may generate additional waste as government officials compete for
such resources or because the rent-seeking activity causes some
distortion in the economy-for example, by altering innovation
incentives. 360 These costs offset the social benefits of the patent or
prize system, and if the costs of a prize system are sufficiently high,
they might outweigh the benefits of a prize system relative to a patent
system.
The problem of rent-seeking should neither be ignored nor
exaggerated. On the former point, as just one example, several studies
have shown that political contributions by companies seeking
protectionist legislation have a significant effect on legislators'
votes. 361 The patent system itself is arguably a good example of the
latter point. Considerable resources are expended, of course, on patent
prosecution and patent litigation.362 The relative independence of the
Patent and Trademark Office, however, makes direct lobbying
unlikely, though industry as a whole may affect the selection of high-
ranking agency officials. 36 3 Similarly, and interestingly, it is rare for a
company to lobby Congress to enact legislation extending a patent
term, and when such efforts are made, they are at least ostensibly
based on the ground that there is some fairness reason for an
extension. 364 Given the potential benefits from an extension, this lack
360. See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE
RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 12-14 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (discussing these socially
costly effects of rent-seeking).
361. See ROBERT E. BALDWIN & CHRISTOPHER S. MAGEE, IS TRADE POLICY FOR SALE?
CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON RECENT TRADE BILLS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 6376, 1998), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6376.pdf; Cletus C. Coughlin,
Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economics of Regulation, 23 ECON. INQ. 437
(1985); Suzanne C. Tosini & Edward Tower, The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of
Congressional Voting Patterns, 54 PUBLIC CHOICE 19 (1987); see also MUELLER, supra note 359,
at 242 (discussing various studies).
362. See Gill, supra note 355; see also Albert F. Bower, The Independent Inventor: In Which a
Practitioner Shares Some Highly Practical Advice for Safeguarding the Products of Intellectual
Labor, DEL. LAW., Mar. 1989, at 24-25 ("A major cost in patenting is incurred in preparing and
filing the application, mainly because of the attorney time required to make an adequate
disclosure.").
363. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1149 (1990) (noting that interest groups may be able to control the selection
of officials and judges in relatively specialized agencies and courts).
364. See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, Senate Mulls Bill to Extend Drug Patents, WALL ST. J., Aug.
5, 1999, at A3 (noting that proponents of Schering-Ploug's attempt to obtain legislative extension
of the patent for Claritin "argue the extensions are only fair, considering delays in the federal
approval process for the drugs"); see also Charles R. Babcock, Patent Fight Tests Drug Firm's
Clout: Claritin Maker Goes All Out in Congress, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1999, at Al (noting
Schering-Plough chief executive's claim that the company just wants a fair hearing). Critics, of
course, will dispute the fairness reason. See, e.g., Claritin Patent Extension: Don't Be Fooled by
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of activity suggests a perception that Congress ordinarily will not
grant one, probably because legislators view the patent system as the
exclusive means of obtaining monopoly power in exchange for
innovation. 365
Patent prize systems similarly might escape the most blatant
rent-seeking abuses. Once an agency is established to award prizes,
Congress presumably would be skeptical of requests for prizes outside
the system. Greater concerns are the potential for lobbying over the
appointment of agency officials and the potential for seeking to
influence statutory formulae in ways beneficial to individual
companies and industries. These concerns suggest a tradeoff. On one
hand, more mechanical proposals entail the risk that special interests
may succeed in influencing Congress to adopt an inferior formula or
algorithm because it is particularly likely to benefit them. We have
seen the danger that a poorly motivated government official could
apply a formula in a perverse way, but this danger may be secondary
to the possibility of the government adopting a bad formula that
prevents even a well-motivated bureaucrat from efficiently
distributing prizes. On the other hand, more flexible proposals may
increase rent-seeking designed to influence those who will make
agency decisions. The challenge is to avoid both dangers.
III. PERFECTING PATENT PRIZES
The recent revival of interest in prize systems, even among
such prominent scholars, seems unlikely to lead to full-scale
implementation. For one, the change may be simply too radical to be
politically palatable in the near future. Calandrillo might be correct
that the government would be able to levy sufficient taxes to pay the
rewards that would be necessary in a prize system, 36 6 and Shavell and
van Ypersele might be correct in stating that "industry should not
object" to an opt-in proposal, "as it can only raise firms' profits."367
Nonetheless, there might be some special interests opposed to such a
the "R&D Scare Card," PUBLIC CITIZEN, at http://www.citizen.org/congress/reform/archives/clari-
tinlarticles.cfm?1D=1077 (last visited Nov. 23, 2001) (criticizing Schering-Plough's attempt).
365. Even if Congress does grant such an extension, the courts might strike it down. See
Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent
Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 64-65 (2000) (arguing that courts should scrutinize term
extensions, especially if the extensions benefit only a small number of inventors, as potentially
violative of the Copyright and Patent Clause).
366. Calandrillo, supra note 20, at 345.
367. Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 544.
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change, such as patent attorneys, 368 and there certainly is not a
powerful interest lobbying for such a change. Likelihood of adoption, of
course, does not detract from the proposals' academic merits, but it
does suggest that any reform proposal should be incremental. 369
An administrative program with a great deal of flexibility for
agency decisionmakers is particularly attractive for a pilot program. It
is likely to be difficult to anticipate precisely how successful any
program for patent prizes will be, and one virtue of flexibility is that if
the initial plan proves suboptimal, agency officials will have an
opportunity to adjust. Moreover, a relatively flexible program can be
quite simple and conventional: Establish an agency and give it money
to distribute to pharmaceutical companies that place their patents in
the public domain or take some other action to reduce the deadweight
cost of patents. It is far easier as a statutory drafting matter to give
decisionmakers freedom to estimate the value of a project than it is to
tell them how to go about the estimation. Implementation of other
design features-such as a rule specifying that the fund should be
distributed in proportion to the final assessments-is relatively
trivial. While statutory drafting is likely not a significant expense
even for far more complicated programs, the familiarity of the
structure of such an administrative program, if not its purpose, is a
virtue, especially initially.
This is, of course, a simplification of the design decisions that
would need to be made in the actual construction of such an
administrative agency. One would, for example, face the usual
questions about whether the agency should be independent or
executive,370 and whether it should use formal or informal adjudicative
processes in determining the value of any particular research
368. Members of the patent bar have in the past expressed opposition to many patent reform
proposals. See, e.g., Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of
U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition-and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 63, 83 (1998) (describing one such instance). The patent bar, of course, is not a
monolith, and different groups of attorneys may have different interests. Cf. Lee Rousso,
Comment, Japan's New Patent Attorney Law Breaches Barrier Between the "Legal" and "Quasi-
Legal" Professions: Integrity of Japanese Patent Practice at Risk?, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 781
(2001) (discussing such a conflict in Japan).
369. Shavell and van Ypersele implicitly acknowledge this, concluding in the last line of their
article that "serious study of the possibility of reward systems, with a view toward their
implementation at least on an experimental, partial basis, is worth contemplating." Shavell &
van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 545. They do not, however, describe how such an experimental,
partial program would work.
370. See generally GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing
the differences between independent and executive agencies).
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project.371 The task of calculating patent prizes would seem to argue
for an agency that is as independent as possible, to ensure that the
best way to obtain a claim on a prize is through actual scientific
research, rather than through lobbying. At the same time, if what is
important is only that the administrative agency make accurate
decisions on average, relatively informal and low-cost adjudicative
processes should probably be used. Finally, as Kieff has pointed out,
there must be some mechanism to encourage production of
information that would reduce the credibility of applicants' claims.372
A full evaluation of policy options on all these fronts is beyond my
scope here, as is full development of an argument that a patent prize
agency would be able to keep administrative costs, including rent-
seeking costs, to a minimum. Nonetheless, creation of an
administrative agency with considerable flexibility to award prizes to
those who have placed patents in the public domain would involve far
fewer decisions than creation of an agency constrained to follow a
particular algorithm or formula, because the statute in the latter case
would need to explain exactly how the agency should make particular
decisions.
Administrative familiarity and simplicity, of course, are not
sufficient to justify any particular approach, and while I have
identified in Parts I and II some of the problems associated with
formulaic or algorithmic approaches to calculating patent prizes, I
have not yet systematically defended flexibility in agency
decisionmaking. I will mount such a case in Part III.A, arguing that
an agency given total flexibility would function effectively, at least if
decisions to take actions are irrevocable and the agency has a fixed
amount of money that it must spend.373 The argument for flexibility,
however, may be worthwhile even if Congress were to decide not to
give an agency complete discretion, and indeed even if Congress were
to decide to take an approach similar to one of the proposals critiqued
in Part I. In Part III.B, I will thus show how flexibility might improve
any of those proposals. I will also offer a variety of modifications to
such proposals, some borrowing from insights of the other
commentators.
371. Cf. Deborah R. Hensler, Does ADR Really Save Money? The Jury's Still Out, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 11, 1994, at C2 (discussing whether the use of alternative dispute resolution is cost-
efficient).
372. See supra Part II.A.2.
373. See supra text following note 28.
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A. The Case for Flexibility
The argument for flexibility is that it has small costs and large
benefits. Prizes would not be much more uncertain than patents from
the perspective of someone deciding whether to begin a long-term
research-and-development project, and any marginal increase in
uncertainty is of little concern to well-diversified shareholders. At the
same time, flexibility eliminates the possibility of loopholes, so
potential prize applicants' only incentive will be to provide social value
if this is what eventual prize decisionmakers will seek to measure.
1. The Small Costs of Uncertainty
It is natural to seek certainty in legal affairs37 4 and it may
seem even more natural in the design of a prize system.37 5 With one
prominent recent exception,376 scholars generally have claimed that
the patent system aspires to certainty,377 with uncertainty decreasing
374. Concern with certainty dates back at least to Blackstone's treatment of the law of
custom. Blackstone explained that for a custom to be enforceable despite contrary common law,
the custom (among other requirements) had to be certain. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *78; see also David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach
Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1389 (1996) (noting that Blackstone's
focus on certainty was influenced by earlier commentators).
375. Achieving certainty was indeed a primary aim of Polanyi's early patent prize proposal.
Polanyi criticized patent law, stating, "Hard cases occur of course under the operation of every
law; but the patent law seems to form a veritable labyrinth of hazards for the interests governed
by it." Polanyi, supra note 13, at 70. Polanyi continues that patent law "is essentially deficient."
He explains:
[I]t aims at a purpose which cannot be rationally achieved. It tries to parcel up a
stream of creative thought into a series of distinct claims, each of which is to
constitute the basis of a separately owned monopoly. But the growth of human
knowledge cannot be divided up into such sharply circumscribed phases. Ideas usually
develop gradually by shades of emphasis, and even when, from time to time, sparks of
discovery flare up and suddenly reveal a new understanding, it usually appears on
closer scrutiny that the new idea had been at least partly foreshadowed in previous
speculations.
Id. at 70-7 1. I am skeptical of Polanyi's claim that patent law is inherently more ambiguous than
other areas of law. Nonetheless, Polanyi is convincing in showing that a patent system, no less
than a prize system, is in some ways an artificial construct without complete correspondence to
intuitively appealing principles. This helps rebut the argument that patent law is inherently
more natural than a prize system because in the former, inventors simply have a monopoly over
their own discoveries. The task of determining patent scope may be as artificial as the task of
determining monetary awards for individual discoveries.
376. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REV. 985, 989-93 (1999) (arguing that the level of innovation can be kept constant if the
government compensates for less certainty in patents by offering longer patents).
377. For a recent and articulate defense of the importance of certainty in patent law, see
Erik S. Maurer, Note & Comment, An Economic Justification for a Broad Interpretation of
Patentable Subject Matter, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1057, 1095 (2001) ("[T]he risk of committing Type I
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confidence in inventors' abilities to recoup their investments.378 The
patent system offers a mostly decentralized way of encouraging
inventors to pursue whatever projects are most likely to increase
social wealth, and skepticism about a benevolent government's ability
to match the invisible hand is well placed. If a prize system is to
match the patent system, it might seem that the government must
provide some form of guarantee. A sufficiently rigid formula or
algorithm can serve this purpose, assuring that the inventor will
profit from innovation. Without such a guarantee, the government
might do a poor job in distributing prizes, rewarding unmeritorious
inventions over meritorious ones. Why invest billions of dollars on a
project when some bureaucrat capriciously might decide that the
invention is not sufficiently beneficial for society?
Given the intuitive appeal of this argument, it is hardly
surprising that commentators on prize systems seem to be engaged in
a search for the best approach to constraining an agency. The
argument, however, overstates both the certainty that the patent
system provides 37 9 and the importance of certainty in a prize system.
Some of the uncertainty in the patent system itself is embedded in
requirements that inevitably will require some judgment. Though
concepts like nonobviousness receive detailed treatment in case law, 38 0
no matter how much explanation is provided, application ultimately
error by subjectively narrowing the interpretation of patentable subject matter justifies the
current, broad, and objective interpretation adopted by the courts and the PTO."). As Thomas
Landry notes, the creation of the Federal Circuit reflects a belief that certainty and predictability
in patent law are even more important than in other areas. See Thomas K. Landry, Certainty
and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judicial Power
in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1152-53 (1994); see also Harry F. Manbeck, Jr.,
The Federal Circuit-First Ten Years of Patentability Decisions, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 499, 503
(1992) (arguing that "[tihe added certainty provided by the Federal Circuit is beneficial to both
patent applicants and the PTO itself, since it allows for reliable decisions by all concerned in the
patent application process").
378. Interestingly, the goal of certainty is often equated with the economic goals of the
patent system. For example, David Cohen notes that "economic concerns were of little
importance in the formation of German patent law," explaining that in Germany "legal certainty
is only one factor to be balanced against the needs of justice for the inventor." David L. Cohen,
Comment, Article 69 and European Patent Integration, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1082, 1126 (1998).
379. For articles arguing that the patent system is not as certain as might appear, see
Landry, supra note 377, at 1159-1203, which provides case studies of patent doctrines, and Craig
Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 763-64 (1999),
which argues for greater deference to the PTO as a way of creating greater certainty.
380. See, e.g., Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers Int'l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1093-94
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Archer, C.J., dissenting) (detailing secondary considerations to be considered in
considering whether an invention was obvious).
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requires some human decision. 38' As in law generally, the existence of
litigation suggests that litigants sometimes have different predictions
about the law, whether about patent validity or about patent scope.38 2
There can be more or less uncertainty and more or less litigation, but
the high reversal rate in patent cases suggests that there are at least
some difficult cases. 38 3
More importantly, even in the absence of any doubt as to the
validity and scope of a patent, inventors face considerable uncertainty
about the commercial success of the innovation. A product may face
unexpected competition, regulatory hurdles, or consumer indifference.
These uncertainties may dampen innovation somewhat, but probably
not too much. The magic of capital markets allows companies to make
speculative bets. Because the public holds a diverse array of securities,
the risk of the failure of any one product produced by one company is
insignificant, for that failure will be balanced by other successes. 38 4 A
product that has a fifty percent chance of producing a billion-dollar
profit and a fifty percent chance of being worthless will not quite be
worth five hundred million dollars, because the impossibility of
creating a perfectly diversified portfolio makes even companies and
shareholders somewhat risk averse.38 5 For holders of a relatively
diversified portfolio, however, the costs of risk are quite small. And so,
companies invest in research and development despite uncertainty
about ultimate commercialization prospects, not to mention
uncertainty about the results of research and development.
381. The Federal Circuit itself has recognized the futility of creating a wholly objective test,
holding that objective evidence of nonobviousness is not necessarily required for patentability.
See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
382. Economic analyses of settlement predict that cases will settle unless parties are
mutually optimistic about outcomes. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of
Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 2169, 2224-26 (1993); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135 (1993). See generally John P. Gould, The
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 281-86 (1973) (providing an economic model
of litigation and settlement).
383. For a comprehensive study demonstrating that district courts err in a large number of
patent cases, see Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001).
384. See, e.g., Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern
Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 87, 108 (1990) ("[Under portfolio theory the well-diversified
portfolio may have a low level of risk despite the presence of individually volatile components.").
See generally Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (providing a seminal
approach to portfolio theory).
385. Companies may be more risk averse than their shareholders because of agency
problems. See, e.g., SCHERER & Ross, supra note 43, at 46 (discussing the phenomenon of
'empire building" by managers).
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Even gross uncertainty in a prize system is thus unlikely to
have a substantial effect on innovation. Lichtman recognizes, "It does
not matter if one innovator is overcompensated and another is under-
compensated, as long as the average payment is approximately
correct." 3 6 The possibility that what would have been a company's
billion-dollar drug may end up producing zero or two billion will have
little effect on the company's incentive to produce the drug. A decision
by the prize agency might come more quickly and suddenly than a
decision in the marketplace, thus producing potentially significant
stock volatility, 38 7 but the prospect that a drug might turn out to be a
failure sooner rather than later is not troublesome. Reduced
uncertainty may have some benefits; we would not, after all, be
indifferent to companies' gambling millions on roulette, even with fair
odds. These benefits, though, are modest-an insufficient basis to
make a strong policy case for constraint over discretion. If there is
thus some compensating benefit to a prize system-for example, if
prizes are awarded based on the social value of a patent rather than
on the lower private value-some will choose the patent system. In
any event, there is no basis for concern that all patent holders would
spurn an optional prize system. If the government promises to
distribute a certain amount of money to companies making sacrifices,
the individual incentives of each company will result in the total
sacrifices adding up to almost the amount being distributed, with the
differential representing the cost of risk. This outcome at least will be
the result in equilibrium, since if relatively few patent holders
participate, others will have a large incentive to join.
The greater concern with giving an agency wide flexibility in
distributing prizes is that the government might make errors. For
example, the agency might ignore market data about the importance
of patents yielded into the public domain, instead seeking to reward
companies that have helped the agency pursue its own agenda.
Perhaps the government would seek to reward the developer of a
technology that promises to reduce air pollution in automobiles even if
that technology has deficiencies that make it unattractive
commercially. 38 8 An agency might be inclined to give large awards to a
386. Lichtman, supra note 22, at 132. Lichtman also adds that "[e]rror in and of itself raises
distributional, but not efficiency, concerns." Id.
387. On the significance and sources of stock market volatility, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr.,
Market Volatility: Causes and Consequences, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (1989).
388. I use this as an example because of criticisms that federal attempts to reduce pollution
have focused excessively on command-and-control approaches despite their lack of success in
efficiently reducing pollution. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227, 1235-41 (1995).
2003] 217
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
company producing an innovation that has received favorable
attention in the popular press, even if the innovation suffers from
obvious deficiencies. Government has a poor record picking "winners"
in industrial policy,38 9 and if there is reason to suspect that an agency
systematically will pursue an agenda instead of rewarding innovation,
that suspicion will distort investment.
The answer to this objection, and the most critical point of this
Article, is that errors in prize decisions usually do not matter. The
decisions that matter from a social perspective are the investors'
decisions whether to invest and whether to opt for a prize instead of
full exploitation of a patent. Governmental errors in awarding prizes
will affect these decisions only if the errors are predictable in advance.
This conclusion is counterintuitive, because in most contexts the
prospect that the government might make bad decisions counts as a
mark against these programs. Usually the government spends money
to accomplish something in the future, but when the government
ultimately distributes money in a prize system, it rewards activity in
the past. Thus, while flawed governmental decisionmaking in
awarding prizes might increase risk slightly, it is otherwise of concern
only if the government's biases are predictable in advance. And if such
biases are predictable, a simple solution is to add a substantial delay
before the government makes its decision, with any government funds
committed to the project invested in the interim and thus allowed to
earn an ordinary rate of return. Such delay would ease the
government's decisionmaking task by allowing it to evaluate the
actual success of a product and would make it more difficult to predict
who the decisionmaker in a particular case would be and thus whether
that decisionmaker would have any known biases.
2. The Large Benefits of Flexibility
The possibility that inventors would be able to predict some
bias in a prize system is less worrisome than the certainty that a
constrained system would have built-in biases. We have seen that
each of the various patent proposals ignores data that ought to be
relevant to decisions about prizes. The Guell and Fischbaum proposal
ignores sales data after the initial market test,390 while the Shavell-
van Ypersele approach assumes that a patent will have no value as a
foundation for subsequent innovations. 391 The Kremer mechanism will
lead to overcompensation for complementary patents not identified by
389. See Hart, supra note 48, at 36.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
391. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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the government agency,392 while the Lichtman approach risks
providing coupons without substantially limiting deadweight loss. 393
In addition, none of the proposals would lead the government agency
to consider any social loss that release of a patent might cause
through rent dissipation in development of follow-on innovations. 394 A
flexible system, in contrast, will not be subject to structure-induced
biases and can take into account a large number of considerations,
including rent dissipation.
Moreover, because each of the proposals necessarily would
entail subjective decisionmaking, there is no guarantee that even a
constrained system will prevent agency bias. An agency might, for
example, estimate demand curves in such a way as to advance the
projects that it prefers, 395 or award large coupons as a means of
rewarding a company without consideration of whether the coupons
are provided to the correct individuals to lower deadweight loss. Thus,
constrained proposals inevitably prevent the government from making
appropriate adjustments, while failing to ensure that bias will not
contaminate administrative outcomes. Of course, an agency might use
its discretion in a constrained system to take into account some
legitimate factors not explicitly addressed in a constrained system,
such as rent dissipation. To the extent that this makes a constrained
system more like an unconstrained one, such discretion may make the
proposals closer. Nonetheless, incorporation of legitimate factors in a
prize system not designed to accommodate them would be messy at
best, while general bias for or against an applicant would be easy to
achieve simply by estimating individual variables in a biased way.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of a flexible system over a
constrained one is that it would allow different approaches to reducing
deadweight loss to be used in different circumstances. We have seen
that a variety of factors affect which approach to reducing deadweight
loss is best. Where government information is sufficiently good, a
coupon scheme might be preferable to a patent buyout.396 Where a
product market is unlikely to be competitive regardless of whether a
patent is released into the public domain, the best solution may be a
reduction in price by the patent holder. 397 Even if a patent buyout is
optimal, different methods of valuing the patent may be appropriate.
When there is a one-to-one relationship between a patent and a
392. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
394. See supra Part II.B.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 110- 11.
396. See supra text accompanying note 177.
397. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
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product, the Shavell-van Ypersele formula may prove useful.398 On
the other hand, when a substantial portion of the value of a patent
relates to its contribution of a foundation for follow-up innovations,
the Kremer market scheme may be more accurate, especially if the
patent is not complementary with others. 399 Similarly, we have seen
that sometimes it may be optimal to obtain a patent and then release
it to the public domain, while at other times it may be preferable to
provide prizes for companies skipping the patent process altogether.400
In theory, it might be possible to create a complex formula to
determine the optimal approach for each patent, but the number of
considerations is so staggering that it seems unlikely that an effective
formula could be developed in advance.
A system in which agency officials are unconstrained helps
accomplish this objective by allowing patent holders to choose
whatever means of reducing the effects of monopoly that they wish
and subsequently permitting agency officials to tailor awards based on
the benefit of the scheme chosen. 401 For example, if a company decided
to reduce the monopoly effects of its patent by giving coupons, the
agency nonetheless might conclude that no decrease in deadweight
loss resulted if the coupons simply allowed the monopolist to charge
more than it otherwise would have. As long as potential prize
applicants anticipate that the agency will base prizes on reduction in
deadweight loss accurately on average, applicants will have an
incentive to select the method that will achieve the greatest benefit at
lowest cost. The same logic goes for any other factor that the agency
ought to take into account. The agency, for example, might reduce
prizes when release of a patent into the public domain leads to
inefficient rent dissipation. Although it might be difficult to calculate
the extent of this inefficiency, 40 2 as long as the agency's adjustments
398. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
399. Bidders would have incentives to calculate the value of the patent, regardless of the
extent to which this value stems from direct sales of a product or licensing or exploitation of the
patent for follow-up inventions. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
400. See supra text accompanying note 347.
401. Such a system also might discourage patent holders from taking any actions to reduce
deadweight costs if those actions would increase other costs. For example, one commentator has
developed a model suggesting that broad patent protection for antibiotics may be beneficial,
because excessive use of antibiotics may lead to resistance, thus making them less valuable in
the future. See generally Ramanan Laxminarayan & Gardner M. Brown, Economics of
Antibiotics Resistance: A Theory of Optimal Use, J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. (forthcoming),
available at http://www.rff.org/CFDOCS/disc-papers/PDF-files/0036.pdf (last visited Dec. 16,
2002).
402. Such calculations would not be impossible. Cf. Grady & Alexander, supra note 198, at
313 (suggesting that criticisms that the patent system simply could not take into account
variables, like the difficulty of developing an invention, are overstated). One might consider
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are correct on average, patent holders will have optimal incentives in
choosing an approach, if any, to eliminating or reducing deadweight
loss.
Similarly, patent holders choosing to release their patents into
the public domain would have incentives to accede to procedures for
valuing the patents when doing so would be efficient. A holder of a
patent that would be relatively difficult to value by examining sales
could accede to Kremer's scheme. Even without government
involvement, a private group might perform a similar function,
auctioning patents using the same randomization procedure that
Kremer recommended. Presumably, there would be some cost
involved, but a patent holder might do so as a way of certifying results
to the government agency. Similarly, a patent holder might hire an
independent accounting firm to estimate the value of a patent being
placed in the public domain. These methods might increase the
confidence that an agency will have in its ultimate prize assessment
and thus reduce the amount by which the agency would decrease
prizes as a way of accounting for the adverse selection problem.40 3 Of
course, using these procedures entails costs, but these costs may be
worth undertaking in some cases if not in others.40 4
That a system in which agency officials are given flexibility is
superior to one adopting a single approach does not necessarily mean
that the agency should be given no guidance whatsoever. The statute
creating the agency usefully might catalogue some of the
considerations that should be taken into account in calculating prizes.
By explicitly indicating that an agency should take into account a
particular factor, Congress could avoid the danger that companies
might believe that the agency will ignore a factor even though that
factor seems important to economic efficiency. That danger also could
be lessened by requiring the agency to document its calculations and
to explain why it rejected any arguments for considering a factor
suggested by the applicant or an adversary. The virtue of requiring
such explanations is similar to that of requiring appellate judges to
different companies' investments in follow-up inventions and the profits from those inventions. If
the profits tend to amount only to a fair rate of return on capital, rent dissipation has probably
occurred. Such a conclusion would be bolstered by evidence of redundant research by competing
companies.
403. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 19, at 539-40 (optimizing the amount by which
prizes should be lower than the anticipated social surplus).
404. Sometimes, it might seem, a patent holder would have excessive incentives to provide
verification of patent value, because the benefit in terms of a greater prize accrues solely to the
patent holder. In theory, though, the agency might punish excessive spending on administrative
costs by reducing the prize. Once again, as long as the agency makes the appropriate reduction
on average, companies will have appropriate ex ante incentives.
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produce written opinions,405 providing the decisionmaker with a
reputational incentive to demonstrate consideration of all relevant
factors.
Of course, I may not have anticipated all potentially relevant
factors, and Congress might do no better. Ultimately, though, this is
an argument for flexibility, not an argument against it. Indeed, one
virtue of allowing flexibility is that it might stimulate further research
into when it is efficient to grant prizes and the optimal amount of
these prizes. If an agency simply applies a formula, academic
commentators might urge reforms and changes, but private parties
would have little incentive to do anything other than plug projections
into the government-mandated equation. With a flexible agency, prize
applicants will be incentivized to advertise any way in which the
efforts they make improve social welfare. Similarly, if an adversary
system is used to resolve prize claims, the adverse parties would have
an incentive to identify any inefficiencies that should offset prize
awards. These analyses might be useful beyond individual cases in
promoting understanding of the value of prizes.
To some, the notion of simply giving a government agency
money to spend, while not unheard of,40 6 is utopian and foolish. We
know, the argument goes, that the government simply will not do a
good job of spending it, and there is a good reason that we do not
generally give agencies large amounts of money to distribute based on
the whims of individual decisionmakers. Retrospective prizes, though,
are different from other government programs, because what matters
from a social perspective is not individual prize decisions themselves,
but predictions about those decisions. We cannot be satisfied if some
405. ' The publication of written opinions provides judges with an opportunity to criticize
colleagues, and allows members of the bar and academia to criticize sitting judges when the
authors of published opinions fail to abide by their own stated principles in future cases."
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 1309, 1349 (1995). Commentators interested in improving the quality of decisionmaking
have called for requiring written opinions in various contexts. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to
Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 800-02
(1995) (arguing for written, published opinions in the federal appellate courts); Christopher B.
Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law Arbitrators Should Be
Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 285, 312-25
(2000) (arguing that arbitrators should issue written opinions). For articles assessing the
importance of written opinions more broadly, see Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1474-75 (1995); James Boyd White, What's an Opinion for?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1363, 1363-69 (1995).
406. Agencies are often given considerable freedom when they are given lump-sum
appropriations. See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593, 612-13 (1988) (documenting the increasing prevalence of lump-
sum appropriations over the twentieth century).
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social security recipients receive twice what they should and some
deserving receive nothing.40 7  But with prizes, if the average
governmental decisionmaker will be expected to get it right, that is
good enough. 408 If someone contemplating releasing a patent into the
public domain anticipates that he might receive twice his estimate of
the social benefit half the time and nothing at all half the time, he still
might release the patent.
Prize systems may not be unique among legal institutions in
being able to achieve an aim well even if decisions are noisy. Tort
scholars have observed that the tort system could provide the
appropriate amount of deterrence even if individual decisions are
variable. 40 9 For example, economists have argued that if punitive
damages imposed on tortfeasors when they are caught compensate for
the chance that tortfeasors sometimes will not be caught, deterrence
will be optimized. 410 Of course, in tort law, many scholars argue that
407. Some level of incoherence and inconsistency in the operation of such a program,
however, may be inevitable. See JERRY L. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 49-78 (1983).
408. If looking only at the universe of settled civil cases, achieving justice on average may be
good enough too, since settlements reflect expected values of verdicts. This logic suggests that
settled cases may achieve a higher level of justice than litigated cases, in which there is a
possibility that the court might err significantly. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement: Allocating Attorney's Fees by Amending Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. REV. 65, 122 (1996) ("Settlement for the expected outcome may not
yield perfect justice, but neither will it yield perfect injustice.").
409. Louis Kaplow, for example, explains, "Accuracy in the assessment of damages is
relevant primarily because of how it affects the precision with which legal rules control
behavior." Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 307, 399 (1994). If there is simply a fifty percent chance of receiving zero damages
and a one hundred percent chance of receiving double damages, the expected damage, at least for
a risk-neutral party, is unaffected. Thus, inaccuracy matters only to the extent it affects ex ante
expectations and imposes risk costs on risk-averse parties. As Kaplow and Shavell explain:
[A]ccuracy in the assessment of harm cannot influence the behavior of injurers-and
is therefore of no social value-to the degree that they lack knowledge of the level of
harm they might cause when they make their decisions. Thus, if, when choosing his
precautions, an injurer knows only that the average level of harm that would be
caused in an accident is $500,000, there is no point in the court's measuring harm
accurately. As long as the injurer's expected liability is $500,000, his behavior will be
the same as if harm were measured precisely.
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191,
192 (1996). But see Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain
and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 925 (1989) ("[H]ighly variable, unpredictable valuations
undercut the deterrence function of tort law. Where liability costs are relatively predictable, they
can be avoided (where it is efficient to do so) or 'built in' to the costs of goods and services."). The
problem with this analysis is that potential tortfeasors will avoid uncertain liability at least as
much as certain liability, if uncertainty can equally result in greater or lower damages than
would be efficient.
410. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 887-88 (1998).
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economic efficiency should not be the only goal, 411  and that
consideration of factors other than optimal deterrence therefore might
lead to systematic overdeterrence or underdeterrence. Disagreement
over fundamental premises should be less of a danger in patent law. 41 2
In addition, while jury-based decisionmaking may make tort law
difficult to rationalize, 413 prize determinations presumably would be
made by government officials rather than juries.
411. Jules Coleman argues that economic analysis does not even produce the best positive
analysis of tort practice. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 261, 361-85 (providing a comprehensive
guide to his theory of corrective justice); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 30-31 (1995) (considering some meta-issues in articulating a theory of
corrective justice). Similarly, some scholars argue that even if economic efficiency is the only
goal, optimal deterrence may trade off with other efficiency concerns. See, e.g., Michael
Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 CAL. L. REV. 231, 271 (2001)
(noting a tension between optimizing deterrence of harm-causing acts and optimizing incentives
for firms to enter into industries, membership in which might lead to erroneous findings of
liability).
412. The vast majority of patent law scholarship is utilitarian and economic, in spirit, if not
in form. For explicitly noneconomic analyses of intellectual property law, see Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-83 (1993), which defends a natural rights approach for
patent, copyright, and trademark law; and Steven Cherensky, Comment, A Penny for Their
Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood,
81 CAL. L. REV. 597, 641-66 (1993), which argues that an employee's personhood should be a
primary consideration in law concerning preinvention assignments of property rights. A. Samuel
Oddi, meanwhile, has argued that natural rights concepts help explain the acceptance of a
universal standard of patent law even by countries that might not benefit from such a standard.
See Oddi, supra note 46, at 417-40. Part of the reason for the dominance of utilitarian arguments
is that scholars have generally believed that the Framers defended intellectual property using
such arguments, but a recent intellectual history suggests that natural rights arguments were
important as well. See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual
History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1313-15 (2001).
Even someone accepting a natural rights, rather than an economic approach, to patent law
would not necessarily object to a prize system on the ground that such a system would deprive
inventors of their natural rights. Professor Gordon's natural rights analysis, for example,
emphasizes that the claims of a creator of intellectual property do not necessarily trump those of
the public to use intellectual property. See Gordon, supra, at 1544-72. Specifically, she argues
"that creators should have property in their original works, only provided that such grant of
property does no harm to other persons' equal abilities to create or to draw upon the preexisting
cultural matrix and scientific heritage." Id. at 1563-64. Professor Gordon argues that this
requirement might be satisfied by an intellectual property regime in which the right was
protected only by a liability rule. Id. at 1572-76. If such a regime would not infringe on the
natural rights of a creator of intellectual property, then a like regime in which "damages" are
paid by society as a whole rather than by individual users of the property would not infringe on
the creator's rights-at least if we assume the legitimacy of the taxation needed to pay the
prizes. Indeed, under a natural rights approach, a prize system may be more appealing than the
existing patent system, because such a system would reduce interference with the public's access
to the common by increasing the number of works placed in the public domain.
413. One reason for this is that even where juries agree on moral desert, they exhibit high
variability in translating such judgments into dollar figures. See Cass R. Sunstein et al.,




The argument for flexibility suggests that, with appropriate
administrative design decisions to achieve agency independence and
reduce wasteful rent seeking, a virtually unrestricted agency might do
an effective job at distributing patent prizes. The case for flexibility,
however, also could be made in conjunction with other proposals, and
each of these proposals could benefit from insights that the other
proposals offer. In this section, I offer variants on the different
proposals assessed in Part I. I first explain in Part III.B.1 how a
judicial proceeding or a test market might be a more viable strategy
than it first appeared, especially with certain changes, such as one
designed to take advantage of the patent holder's information about
the relative attractiveness of different markets. Then, in Part III.B.2, I
explain that the formula devised by Shavell and van Ypersele might
serve as a starting point for determining a prize, with appropriate
downward or upward adjustments for other relevant considerations.
Then, in Part III.B.3, I make a similar point about Kremer's proposal,
and then describe an auction mechanism that is distinct from
Kremer's but would allow the government to obtain the benefit of
private information and use that as a starting point for calculating a
reward. Finally, in Part III.B.4, I explain how Lichtman's proposal for
a coupon scheme would be more attractive if the government ex post
seeks to determine whether the patent holder reduced prices by a
sufficient amount and whether the coupons were distributed
effectively.
1. Self-Assessment Test Market
The Guell and Fischbaum proposal was in fact two separate
proposals combined into one: the use of judicial condemnation
proceedings to determine compensation and the use of a market
appeal. The argument for flexibility interestingly makes each of these
proposals individually more attractive than it otherwise would be, at
least with modest revisions, though probably not in combination. Let
us first consider judicial condemnation proceedings. The most
apparent disadvantage of judicial proceedings is concern about judicial
competence. 414 My argument suggests that this concern is not so great;
even if judges, steeped in law rather than economics, made many
mistakes in valuing patents, they might make decisions
approximately correct on average, and thus such proceedings would
414. Indeed, Guell and Fischbaum explicitly acknowledge this concern. Guell & Fischbaum,
supra note 29, at 225.
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not distort innovation incentives. Moreover, there is a significant
virtue to using the judiciary to make such decisions. Judges, especially
federal judges, are independent, 4 5 and so parties seeking prizes would
be unlikely to engage in rent-seeking campaigns to influence the
decisionmakers. At the same time, patent holders would not be able to
predict in advance the identity of judicial decisionmakers given
random selection of judges, and they thus would not make decisions
based on the idiosyncratic preferences of particular individuals.
Nonetheless, despite judicial oversight, condemnation
proceedings are routinely criticized for providing too little
compensation to property owners, 416 and they thus raise the danger of
inadequate compensation, dampening innovation incentives. Merely
providing a limited agency budget would not solve this compensation
problem, as the agency would be able to condemn more patents for the
dollars given than might be socially optimal if they expect favorable
judicial decisions. Nonetheless, judicial proceedings conceivably could
be used to value patents voluntarily placed into the public domain by
patent holders. A statute could even provide that a set amount of
money, such as $1 billion, should be distributed in proportion to the
judicial valuations of voluntarily released patents. With these
modifications, the Guell and Fischbaum proposal, minus the right to a
test market appeal, is essentially my principal proposal, with the
alteration that the ultimate decisionmakers would be judges rather
than agency bureaucrats.
The test market proposal in isolation, however, also becomes
more attractive given my argument in favor of flexibility. Recall that
my primary criticism of the test market was that it might be difficult
to extrapolate from the firm's profits in the test market across both
space and time to determine what the value of a patent placed in the
public domain would have been if it had instead been exploited
415. Judicial independence is not assured in all governmental systems. See, e.g., Laifan Lin,
Judicial Independence in Japan: A Re-Investigation for China, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 197-
201 (1999). Whatever the virtues of judicial independence in other contexts, there is a strong
case for a country implementing a patent prize system to assure the independence of its
decisionmakers.
416. See William A. Fischel, The Offer/Ask Disparity and Just Compensation for Takings: A
Constitutional Choice Perspective, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 187, 193 (1995) (noting that the
Framers recognized that in practice "just compensation" might be low). One complaint is that
courts often seek to determine market value, without considering that value to owners may be
higher. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 53 (1985); James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1278-79 (1985); Note, Condemnations, Implicit Benefits, and




monopolistically. 417 The argument for flexibility, however, suggests
that this concern is not all that significant, at least if the government
does not try to respond to this perceived problem by crafting detailed
but inevitably imperfect rules detailing how the agency should
accomplish this extrapolation. If the agency does the best job in
extrapolating that it can, then as long as it does not make predictable,
systematic errors, any inaccuracies will be relatively harmless.
Meanwhile, the test market approach could be combined with the
approach of granting the agency a fixed amount of money and
adjusting the agency's estimations up or down to equal that amount of
money, in order to prevent systematic errors from distorting
decisionmaking.
Perhaps the greatest danger in this revised version of the test
market approach is an adverse selection problem 41 8 -that the
companies most likely to opt in would be those who find that the
techniques that the agency uses for conducting the extrapolation most
overstate the actual value of the patent. This problem might be
addressed by seeking, as Kremer's proposal does, to take advantage of
private information, although here the government might rely
straightforwardly on the patent holder's own private information
rather than that of third parties. A simple approach would be to
require the patent holder to indicate for each state or region how
much the patent holder expects to earn in that state or region, with
the percentages adding up to one hundred percent. Then, the agency
could select a particular region from that list, perhaps at random, and
calculate the total expected profits for all regions on the basis of that
percentage. So, if the test market were conducted in California, and
the company had specified that it expected twenty percent of profits
from that region, then the agency would calculate national sales by
multiplying by five. A risk-averse company would have an incentive
honestly to state how large its profits would be in each region.
A similar approach could be used to extrapolate across time. If
the company, for example, concludes that it would expect an equal
amount of profit in each year of the patent, the agency would then
choose when the patent would enter into the public domain. Thus, if a
company falsely claimed that the first years would represent only a
very small percentage of sales, the agency might choose to have the
patent enter into the public domain relatively late, and the company
would be undercompensated for the remaining years of the patent.
This solution, however, is not ideal, as it compounds the problem of
417. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
418. See supra Part I.C.
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delaying the entry of the patent into the public domain. An alternative
approach would be to require the company to estimate what
percentage of sales would occur in each year that the patent was in
the public domain, with the agency relying on these estimates to make
appropriate extrapolations. After the period that would have been the
patent period expired, the agency would determine whether its
prediction had been correct. The company, which would be required to
bond itself, would then be required to return an appropriate
percentage of the prize if it had inaccurately forecast high future
success. 419 The exact amount required to be returned, with
appropriate adjustments based on interest rates, might be difficult to
calculate, but the general case for flexibility suggests that
unpredictable errors in such calculations would not hurt investment
incentives.
2. A Revised Prize Formula
The argument for flexibility weakens Shavell and van
Ypersele's defense of the formula that they derive. Because that
formula does not take into account numerous relevant criteria, agency
decisions may be inaccurate in predictable ways, and those
inaccuracies will distort decisions on investment and on whether to
opt into the prize system. A relatively simple fix would be to allow the
agency to use the prize formula as a starting point, with the agency
making discretionary adjustments for other relevant considerations.
For example, the agency might reduce a prize if release of a patent
into the public domain would be expected to result in rent-dissipating
races for improvements on the patent. Similarly, the government
could calculate the function using the product that is most
significantly connected with the patent. It could then make upward
adjustments if the patent is used in other products as well, and it
could make downward adjustments to the extent that a particular
product's development was based on contributions other than the
patent. Indeed, Shavell and van Ypersele's observation that prizes
could be adjusted upward or downward based on sales itself provides
some support for this approach, 420 although their claim is presumably
that updated sales figures could simply be plugged into the relevant
formula. A more flexible approach is likely to be superior to
mechanical use of sales figures. After all, it is impossible to determine
from sales alone whether a million people bought a pill priced at
419. One virtue of this approach is that it would give the company a continued incentive to
market the product. See supra Part H.A. 1.
420. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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almost nothing because they thought it would save their lives or
because they thought that there was an outside shot that it might
provide a marginal nutritional benefit, a relevant piece of information
in determining what a patent would have been worth had it not been
placed in the public domain.
Even if the basic Shavell-van Ypersele approach of considering
possible demand curves is a useful foundation, however, the ultimate
formula that they derive for an optional prize system is likely
unnecessary and suboptimal. Recall that the formula that Shavell and
van Ypersele used produced relatively low prizes to accommodate the
adverse selection problem, with the authors reasoning that when the
calculation was too low, the inventor simply would decide not to opt
in. 421 The approach that I have recommended, in contrast, would
require inventors to make irrevocable decisions to opt into the prize
system in exchange for a prize, thus greatly mitigating the adverse
selection concern. Although a patent holder might suspect that the
government would overestimate the value of its patent, it could not
simply wait for the government to make its valuation decision to be
sure. The more flexible the agency is in deviating from the formula,
the less a patent holder will be able to guess accurately when the
government is likely to overestimate a patent's value. While flexibility
does not answer my critique that governmental officials might not be
well motivated, 422 the agency could distribute a fund in proportion to
its valuations, which I have explained eliminates concerns about
systematically biased valuations. With these modifications, the
Shavell and van Ypersele approach is once again close to the proposal
that I have made, with the analysis of demand curves an essential but
not dispositive element in decisions about the size of prize grants.
3. Alternative Auctions
At times, Kremer's article seems to concede that his auction
proposal will work most effectively only if the government has
flexibility. To combat problems such as collusion, Kremer imagines an
agency seeking out suspicious activity and developing ceiling prices
that would cap the maximum amount that the government could pay
for a patent.423 There is an irony, however, to such concessions;
Kremer's price cap would depend on "an administrative estimate of
the social value of the drug per dose or per patient,"424 an estimate
421. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
424. Kremer, supra note 21, at 1160.
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that, if reliable, would obviate the need for his auction proposal. At
other times, Kremer seems resistant to flexibility. He suggests that
the government use a markup to pay patent holders more than the
private value of their inventions, 425 but he does not consider the
possibility that a different markup would be appropriate in different
cases, depending on the proportion of social value that a particular
patent holder could capture through private exploitation of the patent.
He advocates that the amount the government pays should be a
"multiple of the third highest bid,"426 even though there is no reason to
believe that the third highest bid is the best one to use in all cases,
regardless of the competitiveness of the auction. In seeking to develop
an algorithm for calculating patent prizes, Kremer adopts a one-size-
fits-all approach.
As with the other proposals that I have discussed, flexibility
could help. An auction mechanism of the type that Kremer advocates
could be used to provide a baseline for approximating the value of a
patent. Rather than have the government simply make an offer to the
patent holder to execute the randomization function, an aspect of
Kremer's proposal that exacerbates the adverse selection problem, a
patent holder could be required to opt irrevocably for the prize
mechanism. After the auction, a government agency could then
consider specific aspects of the patent and auction to determine a
value in a particular case. The more competitive the auction, greater
is the case against overriding the price produced by the auction
mechanism. Any evidence of collusion would cause the agency to place
less weight on the result of the auction itself, and even in the absence
of explicit evidence of collusion, the government might disregard the
auction total if the bids seemed implausibly high. Other
considerations, such as the possibility of loss from excessive
improvements on the invention, also could affect the total amount
paid. Because the auctions would serve as an anchor for the agency's
decisionmaking, this approach would allow the government to harness
third-party information without putting the government in the
straightjacket of a flawed and exploitable auction mechanism.
Of course, flexibility might increase the uncertainty that
auction participants would face, but less so than a proposal not based
on auctions at all. Moreover, because the government would focus
primarily on whether to deviate from the auction result, there may be
less danger of governmental errors, and even if the government does
make errors, once again only systematic errors are of any
425. Id. at 1142.
426. Id. at 1148.
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consequence. Systematic errors, of course, might still be a concern.
While the existence of any markup, even one calculated on a case-by-
case basis, makes it unlikely that prize decisionmakers systematically
would shortchange applicants, there might be a danger of
systematically inflated valuations. A relatively simple solution to this
problem would be to require that the government's total deviations
from values suggested by a simple formula add up to zero, so that if
the government decided to deviate from the result of the auction with
a standard markup for one applicant, it would need to deviate
downward for another. Of course, the adjusted auction proposal also is
compatible with the approach of distributing a set amount of money in
proportion to the government's calculation of social value. With this
approach, the ultimate amount received by an applicant would depend
on the result of the auction, the agency's discretionary adjustment
from the auction-determined price, and then an automatic adjustment
so that each applicant receives a proportional share of the fund.
The recognition that flexibility imposes few costs might allow
for other improvements in the auction mechanism as well. The reason
that collusion might lead bidders to overbid is that they will have to
pay for their overbidding only one-tenth of the time, but if bidders
were required to pay ten times the excess amount this one-tenth the
time, there would be no room for collusion. One way to accomplish this
task would be for the government, in the one-tenth of cases that are
randomized to a private party, to estimate the company's profits from
ownership of the patent after a number of years had elapsed since the
initial randomization. If the profits turned out to be positive, the
government would provide the company with nine times these profits;
if they turned out to be negative, the company would be required to
pay the government nine times its loss. A full assessment of this
proposal is beyond the scope of this Article; relevant considerations
would include risk aversion and the increased amount of risk placed
on bidders. But the immediate point is that the difficulty of calculating
actual profits in advance ought not to be an obstacle. Measuring
actual profits should in any event be easier than calculating what
profits would have been if a patent were not placed in the public
domain, but the argument for flexibility shows that errors, as long as
they are not predictable and systematic, matter little.
In the end, the costs of this adjustment mechanism might well
exceed its benefits, and more broadly the costs of an auction might not
be worth any corresponding decrease in uncertainty relative to an
agency that estimates social benefit without an auction. Kremer's
particular auction proposal in any event is not uniquely capable of
allowing the government to benefit from third-party information about
2003]
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the value of patents. An alternative that might be useful here could be
adopted from a proposal offered by Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer.
427
Ayres and Klemperer describe what they call a "duopoly auction," in
which a patent holder auctions a license to use the patented invention.
In their article, the duopoly auction serves as one possible way that
the government could effect a welfare-increasing tradeoff in which a
patent holder receives a longer patent term and a weaker patent.
428
The duopoly price would be lower than the monopoly price, thus
reducing the deadweight loss associated with patent protection.
The Ayres-Klemperer proposal depends on the welfare benefits
associated with the decreased price during the original patent term
exceeding the welfare costs of the increased price after the original
patent term expires.429 Whether or not this tradeoff is a sensible one,
the proposal is easy to transform into a prize system, by having the
government pay the patent holder with cash instead of with a longer
patent term. That is, the patent holder would receive not only the
revenues from the duopoly auction, but also an additional amount
from the government. That amount could be based on the auction
revenues themselves, because greater auction revenues indicate a
more valuable patent, and thus presumably a greater increase in
deadweight loss attributable to competition. 430 Of course, the proposal
for a duopoly auction could be replaced with one for an oligopoly
auction, with two or more competitors receiving licenses. The more
licenses that are auctioned, the greater the reduction in both the
deadweight loss and the incentive to innovate, but up to a point the
427. Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 183, at 1031-32.
428. Ayres and Klemperer explain:
Limited amounts of infringement combined with increased patent duration, however,
can substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supra-competitive pricing
without reducing the patentee's ex ante incentives to innovate. Indeed, this Article
derives a legal regime that preserves the incentive to innovate by giving the patentee
the same expected profits, but that substantially increases efficiency in comparison
with an "idealized" patent regime ....
Id. at 986-87.
429. Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman argue in favor of a different proposal,
allowing patent holders to exploit their market position through trademarks, reasoning that any
increased price paid by some consumers is not efficiency-reducing, as long as other consumers
can purchase the product at competitive rates. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman,
Toward an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002).
430. An important caveat is that the reduction of deadweight loss is not solely a function of
the auction revenues, as the firms' equilibrium output decisions will depend on issues like the
shape of the firms' cost curves. Of course, this point provides a justification for flexibility once
again, with the administrative agency making assessments of decreased deadweight loss
primarily on the basis of auction results, but then making suitable adjustments to those results
based on the particular characteristics of the firms.
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government can compensate for the latter with greater dollar
payments.
The principal advantage of this proposal is that it eliminates
much of the gamesmanship that Kremer's proposal risks. There
remains a danger of bribery, as firm A might be willing to give firm B
extra money with which to supplement its bid, recognizing that if B
wins, A will receive this money back, plus receive more money from
the government. The impact of bribery, however, is reduced, because
any excess money bid must be paid all of the time rather than just
some fraction of the time. Moreover, because all auctions are
consummated, the risk of implicit collusion, which is likely to be more
difficult to detect than explicit collusion, is greatly reduced. 43' Finally,
the government could largely eliminate both problems in an auction
with multiple winning competitors by keeping individual bids secret.
A patent holder could try to bribe more than one of the bidders, but
each bidder would have an incentive to renege, since the patent holder
would not be able to determine which bidder had done so. 432 This
approach is not possible with Kremer's proposal, because his auctions
would have only one winner.
The principal disadvantage of this proposal relative to
Kremer's is that it cannot achieve a competitive result. If having one
hundred competitors would bring the price of the product down to
marginal cost, then no one would be willing to pay anything for the
right to be one of those competitors, so the proposal can only work
where the number of competitors will still leave the price above the
competitive level. This disadvantage, however, is not serious if the
government is willing to spend only a limited amount of money on a
patent prize system. Indeed, the proposal may be a useful way of
encouraging a modest reduction in price across a relatively large
431. For the same reason, the problems related to complementary products are eliminated.
See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. No one would bid on the right to license a drug
that is useless except as part of a three-drug cocktail, if the patent holder retained patents over
the other two drugs, because the patent holder would have an incentive to sell the auctioned
drug at a competitive price and obtain monopoly profits from the patent still under patent
protection.
432. A patent holder might try to overcome this obstacle by demanding that a patent holder
show it a cancelled check representing its payment. The government, however, could overcome
this strategy by allowing bidders to send in excess payment and then requesting a refund that
others would not be informed about. Interestingly, this is precisely the approach that Ayres,
writing with Jeremy Bulow, takes in an analogous context, explaining how the government could
keep campaign donations anonymous. See Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth:
Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837,
859-60 (1998) (suggesting a system that would allow nondonors to mimic donors). Another way of
making bribery more difficult would be to have all winners pay the bid of the winner with the
lowest bid, as on many auction sites, or to have all winners pay the bid of the loser with the
highest bid, as in a second-price sealed bid auction. See supra note 125.
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number of products, instead of a large reduction in price across a
small number of products. Total social welfare increases might be
larger with this approach, because the last increment in monopoly
pricing does the most harm.433 If the government were to offer $1
billion, to be distributed in proportion to auction revenues to
companies opting into the duopoly auction, then a large number of
firms likely would make sacrifices in reduced monopoly profits of close
to this amount to receive portions of the fund in return, but the
corresponding increase in social welfare should be considerably
greater than the fund. Only if the government is determined to
eliminate deadweight loss completely in a particular market
altogether does the duopoly or oligopoly auction cease to be a viable
approach.
4. Prizes for Coupons
Lichtman's proposal for the donation of coupons to relatively
low-income consumers might benefit the most from increased
flexibility. A principal aim of providing government-supplied coupons
was to induce the patent holder to lower prices, and a government
agency with poor information about individuals' willingness to pay for
a patented product might fail to induce the appropriate price shift.
The government in Lichtman's proposal thus makes a decision in
anticipation of an appropriate response from a patent holder, but then
does not penalize the patent holder if it fails to make the expected
response. This problem vanishes if the patent holder provides the
coupons itself to low-income individuals and then lowers the price of
its product, expecting the government ex post to reward it for the
resulting decrease in deadweight loss. This outcome is possible in a
flexible prize system, in which the government estimates the
deadweight loss reduced instead of issuing the coupons itself.434 One
virtue of this approach is that it helps answer a criticism Kremer
levied against Lichtman, that if the government could price
discriminate, the patent holder presumably could as well. 435
Sometimes price discrimination might be expensive to achieve-for
433. See, e.g., Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 183, at 989 ("[T]he last increment by which an
unconstrained patentee chooses to increase price hurts society much more than it helps the
patentee.").
434. The government also might assist in distributing coupons if the government wishes to
allow the patent holder to take advantage of its information without raising privacy concerns.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text. For example, the government might agree to
distribute coupons to all individuals whose tax returns indicate income below a certain
threshold, without informing the company of the names of these consumers.
435. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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example, if income or medical condition needs to be verified-and
because the patent holder is no worse or better off in the hypothetical
coupon system administered by a government with perfect
information, the patent holder has no incentive to incur these costs.
But if the patent holder receives not only the same revenue from
consumers as before, but also a prize from the government for the
decrease in deadweight loss, it will be willing to invest in price
discrimination as long as it is cost justified.
Measuring the decrease in deadweight loss may be difficult,
especially because the government may not be able to determine what
the monopoly price would have been. This Article's argument for
flexibility suggests that any errors in calculating deadweight loss may
not be serious, but the government also might use a coupon system to
estimate the reduction in deadweight loss quite closely. Suppose the
face of each coupon did not reveal its value. The patent holder then
might ask potential users of the drug to send their coupons with
checks for the maximum amount that they are willing to pay for the
drug. If the sum of a check and the coupon face value were at least the
price of the drug, the company would send the drug (or a full coupon to
receive it in a pharmacy) plus a refund for the price difference;
otherwise, the company would simply send back the check. This would
allow precise calculations of consumer surplus of those receiving the
drug and of deadweight loss from those whose combined check and
coupon offer was too low. Perhaps this system is too strange to be
implemented; consumers surely would be puzzled by it. The
hypothetical solution, however, shows that information revelation
mechanisms may help the government calculate patent prizes and
that there may well be less alien information revelation mechanisms
that similarly could help the government estimate reductions in
deadweight loss. Some combination of such mechanisms and
allowance for governmental agency flexibility might provide the best
approach to perfecting patent prizes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Proponents of patent prizes have sought to avoid the
deadweight losses associated with intellectual property protection by
recommending that a centralized governmental spending program
replace a market-based incentive. In seeking formulaic or algorithmic
approaches to patent prizes, these scholars implicitly have recognized
public choice concerns about the government's ability to make wise
spending decisions. In this Article, my concern has been less with the
benefits that a governmental spending program has over the market
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than with the benefits that a retrospective prize system has over a
typical governmental spending program. Concerns that government
will misspend money, either through individual decisionmakers'
incompetence or as a result of influence, are understandable. Public
choice and administrative law scholars have long focused on how to
overcome these problems, considering antidotes such as separation of
powers and judicial review. But they have ignored the virtues of
flexible, retrospective decisionmaking. With a carefully designed prize
system, even if an individual decisionmaker makes an error or is
influenced by political considerations in calculating a prize, these
flaws will not affect the decisions that matter-those made in
anticipation of the eventual governmental awards.
